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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 920633-CA 
v. : 
RONALD ALAN HARRY, : Category #2 
Defendant/Appellant,: 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE 
The State of Utah appears through counsel Jan Graham, Attorney 
General, and David N. Sonnenreich, Assistant Attorney General, and 
submits the following Brief of Appellee: 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Appellee agrees with the Appellant's statement of 
jurisdiction* 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND THE STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
ISSUE 1: Did the trial court abuse its broad discretion when 
it allowed expert testimony in a securities fraud case as to the 
materiality of certain misrepresentations and omissions? 
STANDARD: "Whether a piece of evidence is admissible is 
a question of law, and [appellate courts] always review questions 
of law under a correctness standard," but when the rule of evidence 
"vests a measure of discretion in the trial court," the appellate 
court reverses only If it concludes that the trial court exercised 
its discretion unreasonably. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 481-
82 n.3 (Utah 1991), With respect to expert testimony, the trial 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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court's determination will not be reversed on appeal "in the 
absence of a clear showing of abuse." Lamb v. Banqart, 525 P.2d 
602, 607-608 (Utah 1974) (as cited in State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 
487, 492 (Utah App. 1992). 
ISSUE 2: Was the defendant entitled to a jury instruction 
that specific intent to defraud is an element of securities fraud 
under Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-1-1(2) & (3) and 61-1-21? 
STANDARD: This is an issue of statutory construction, and is 
reviewed for correctness. Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 
P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989). 
ISSUE 3: Was the defendant entitled to a jury instruction 
that his alleged subjective good faith constituted a complete 
defense to a prosecution for securities fraud under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 61-1-1(2) & (3) and 61-1-21? 
STANDARD: This is an issue of statutory construction, and is 
reviewed for correctness. Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 
P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989). 
ISSUE 4: Was the trial court's determination that the 
defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel at 
trial clearly erroneous, and if so, is the defendant therefore 
entitled to a new trial? 
STANDARD: This exact issue was recently reviewed in State v. 
Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990): 
"The Strickland Court held that ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims present a mixed question of 
fact and law. Therefore, in a situation where a trial 
court has previously heard a motion based on ineffective 
assistance of counsel, reviewing courts are free to make 
an independent determination of a trial court's 
- 2 -
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conclusions. The factual findings of the trial court, 
however, shall not be set aside on appeal unless clearly 
erroneous." 
805 P.2d at 186 (footnoted omitted). 
ISSUE 5: Did the facts proven at trial with regard to Count 
4 constitute a public offense? 
STANDARD: This is a mixed question of fact and law because 
the defendant, in his brief, argues for a particular statutory 
construction, and then asserts that the facts at trial did not meet 
the elements of that construction. The question of statutory 
construction is reviewed for correctness. Grayson Roper Ltd. v. 
Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989). The question of factual 
sufficiency requires that 
. . . we defer to the jury and evaluate the evidence in 
a light favorable to the verdict. We accept the 
evidentiary inferences that tend to support the verdict 
rather than the contrary inferences that support the 
appellants' version of the facts, even if we might have 
judged those inferences differently had we been deciding 
the matter in the first instance, and not as an appellate 
court. When the testimony of witnesses is in conflict, 
we accept that testimony which supports the jury's 
verdict, unless it is inherently implausible, and ignore 
the evidence which does not support the verdict, even if 
we might think it more convincing. For the appellants to 
overturn the jury verdict, therefore, they must set out 
in their briefs, with record references, all the evidence 
that supports the verdict, including all valid inferences 
to that effect, and demonstrate that reasonable people 
would not conclude that the evidence supports the 
verdict. 
Hodges v. Gibson Products Co., 811 P.2d 151, 156 (Utah 1991). 
ISSUE 6: Did the facts proven at trial with regard to Counts 
2 and 3 constitute a public offense? 
STANDARD: The standards for this issue are the same as Lue 
standards for Issue 5. 
- 3 -
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (1989): 
It is unlawful for any person, in connection with 
the offer, sale, or purchase of any security, directly or 
indirectly to: 
(1) employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud; 
(2) make any untrue statement of a material fact or omit 
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which 
they are made, not misleading; or 
(3) engage in any act, practice, or course of business 
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any 
person. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case is an appeal from a Third District Court jury 
verdict finding Ronald Alan Harry ("Harry"), the Defendant and 
Appellant, guilty of four counts of securities fraud in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (1989). In summary, the State charged, 
and the jury found, that Harry had committed securities fraud with 
respect to sales of a real estate limited partnership that he made 
to three of his clients between May 6, 1988 and May 10, 1988, * and 
that he further defrauded his brokerage house by selling those 
securities without the brokerage house's permission in an attempt 
to avoid sharing the commission. After the trial, Harry vigorously 
challenged the verdict on the grounds set forth in this appeal, and 
lost. Judgment and conviction was entered by the Honorable Richard 
H. Moffat on September 25, 1992. The facts of the case, which 
follow, are set forth in the light most favorable to the verdict, 
as this Court is bound to "accept the evidentiary inferences that 
xSorry, but these exact dates are important, as will be seen. 
- 4 -
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tend to support the verdict rather than contrary inferences that 
support the appellants' version of the facts, even if [this Court] 
might have judged those inferences differently had [it] been 
deciding the matter in the first instance, and not as an appellate 
court." Hodges v. Gibson Products Co., 811 P.2d 151, 156 (Utah 
1991). 
A. HARRY'S BACKGROUND 
1. Harry had been a registered securities representative 
("stockbroker"2) since 1975. R. at 1124. He worked at E.F. Hutton 
for eight years and at Prudential Bache for four years before he 
joined Private Ledger on January 11, 1988. R. at 716, 1125-1128. 
He took and passed numerous securities examinations, including the 
basic Series 7 examination, the Series 63 all states examination, 
and the Series 24 supervisor's examination. R. at 877, 1027 (for 
an explanation of the exams, see R. at 701-702). He took the 
supervisor's examination on April 18, 1988. R. at 904. In short, 
by April of 1988 Harry was a very experienced, well trained 
stockbroker, who knew what his clients and his brokerage house 
expected of him, and what the law demanded of him. 
2Although both sides' briefs refer to Harry as a "stockbroker" 
as a matter of convenience, the term is not technically accurate. 
Harry was a registered representative of Private Ledger, which is 
a licensed broker-dealer. Registered representatives are agents, 
as that term is defined in Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-13(2) (Supp. 
1992). Notably, "[t]he license of an agent is not effective during 
any period when he is not associated with a particular broker-
dealer licensed under this chapter or a particular issuer." Utah 
Code Ann. § 61-1-3(2)(a) (Supp, 1992). Thus Harry's legal right to 
act as an agent, and to cond r.t transactions such as the ones at 
issue in this case, was tota dependent upon the existence of a 
contractual relationship with Private Ledger or some other licensed 
broker-dealer. 
- 5 -
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B- SUMMARY OF THE RED RIVER DEAL 
2. In February of 1988 Harry and several other Private 
Ledger brokers had a meeting with Ross Farnsworth, who was a 
general partner of a newly formed real estate limited partnership 
named Red River Mountain Limited Partnership ("Red River"). R. at 
772, 774-775. Ross Farnsworth explained that Red River planed to 
purchase two plots of land for speculation in the Phoenix, Arizona 
area, and he gave the brokers a Pre-Offering Summary Memorandum 
(the "Pre-Offering Memorandum," admitted as Exhibit P-l).3 R. at 
775-780, 1093. According to Mr. Farnsworth, among other things, he 
specifically discussed the following aspects of the Red River deal: 
A. Farnsworth discussed the payment schedule shown on 
page 13 of the Pre-Offering Memorandum, which shows that an 
investor (limited partner) would make an initial investment of 
$5,100 per unit, but could be liable for up to 13 additional 
annual payments of differing amounts, for a total investment 
of $39,975 per unit. R. at 776-777; Exhibit P-l, at 13. He 
testified that his discussion with Harry of the possibility of 
future payments was "the thing that was most important," and 
he went on to say "so we talked about annual payments, you 
know, obviously being an important part of the project." R. 
at 777-
B. Ross Farnsworth discussed his own track record, and 
he showed Harry page 18 of the Pre-Offering Memorandum, which 
3A11 of the State's Exhibits at trial (P-l through P-21) are 
included as Addendum "A" to this brief. 
- 6 -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
shows that of 10 completed projects, five lasted for 12 months 
or more and required at least one additional annual payment. 
One project lasted for 27 months, and required at least two 
additional annual payments, R. at 776-778• Farnsworth was 
emphatic with respect to what he told Harry on this point: 
Q (Sonnenreich): Did you give any opinion as 
to the time frame that you used to sell these 
projects, specifically that you used to sell the 
project "Red River Mountain" to investors? 
A (Farnsworth): Yes, sir. We were. I was 
very clear that I sold all my limited partnerships 
hoping for three to five year goals. 
Q: Meaning? 
A: Meaning that — they should figure that at 
least they should be involved — the limited 
partners would be involved for three to five years. 
Q: Even though in fact your track record was 
better than that? 
A: Right. But we took into consideration 
because we were involved in a fairly strong market 
at that time; and we knew that that was more 
realistic. 
R. at 778-7 79. In short, Harry new that there was a very real 
possibility that investors in Red River would have to make at 
least some additional payment beyond the original purchase 
price of $5,100 per unit. 
C. Farnsworth also told Harry that he would receive a 
10 percent commission on Red River/ R. at 7 80. 
3. In March of 1988, Harry told Farnsworth, during a 
telephone conversation, that Red River was "a lot tougher" to sell 
AHarry did not retain any commission. Farnsworth sent him a 
check for a portion of the commission, which Harry returned because 
he "cannot accept the payment on a piecemeal basis." R. at 780-
782; Exhibits P-13, P-14. Farnsworth later sent Harry another 
check, but voided it because of concern over Harry's relationship 
with Private Ledger. R. at 782-787. 
- 7 -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
than regular brokerage deals because Red River required annual 
payments. R. at 780. 
4. Neither Ron Harry nor any member of Ron Harry's family 
ever personally purchased any units in Red River. R. at 793. 
C. THE SELLING AWAY ISSUE 
5. An important issue in the case was whether Harry was 
"selling away" from Private Ledger with respect to the Red River 
deal. The State's expert, Steven Nielsen,3 offered this definition 
of the term: 
"Selling away" refers to the acts of an agent of a 
broker-dealer selling a security that is not being 
offered by the broker-dealer. It is also referred to as 
a private securities transaction. The broker-dealer has 
no knowledge of that transaction. 
. . . 
The problem is that an agent or a broker-dealer must 
supervise all agents' activities as they transact 
securities. If an agent sells away or effects a private 
securities transaction, the broker-dealer is unable to 
supervise and therefore the investors lose the protection 
that the supervision provides. Normally a broker-dealer 
will conduct due diligence; that is, he will take the 
time to review the offering to make sure that it's 
something they want to sell, to make sure that the 
offering is legitimate. And then they will monitor the 
activities of their agents as those agents sell those 
securities that the broker-dealer has approved. 
R. at 894, 897-898. Selling away is a violation of the rules of 
the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), R. at 706-
707, and is considered by experts to be illegal. R. at 895. 
6. The Series 24 exam that Harry took on April 18, 1988, 
covered the concept of selling away. R. at 705. Private Ledger, 
5Mr. Nielsen is the assistant director of the Utah Division of 
Securities. He is an attorney and a certified public accountant. 
R. at 875. 
- 8 -
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in compliance with NASD rules, had an explicit policy against 
selling away. On December 5, 1987, Ron Harry signed a memorandum 
that states that selling away, without Private Ledger's prior 
written approval, is prohibited by NASD rules and Private Ledger 
policy. R. at 714, 716; Exhibit P-17. On April 18, 1988, Private 
Ledger mailed a copy of its procedures manual to Harry; he signed 
a receipt stating that he had received and read the manual on May 
3, 1988; Private Ledger received the receipt on May 10, 1988, and 
entered it in their records the following day. R. at 715-717; 
Exhibit P-18. The procedures manual contains numerous prohibitions 
against selling away. R. at 717-720; Exhibit P-19. Clearly, Ron 
Harry knew that he should not be selling away, and that he needed 
written permission to sell any non-Private Ledger sponsored 
investment. 
7. The undisputed evidence is that Harry was selling away 
from Private Ledger in the Red River deal. Even Harry does not say 
that he received written permission from Private Ledger; all he 
claims is that his Salt Lake City branch manager, Craig Cannon (who 
was a general partner in Red River, along with Farnsworth) told him 
that a person at Private Ledger had given oral permission. R. at 
1156. Harry's witness, Craig Cannon, acknowledged (on cross-
examination) that he never received any authorization from Private 
Ledger to sell Red River, that he never told Private Ledger about 
Red River, that he had never cleared the issue of Red River 
commissions with Private Ledger, and that he never told Harry that 
- 9 -
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he had received written permission to sell Private Ledger.6 R. at 
1090-1092. 
8. Harry took pains to conceal from Private Ledger the fact 
that he was selling away Red River. A compliance questionnaire for 
Ron Harry, submitted to Private Ledger on October 17, 1988, five 
months after the sales at issue in this case, shows the answer "no" 
to two questions asking if Harry had sold away investments, or 
received a commission on sold away investments.7 Further, Harry 
submitted weekly sales reports to Private Ledger, which were 
6Cannon did say that he lied to Harry and told Harry he had 
orally received permission from a person at Private Ledger (who was 
not actually authorized to give permission). R. at 1091; cf. R. at 
736-741, 1099. This court should infer that the jury decided 
Cannon was lying on that last point. Cannon was Harry's friend and 
business associate, and he had an incentive to lie for Harry. 
Cannon had recently pled guilty to two counts of felony securities 
fraud in connection with a related investment (another real estate 
limited partnership that was sold away from Private Ledger) • R. at 
1089. Unlike the points Cannon admitted on cross-examination, 
Cannon knew that there was no way for the State to categorically 
disprove this statement. 
Another defense witness, Val Butcher, testified very similarly 
to Cannon, stating that Cannon told him that Red River had been 
orally approved by Private Ledger. R. at 1112-1113. Butcher was 
another registered representative who sold for Private Ledger, and 
he was a long time friend of Harry's. R. at 1112. He suffers from 
the same credibility problems as Cannon with respect to the issue 
of oral approval. 
In any event, even if Cannon were believed, Harry knew that 
unless he received written authorization from Private Ledger, he 
was selling away. 
7Harry admitted that he filled out most of the form, but he 
claimed that someone else filled in the two critical "no" answers 
and signed his name to the form without his authorization. R. at 
1033-1040. It does seem odd that Harry would leave a form mostly 
filled out, except for the signature and the two critical 
questions, so that some nefarious third party could fill out the 
remainder of the form fraudulently. The jury reasonably could have 
believed either (a) that Harry filled out the whole form, or (b) 
that he asked someone else to fill out the two questions, and to 
sign the form, so that he could later deny having done so. 
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supposed to list all investments he sold that week, including 
private securities transactions that had been approved by Private 
Ledger. R. at 727-728. If Harry believed that Private Ledger had 
authorized Red River, then he would have reported his sales; as it 
was, he did not include Red River sales in his weekly reports. R. 
at 729. 
9. Donna Nauss, Private Ledger's compliance officer, 
testified about the harm caused by selling away. In summary: 
A. Private Ledger lost the potential of its share of 
commissions on Red River8; 
B. Private Ledger was exposed to the risk of a lawsuit 
by a disgruntled investor (R. at 724); and 
C. Private Ledger's reputation could be hurt if clients 
invest in a bad investment that they think Private Ledger had 
investigated and recommended (R. at 725). 
D. HOW HARRY SOLD RED RIVER TO THREE CLIENTS 
10. Three of Ron Harry's longstanding clients, in the spring 
of 1988, were Virl Thornton, Frank Brgoch, and Seymour Isaacs. R. 
8Actually, the way it would have worked if Red River had been 
a transaction approved by Private Ledger is that Private Ledger 
would have received the commission, and Harry would have received 
his share. Ms. Nauss stated, in response to a hypothetical 
question that matched the facts of the case, that for every $5,100 
Red River unit, Harry would have received approximately $390, and 
Private Ledger would have retained approximately $120. R. at 707-
709, 717-718, 742-743; Exhibit P-16, Schedule A(D). This means 
that Private Ledger lost the potential for some $1,800 ($120 X 15 
unitr) worth of commissions from Red River. Of course, once Red 
Rive ««7as sold away, Private Ledger no longer wanted any part of 
the commission because of potential liability concerns. R. at 743-
744. 
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at 633, 823A-824, 913-914 . Ron Harry sold units in Red River to 
each of those clients. 
11. Virl Thornton testified, inter alia, as follows: 
A. He had known Ron Harry and his family for a long 
period of time. R. at 632-633. 
B. He talked to Harry about Red River on April 29, 
1988, before he purchased three units. R. at 640-641. Exhibit 
P-2. The purchase was consummated when a certificate was 
issued on May 6, 1988. Exhibit P-10. 
C. Harry lied and said that both he and his father had 
invested in Red River. That lie was "primarily what sold" 
Thornton on Red River. R. at 641-642, 644, 656. 
E. Harry did not mention the possibility of future 
payments beyond the original $5,100 per unit. If Harry had 
mentioned the possibility of future payments on Red River, 
Thornton "would not have touched it with a ten-foot pole." R. 
at 648. 
P. Harry did not tell Thornton that he was selling Red 
River without involvement or authorization from Private 
Ledger. If Thornton had known that Private Ledger had never 
reviewed or approved Red River, he would not have bought it. 
R. at 644. 
12/ Frank Brgoch testified, inter alia, as follows: 
A. Frank Brgoch and Seymour Isaacs are retired airline 
pilots and old friends who knew each other since 1950. R. at 
823. 
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B. Brgoch had used Harry as his stockbroker since the 
mid-1970s. R. at 823A. It was important to Brgoch that Harry 
was affiliated with a reputable brokerage house such as 
Private Ledger. R. at 825. 
C. Prior to Red River, Brgoch had been involved in 
several limited partnerships that "didn't turn out too well." 
R. at 826. 
D. Brgoch gave Harry limited discretionary trading 
authority.9 From the time Brgoch received his retirement fund 
in 1985, through 1988, Brgoch and Harry had discussions about 
the limit of Harry's authority with respect to the retirement 
fund. Brgoch and Harry agreed to these limits: 
(1) Investments were to be bonds with practically 
no risk; 
(2) Investments were to be liquid, with no long 
term investments; 
(3) "And positively, no limited partnerships." 
R. at 826-830. 
E. Brgoch met regularly with Harry to discuss his 
investment accounts; sometimes Isaacs was also present. See, 
e.g., R. at 825, 827, 830, 834, 839, 867. 
9Discretionary trading authority means that the stockbroker 
can make trades on behalf of the client without first obtaining the 
client's approval as to the specific transaction. Discretionary 
trading authority can be unlimited (i.e. "do whatever you think is 
best for me"), or limited by specific restrictions (i.e. "don't 
invest more than $5,000 without my prior approv or, in this case 
"don't invest in limited partnerships that require future 
payments.") 
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F. In May of 1988, Harry bought six units of Red River 
on Brgoch's behalf, using Brgoch's retirement funds. R. at 
832-833, 840. Brgoch's funds were transferred to Red River on 
May 9, 1988. Exhibit P-7. 
G. Shortly thereafter,10 Brgoch stopped by Harry's 
office to check on his accounts. R. at 830. He had a 
conversation with Harry in which Harry said that he had 
invested some of Brgoch's money "in real estate" and that it 
was "looking good." Id. Because of the agreement limiting 
Harry's discretion, Brgoch understood this to be an investment 
in a real estate development bond, similar to other 
investments that Harry had made. R. at 830-832. Harry did 
not say anything to indicate that this was not a bond, or was 
a real estate limited partnership with future payments. R. at 
832. 
H. Brgoch confronted Harry after he received a June 30, 
1988, bank statement showing funds from a retirement IRA 
account had been used to purchase "Red River Mountain Limited 
Partnership": 
A (Brgoch): He told me that that was the 
money that he got into with his partnership. I 
said what partnership? He said, the one that I 
told you about the other day, that real estate that 
we put in Arizona. I said, you didn't tell me 
anything about being in a partnership. 
R. at 834; Exhibit P-7. 
ioT DBrgoch obtained a bank statement dated 6/30/88 "a couple of 
months" after he talked to Harry. Therefore, his conversation with 
Harry must have been shortly after the May 9th purchase date, or 
even perhaps before Red River had closed. R. at 832; Exhibit P-7. 
- 14 -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I. Brgoch stated that Red River "certainly does not" 
fit within the investment criterion that restricted Harry's 
discretion because Red River is a long term limited 
partnership. R. at 840. 
13. Seymour Isaacs testified, inter alia, as follows: 
A. Frank Brgoch and Seymour Isaacs are retired airline 
pilots and old friends who knew each other since 1950. R. at 
912. 
B. Isaacs had used Harry as his stockbroker since 1977 
or 1978. R. at 913. It was important to Isaacs that Harry 
was affiliated with a reputable brokerage house such as 
Private Ledger. R. at 914. 
C. Prior to Red River, Isaacs had been involved in 
several limited partnerships that Harry promoted, but "the few 
that we got into weren't being resolved as he recommended." 
R. at 916. Instead, those partnerships went on much longer 
than Harry said they would. R. at 916-918. As a result, and 
considering Isaacs' age, in 1987 and 1988 he told Harry "I 
wasn't interested in anything like that anymore. I might not 
live to enjoy the benefits of it." R. at 918. 
D. Isaacs gave Harry limited discretionary trading 
authority. In 1987 and 1988, Isaacs and Harry had discussions 
about the limit of Harry's authority with respect to Isaacs' 
investments. Isaacs and Harry agreed to these limits: 
fl) Investments were to be conservative, with 
practically no risk; 
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(2) Isaacs "didn't want any part of" any 
investments with multiple payments; and 
(3) Harry was not to invest in limited 
partnerships. 
R. at 918-920, 1019. 
E. Isaacs met regularly with Harry to discuss his 
investment accounts. See, e.g., R. at 867, 923, 926, 928, 
1012, 1019. 
F. In May of 1988, Harry bought six units of Red River 
on Isaac's behalf, using Isaac's retirement funds. R. at 914-
915, 922, 923, 929; Exhibit P-4. Isaac's funds were 
transferred to Red River on May 9, 1988. Exhibit P-4. 
G. Isaacs received a June 30, 1988 statement from a 
bank in Kansas, showing funds from a retirement IRA account 
had been used to purchase "Red River Mountain Limited 
Partnership". He confronted Harry about the transaction: 
A (Isaacs): Well, he said that I had invested 
in the Red River Mountain Land Promotion of some 
sort. 
Q (Sonnenreich): How did he describe it, as 
best you can remember, in that meeting? 
A: His description of it was that--his term 
was this was a one-time drop, single investment and 
that this land--the company who was handling this 
thing rarely had an investment go beyond two years, 
there would be no further moneys involved in it. 
R. at 923; Exhibit P-4. Clearly, at this meeting Harry did 
not identify the investment as a limited partnership with an 
obligation for multiple payments. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
The Brief of the Appellant asserts six arguments in favor of 
relief: 
I. the court erred in allowing Donna Nauss and Steve 
Nielsen to testify as to materiality; 
II. the court erred in failing to instruct the jury that 
a specific intent to defraud is an element of securities 
fraud; 
III. the court erred in failing to instruct the jury that 
the defendant's subjective good faith is a complete defense to 
a charge of securities fraud; 
IV. the defendant received ineffective assistance of 
counsel from his trial counsel; 
V. the facts proved with respect to Count 4 do not 
constitute securities fraud; and 
VI. the facts proved with respect to Counts 2 and 3 do 
not constitute securities fraud because the alleged 
misrepresentations and omissions are not in connection with 
the sale of securities. 
The State's short answer to these six points is: 
1. the very recent case of State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 
487 (Utah App. 1992), has resolved issues I and II explicitly 
in favor of the State, and by implication has resolved issue 
III in favor of the State; 
2. the alleged acts of ineffective assistance on the 
part of the defendant's trial counsel were rational tactical 
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decisions that were not clearly harmful to the defendant; and 
3. Counts II, III, and IV were properly pled, 
constitute securities fraud, and were proved with sufficiency 
at trial. 
ARGUMENT OF THE APPELLEE 
I. THE STATE WAS PROPERLY ALLOWED TO ELICIT EXPERT 
TESTIMONY ON THE ISSUE OF MATERIALITY. 
The exact issue raised in point I of the defendant's brief, 
whether an expert can testify as to materiality in a criminal 
securities fraud case, was recently resolved by this Court in State 
v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487 (Utah App. 1992).n This Court held that 
"[s]ince the State is required to prove all of the essential 
elements of a crime, and materiality is an element of the offense 
charged in this case, there was no abuse of discretion in allowing 
the expert testimony." 828 P.2d at 493. Thus, the testimony of 
nThe defendant's brief spends a great deal of time trying to 
convince this court that it wrongly decided the Larsen case, which 
is dispositive of the defendant's first three points on this 
appeal. Because the Larsen case is barely a year old, because it 
is directly on point, and because the law has not changed since it 
was issued, the State views Larsen as definitive and sees no reason 
to extensively rebrief the case in the body of this brief. 
Furthermore, Larsen itself is currently before the Utah Supreme 
Court on writ of certiorari. The issues addressed in Larsen will 
therefore be definitively decided by a higher court, regardless of 
the outcome of this case at this level of appeal. (Presumably, if 
the Utah Supreme Court still has Larsen under advisement, and if 
the outcome in this case rests solely on one of the issues decided 
in Larsen, the losing party will seek a writ of certiorari to 
obtain the possible benefit of a reversal based upon the outcome of 
the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Larsen. ) A copy of the 
State's brief before the Utah Supreme Court is attached hereto as 
Addendum B, and is incorporated herein by reference, in the event 
that the court wishes to review the reasoning underlying the 
State's position on the issues decided in Larsen. 
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both Steve Nielsen12 and Donna Nauss13 on the issue of materiality 
was proper. 
12Although expert testimony on materiality is admissible under 
Larsen, the Court may have some concern over Mr. Nielsen's express 
statement that "selling away" is illegal under Utah securities law. 
A close examination shows, however, that (contrary to the assertion 
in the defendant's brief, page 14) Mr. Nielsen did not thereby 
render an expert opinion that Mr. Harry was guilty. Indeed, Mr. 
Nielsen did not opine that Mr. Harry had actually "sold away," and 
Mr. Harry was not charged with a crime of "selling away" from 
Private Ledger. Instead, the issue was whether Mr. Harry's 
undisputed failure to tell Thornton, Isaacs, Brgoch, and Private 
Ledger that he was "selling away" constituted an omission of a 
material fact. 
Mr. Harry's trial counsel, Jim Barber, had previously 
repeatedly attempted to assert that "selling away" was merely a 
contractual issue between Mr. Harry and Private Ledger, see, e.g., 
R. at 752-755, and hence Mr. Harry's failure to disclose the fact 
was not a willful omission of a material fact. Mr. Nielsen's 
testimony was aimed at rebutting that assertion by showing that 
failing to disclose that you are "selling away" is material and 
that Mr. Harry would have a motive (the fact that the practice is 
illegal) for willfully concealing it from his clients. After 
expressing his opinion that "selling away" was illegal, Mr. Nielsen 
went on to explain the risks caused by the practice in some detail. 
R. at 897-898. 
Although Mr. Barber moved for a mistrial, asserting that Mr. 
Nielsen's opinion that selling away is illegal was effectively an 
opinion that Mr. Harry was guilty of a crime with which he had not 
been charged, Judge Moffat, who had observed the whole course of 
the trial, understood the context of the question, and stated that 
"I couldn't see in any way whatsoever at this point that the 
question inferred the point that [Mr. Barber had] just made." R. 
at 896-897. 
13Actually, Nauss' testimony was less expert testimony about 
materiality than it was a statement of what was material to Private 
Ledger. Since Private Ledger was a victim, its compliance officer 
could certainly testify as to what it expected of its stockbrokers 
and what types of omis ons were material to it. In this respect, 
Nauss' testimony is n ifferent than the testimony of Thornton, 
Isaacs, and Brgoch as to what they expected Harry to do, and what 
types of omissions were material to them. 
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II. SPECIFIC INTENT TO DEFRAUD IS NOT AN ELEMENT OF A 
SECURITIES FRAUD CASE. 
Another holding in the Larsen case was that "willfulness" and 
not "specific intent to defraud" is the required mental state in a 
criminal securities fraud prosecution under Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-1-
1 and 61-1-21 (1989). "The trial court, therefore, properly 
instructed the jury that the culpable mental state for the crime of 
securities fraud is 'willfulness,' rather than specific intent as 
proposed by Larsen." 828 P.2d at 495. This Court then went on to 
specifically approve a jury instruction on "willfulness" that is 
nearly identical to the one used in the case at bar.1A 
14The jury instruction approved in Larsen reads: 
You are instructed that a person engages in conduct 
intentionally or with intent or willfully, with respect 
to the nature of his conduct or to the result of his 
conduct, when it is his conscious desire to engage in the 
conduct or cause the result. 
828 P.2d at 495. 
By way of comparison, the first sentence of Jury Instruction 
# 12 in the case at bar reads: 
You are instructed that a person engages in conduct 
willfully, with respect to the nature of his conduct or 
to the result of his conduct, when it is his conscious 
objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the 
result. 
R. at 250. 
The only difference between the two instructions is that the 
one used in this case left out the phrase "intentionally or with 
intent or." That phrase adds nothing, as "intentionally" and "with 
intent" are synonyms for "willfully" under Utah law. See, Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-2-103(1) (1990). 
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III. THE COURT WAS CORRECT IN NOT GIVING AN INSTRUCTION 
THAT THE DEFENDANTS SUBJECTIVE GOOD FAITH IS A 
COMPLETE DEFENSE TO A SECURITIES FRAUD CASE. 
A. GOOD FAITH IS NOT A DEFENSE TO A SECURITIES FRAUD CASE. 
The Larsen case did not directly address the question of 
whether a defendant is entitled to a jury instruction to the effect 
that "good faith" is a complete defense to a securities fraud case. 
Even so, the Larsen case effectively resolves the issue in favor of 
the State by implication. See, Brief of Appellant at 29. 
The good faith defense is merely the flip side of the specific 
intent coin, as Mr. Harry concedes. Id. If the prosecution must 
prove that the defendant acted with a specific intent to defraud 
the victim, then the defendant can defend by claiming that he acted 
with subjective good faith, and not with an intent to defraud the 
victim. Hence the defendant would be entitled to a jury 
instruction to the effect that his good faith is a complete defense 
because such good faith would necessarily defeat an element of the 
State's case, namely the existence of a specific intent to defraud 
the victim. If, on the other hand, specific intent to defraud is 
not an element of the crime, then there is no basis for a "good 
faith defense" jury instruction. 
In Larsen the Court of Appeals ruled that the State does not 
have to show a specific intent to defraud the victim. All that the 
state must show is that the defendant acted willfully, that it was 
his conscious desire to engage in the conduct or, cause the result. 
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The good faith motivation of the defendant is irrelevant. 
The conduct at issue in this case is found in section 61-1-1, 
which makes it illegal for the defendant, "in connection with the 
offer, sale, or purchase of any security, directly or indirectly 
to: 
(1) employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud; 
(2) make any untrue statement of a material fact or omit 
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which 
they are made, not misleading; or 
(3) engage in any act, practice, or course of business 
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any 
person." 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (1989). It is possible to consciously 
engage in a misrepresentation, and to thereby violate subsection 
(2) of the statute, without intending that the recipient of the 
misrepresentation actually be "defrauded," at least in the sense of 
losing money. For example, a defendant could misrepresent facts to 
an investor in an effort to overcome the investor's unwillingness 
to invest in an opportunity that the defendant honestly thinks is 
in the investor's best interest, yet that defendant has clearly 
violated the statute on its face. Likewise, the language of 
subsection (3) expressly contemplates a case where the intent of 
the act, practice, or course of business may not be to defraud, but 
the effect is to "operate" as a fraud.15 Under subsection (3), if 
a defendant has the conscious desire to engage in an act, practice, 
or course of business, and if that action "operates or would 
15If subsection (3) were to be read as requiring a specific 
intent to defraud, it would become mere surplus verbiage, since the 
act, practice, or course of business would then by definition be 
limited to devices, schemes, and artifices to defraud, which are 
already prohibited by subsection (1). 
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operate as a fraud or deceit," then the defendant is guilty 
regardless of whether he had a specific intent to defraud. Thus, 
good faith is no defense to a subsection (2) or subsection (3) 
claim, and no good faith jury instruction need be given with 
respect to either subsection.16 
B. IF GOOD FAITH WERE A DEFENSE, THE DEFENDANT STILL WOULD NOT 
BE ENTITLED TO AN INSTRUCTION UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE. 
Harry's factual grounds for a good faith jury instruction are 
"that he had a good faith belief that there would be no future 
payments in the Red River Limited Partnership." Brief of Appellant 
at 32. Presumably, Harry therefore felt no need to emphasize the 
possibility of future payments to Thornton, Isaacs, or Brgoch. On 
the other hand, the defendant never asserted that he did not 
receive information about the possibility of future payments (such 
as that contained on page 13 of the Pre-Offering Summary), or even 
that he did not know that some of Farnsworth's projects went over 
one year (as shown by page 18 of the Pre-Offering Summary). 
That is not a good faith defense. Instead, it is at best an 
argument as to the materiality of the omission, a claim that if the 
investor had all of the information the defendant had, including 
16Actually, in light of Larsen, the State would submit that no 
good faith instruction need be given with respect to subsection (1) 
either, since specific intent to defraud is now clearly not an 
element under that section either. However, in this case Harry 
received an instruction on specific intent as it relates to the 
theory that he violated subsection (1) by engaging in a device, 
scheme, or artifice to defraud* R. at 264, Jury Instruction 26. 
Because specific intent is th flip side of good faith, this 
instruction is effectively t' equivalent of a good faith 
instruction. If the instruction was unnecessary under Larsen/ it 
could only have aided the defense, and hence was harmless error. 
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all of Ross Farnsworth's rosy projections, then the possibility of 
future payments would appear so remote as to be immaterial.17 Even 
if a good faith defense could still be raised after Larsen, jury 
instructions for such a defense would be inappropriate based upon 
the facts in this case* 
IV. THERE IS NO BASIS FOR A CLAIM OF INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN THIS CASE. 
Harry claims that the performance of his trial counsel, Jim 
Barber, was so defective that it denied the defendant the effective 
assistance of counsel. This claim is based on the following 
alleged errors: 
1. A failure to make an opening statement; 
2. A failure to introduce the Red River Mountain 
Limited Partnership Subscription Booklet (including a 
subscription agreement and suitability questionnaire); 
3. A failure to demonstrate the suitability of the Red 
River Mountain Limited Partnership for Virl Thornton, Seymour 
Isaacs, and Frank Brgoch; and 
4. A failure to prevent certain testimony by Donna 
Nauss. 
The basic test for ineffective assistance of counsel claims is 
the two part test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
17At worst, it is an arrogant assertion that the defendant was 
somehow entitled to substitute his judgment for that of his 
clients', even to the extent of deliberately hiding the truth from 
them. The law clearly prohibits an agent from saying "I know 
better than you, and I may therefore freely lie to you if I feel 
that doing so will protect you." 
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That test puts the burden on the defendant to show "that counsel's 
representations fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness," 466 U.S. at 687-688, and that "but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have 
been different." 466 U.S. at 694. That standard has been refined 
at length by the Utah appellate courts. This Court set forth a 
detailed set of criterion for evaluating an ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim in State v. Wight: 
In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, defendant must overcome the strong 
presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance and 
exercised reasonable professional judgment. Defendant 
must prove not only that counsel's representations fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness, but also 
that counsel's performance prejudiced defendant. This 
Court will not second-guess a trial attorney's legitimate 
use of judgment as to trial tactics or strategy. 
765 P.2d 12, 15 (Utah App. 1988). Clearly, there is a "wide range 
of professional and competent assistance," State v. Frame/ 723 P. 2d 
401, 405 (Utah 1986), and not even plain error constitutes 
ineffective assistance, unless there is "a reasonable likelihood 
that the verdict would have been different" but for the error. 
Jennings v. Stoker, 652 P.2d 912, 914 (Utah 1982). The burden of 
proof is on the defendant with respect to all elements of an 
ineffectiveness claim, and "[t]he proof must be demonstrable, not 
speculative." State v. Malmrose, 649 P. 2d 56, 58 (1982). With 
these principles in mind, the State shall address the specifics of 
the defendant's claim. 
A- THIS COURT SHOULD GIVE GREAT DEFERENCE TO THE TRIAL COURT'S 
FINDING THAT COUNSEL WAS COMPETENT. 
The standard for review on this issue was recently explained 
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in State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990): 
"The Strickland Court held that ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims present a mixed question of 
fact and law. Therefore, in a situation where a trial 
court has previously heard a motion based on ineffective 
assistance of counsel, reviewing courts are free to make 
an independent determination of a trial court's 
conclusions. The factual findings of the trial court, 
however, shall not be set aside on appeal unless clearly 
erroneous." 
805 P. 2d at 186 (footnotes omitted). In this case, there was a 
lengthy post-trial hearing on the defendant's motion for a new 
trial. Much of that hearing centered on the ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim. After taking a great deal of testimony, and 
reviewing numerous briefs, Judge Moffat made the following minute 
entry with respect to the ineffective assistance of counsel issue: 
Point four is a claim by the defendant that his 
trial counsel was ineffective in assisting him. This 
claim raises a great deal of concern on the part of the 
Court because it has become fashionable as a defense 
tactic to throw the original trial counsel in criminal 
cases to the wolves on the platter of ineffective 
assistance of Counsel giving little or no credence to the 
circumstances of the trial. The trial court supervised 
the proceedings in this case and is of the opinion that 
there was no ineffective assistance of counsel. The 
Court does not believe that trial counsel's performance 
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. The 
Court certainly does not feel that the failure to make an 
opening statement in any way reduces effectiveness of 
counsel. That is often done and in the facts before the 
court in this case is [sic] impossible to determine that 
failure to make an opening statement would have altered 
the outcome of the case in any way whatsoever. The 
question of introduction of the subscription booklet to 
the Red River Mountain Project appears to the Court to be 
much more a tactical decision than it does to be 
ineffective assistance of counsel. There is certainly no 
evidence here that would tend to show that introducing 
the booklet would have altered the outcome of this case. 
As a matter of fact there was no way of knowing what the 
testimony might have been by Mr. Thornton if the document 
had not been used but there is some substantial reason to 
believe that his testimony could have been damaging to 
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the defense. 
R. at 485-486. As more fully explained below, Judge Moffat's 
findings are anything but clearly erroneous. They should be upheld 
on appeal. 
B. A FAILURE TO MAKE AN OPENING STATEMENT IS NOT INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
After the State made its opening, but before the beginning of 
the State's evidence, Mr. Barber expressly reserved his right to 
give an opening statement until after the close of the State's 
case. R. at 627. The decision not to give an opening statement 
before the State put on its evidence was obviously a conscious 
tactical decision made by Mr. Barber, and therefore per se not 
ineffective assistance. That decision has not been challenged by 
Harry. 
When the prosecution had rested, Mr. Barber did not make an 
opening statement. Instead, he argued at length that certain 
counts should be dismissed,18 R. at 1039-1064, and then he 
proceeded to call his first witness. Harry challenges this 
omission of an opening statement, which the defendant's brief 
characterizes as forgetfulness on Mr. Barber's part. 
The decision not to give an opening statement before the 
defense put on its evidence was not an act of forgetfulness, but 
rather it was a tactical decision, if a subconscious one. Mr. 
Barber testified to this point at length during the April 10, 1992 
The motions were taken under advisement, and later denied. 
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portion of Harry's post-trial motion hearing.19 At the time that 
he chose to not give an opening statement prior to the State's 
case, he states that: 
I thought my general impression there was that if I 
felt at the end of the State's case that an opening 
statement was appropriate and helpful, I would give one. 
But I still had the right not to give one and therefore 
I had not made any electable determination one way or the 
other. 
Addendum C at 37. Barber's opinion of the situation when the State 
actually rested is shown by this exchange: 
Q (Sonnenreich) : Okay. First of all, what was your 
opinion with respect to the length of the trial at that 
time? 
A (Barber): It was dragging unmercifully. 
Q: And did you have an opinion as to the effect of 
that upon the jury? 
A: Yes. 
Q: What was your opinion? 
A: Though I did not have the sense that the jury 
was angry that it was dragging, I thought the jury might 
be prone to reward those who would get on with it. 
Q: Did you have an opinion at that time as to 
whether you had been able to communicate the theory of 
your case to the jury through cross examination? 
A: Yes. 
Q: What was your opinion at that time? 
A: I believed that the jury understood the issues. 
Addendum C at 42. Although Barber may have told Mr. Bugden the he 
•' forgot" to make an opening statement, Addendum C at 38, he 
explained at length that he did not mean "I had made a decision to 
19For some reason, only the transcript for the March 18, 199 2 
portion of that hearing was included in the Record, at 947-998 
(through an error, it was inserted into the middle of the trial 
transcript). The transcript for the April 10, 1992 portion is just 
as much a part of the Record under Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 
11. A copy of the missing transcript has been attached as Addendum 
"C." The quotes taken from this transcript are those that support 
the trial judge's finding of no ineffective assistance of counsel, 
in keeping with Templin. 
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make [an opening] statement and then forgot that I had made the 
decision to do it." Addendum C at 49. Instead, the decision to 
not make an opening statement was a subconscious one, based upon 
the situation of the trial at that time: 
. . . What I am saying is that I was satisfied to 
proceed without making the opening statement and whatever 
circumstances were then extinct [sic] that led me to be 
satisfied, appeared to have discouraged from the fact 
that I forgot to put the statement in, to spend any more 
time thinking about it or analyzing that prospect. I 
can't express it any more clearly than that. 
. . . 
In the sense that in light of all of those other 
circumstances that I have given you about eight times, I 
did not think about the process of not giving the 
statement. I am not going to say it is forgetting, 
though, because I think it implies more than I mean to 
say, and that is, that there was a reason to remember. 
You understand what I am saying? 
Addendum C at 51, 53. Subsequently, the following exchanges took 
place: 
Q (Bugden): And are you suggesting today, Mr. 
Barber, that just somehow subconsciously these other 
things you told Mr. Sonnenreich about, that is, that the 
trail was running on, that you thought that the jury were 
bored, that you thought you were losing the jury, you 
think that just subconsciously helped you make the 
decision? 
A (Barber): Of course. 
Q (Bugden): Oh, I see. 
A (Barber): That is how you make decisions in 
trial. 
. . . 
Q (Sonnenreich): Do you make many decisions just 
subconsciously as a matter of reflex? 
A (Barber): If you want to call that making a 
decision, yes. What you do is act on the basis of the 
circumstances as you then perceive them. 
Addendum C at 54, 56. It should be noted that Mr. Barber has tried 
more tr n one hundred cases. Addendum C at 55. Thus Barber made 
a subconscious decision, based upon years of trial experience and 
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his perception of the current status of this trial, that he would 
not make an opening statement. Given the situation as it existed 
when the State rested its case, namely that Barber had made his 
point through cross examination, was only going to call three 
witnesses in defense, and felt that the jury was restless, this was 
a perfectly valid exercise of professional discretion.20 
Even if the lack of an opening statement was mere oversight 
falling below a standard of professional reasonableness, the 
defendant has utterly failed to provide any demonstrable proof that 
giving an opening statement would have been likely to change the 
outcome of the trial, as Judge Moffat found. R. at 486. For 
example, Harry has failed to marshall the evidence and show why 
Barber's closing argument was inadequate to make up for any harm 
done by the lack of an opening statement. Likewise, Harry has 
failed to explain why this case was so complex that a jury could 
not understand Harry's defense from the evidence at trial.21 
Typically, a failure to make an opening statement has been 
20Even Harry's own expert witness on this point, Ed Brass, 
conceded that there were times when he might choose not to make an 
opening statement, and that other trial lawyers might choose to not 
make opening statements in other situations. Addendum * at 8. 
21
 Just calling this a complex securities case is not enough. 
There are some securities cases that involve convoluted financial 
transactions, boxes full of exhibits, and months of highly 
technical testimony. In this case, by contrast, Harry's defense 
can be summarized as follows: "Ross Farnsworth told me that Red 
River would close within a year, so I didn't think the possibility 
of future payments was relevant. Craig Cannon told me that Private 
Ledger had approved my sales of Red River, so I didn't worry about 
that. I never intentionally lied to anyone, and I didn't even care 
about the commission. I just thought this was a good investment 
for my clients." That defense is not difficult to understand. 
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held not to constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. See, 
e.g., United States v. Miller, 907 F.2d 994 (10th Cir. 1990); 
United States v. Mealy, 851 F.2d 890 (7th Cir. 1988); Gilliard v. 
Scroqqv, 847 F.2d 1141 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Lane, 834 
F.2d 645 (834 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1987); Fink v. Lockhart, 823 F.2d 
204 (8th Cir. 1987); and Messer v. Kemp, 760 F.2d 1080 (11th Cir. 
1985).22 
C. FAILURE TO INTRODUCE VIRL THORNTON'S SUBSCRIPTION BOOKLET IS 
NOT AN INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
Mr. Barber did not introduce the Virl Thornton's Subscription 
Booklet, which includes both the Subscription Agreement and the 
Suitability Questionnaire,23 while Virl Thornton was on the stand, 
but he did try (unsuccessfully) to introduce it when the defendant 
was on the stand. This smacks strongly of a tactical decision. 
The Subscription Booklet was introduced in the preliminary hearing 
in this case (as Preliminary Hearing Exhibit D-l), and Virl 
Thornton was questioned at length about it, both by counsel for the 
defendant24 and by counsel for the State. The result of that 
22There are a few cases that postdate Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668 (1984), where a failure to make an opening statement 
was held, in connection with an almost total lack of any effort to 
make an adequate defense, to constitute incompetence of counsel. 
See, e.g., Jemison v. Foltz, 672 F. Supp 1002 (E.D. Mich. 1987). 
23The complete Subscription Booklet was introduced at the 
preliminary hearing as Defense Exhibit 1. Cf. R. at 489-524 with 
R. at 454-463 & 467-477. 
24Mr. Harry was represented by Max Wheeler at the preliminary 
hearing. Mr. Wheeler terminated his representation of Mr. Harry 
prior to trial, Mr. Barber represented Harry at trial, and Mr. 
Bugden took up Harry's case after trial. The pre dnary hearing 
was transcribed over a year before the trial began, and Mr. Barber 
had access to a copy of that transcript. 
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questioning can be summarized as follows:25 
1. Harry called Virl Thornton to his office, and then 
presented the Subscription Booklet to Thornton approximately 
a week after Thornton gave Harry the check for his units in 
Red River Mountain; 
2. Thornton was given no opportunity to review the 
Subscription Booklet and did not remove the Subscription 
Booklet from Harry's office; 
3. Thornton merely signed and initialed those pages of 
the Subscription Booklet that were pointed out to him by 
Harry; and 
4. Thornton never saw, and Harry never pointed out, 
those pages of the Subscription Booklet that discussed the 
possibility of future payments. 
In short, if the exhibit had been introduced through Virl 
Thornton there is every reason to believe that it would have hurt 
the defense, as Judge Moffat found.26 R. at 486. Far from showing 
that Thornton had been aware of the possibility of future payments, 
the exhibit, combined with the testimony that it would have 
elicited from Thornton, would have tended to support the State's 
contention that the defendant was doing everything possible to hide 
25See, Preliminary Hearing Transcript, at: page 38, line 15 
through page 39, line 8; page 55, line 20 through page 56, line 12; 
page 58, line 17 through page 62, line 10. Those pages, along with 
a few transitional pages, are set forth in the Record at 527-540. 
A full copy of the Preliminary Hearing Transcript can be found in 
one of the envelopes marked "Exhibits," as part of the Record. 
26In fact, the State seriously considered introducing the 
document as a State's exhibit. R. at 492-497. 
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the liability for future payments. Certainly, there is no reason 
to believe that the admission of this exhibit through Thornton 
would have altered the outcome of the trial.27 (This is 
particularly true in light of Thornton's testimony that the most 
important inducement to his investing was Harry's misrepresentation 
that both he and his father had invested already, an assertion that 
is not at all affected by the Subscription Booklet.) 
One final point concerning the Subscription Booklet: If the 
failure to introduce the Subscription Booklet through Thornton was 
mere oversight, then the defendant is also personally responsible 
for that oversight. Ron Harry clearly knew about the Subscription 
Booklet, had heard the testimony concerning it at the preliminary 
hearing, and knew that it pertained to Virl Thornton. Ron Harry, 
a particularly intelligent defendant, was also actively engaged in 
his own defense. Indeed, he regularly passed notes to Mr. Barber 
throughout the trial, and Mr. Barber almost always checked with 
Harry before leaving a witness. He certainly could have pointed 
out the deficiency at the end of Mr. Barber's cross exam or while 
State's counsel was conducting redirect. The Utah Supreme Court 
has recognized that a knowledgeable defendant has some obligation 
to request obvious assistance. See, Duran v. Turner, 516 P. 2d 353, 
27The defense's only hope to make good use of the exhibit was 
to wait until Virl Thornton had left Utah, and then try to 
introduce the exhibit through the defendant himself, so that Mr. 
Thornton could not explain the circumstances surrounding his 
signature of sor of the pages. That is precisely the strategy 
that the defense tempted. Naturally, the State objected, and the 
court correctly refused to allow the exhibit to come in through the 
defendant after Mr. Thornton had been excused. 
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354, 30 Utah 2d 249 (1973) (defendant familiar with Utah procedure 
had obligation to ask counsel to file an appeal). 
D. THERE WAS NO INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WITH REGARD TO 
ESTABLISHING THE SUITABILITY OF THE INVESTMENT. 
The State has two responses to the defendant's claim that Mr. 
Barber took inadequate steps to establish the suitability of Virl 
Thornton, Seymour Isaacs, and Frank Brgoch. 
First, as a matter of law, suitability28 is not a defense to 
a securities fraud charge. If a defendant employs a scheme to 
defraud, makes misrepresentations or omission, or engages in a 
course of business which would operate as a fraud, it is no defense 
to argue that the investment is suitable for the defrauded victim. 
In particular, the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (1989) 
does not allow a defendant to say, in essence, "yes I 
misrepresented the facts, but the investment was actually suitable 
for the defendant, so I am not guilty of securities fraud." Even 
if an investment in Red River Mountain was objectively reasonable 
for Thornton, Isaacs, and Brgoch, that fact alone does not allow 
the defendant to force the investment upon those individuals 
through fraudulent means. 
Second, as a matter of fact, Mr. Barber did establish evidence 
of suitability with regards to Thornton, Isaacs, and Brgoch. See, 
e.g., R. at 675, 842-846, 930-931. Mr. Barber explained his 
decision not to explore suitability further as follows: 
28Stated simply, an investment is "suitable" for an investor 
if it objectively meets that investor's requirements with respect 
to risk, probable return, liquidity, and other factors. 
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Q (Sonnenreich): Each of these exhibits, there is 
a list of suitability questions or issues or points, 
however you want to phrase them, one for Mr. Isaacs, one 
for Mr. Brgoch, and one for Mr. Thornton. Did you 
address suitability in your cross examination of the 
witnesses? 
A (Barber): Yes. Well, using it in the plural, to 
my recollection I addressed the issue of suitability with 
considerable detail with Mr. Thornton. And perhaps 
somewhat less detail with the other two. 
Q: There are also lists of limited partnership 
portfolios for each individual. You did not go in detail 
on each one of those limited partnerships with each 
individual, did you? 
A: No, I did not. 
Q: Why was that? 
A: Well, a number of reasons. One is that most of 
them are not real estate limited partnerships, and I 
doubted that but for a reference to them they are very 
likely admissible. But secondly, I was familiar with the 
direct testimony of each of these investors, at least 
Brgoch and Isaacs, that the two of them claimed to have 
expressly instructed Mr Harry not to put them in any more 
of those kinds of deals before the Red River Limited 
Partnership was presented to them. And I knew that both 
Mr. Brgoch and Mr. Isaacs were pretty much there to make 
a speech and that every time I raised the issue, they 
made their speech. And so I thought it was going to be 
damaging to go through the detail of those and that the 
return on that issue would not be very great. 
Addendum C at 47-48; See, e.g., R. at 844-846. At most, Harry may 
complain about the quantity of that evidence. There is absolutely 
no proof, however, that more evidence of suitability, essentially 
along the lines Mr. Barber explored, would have altered the outcome 
of the trial, particularly in light of its legal irrelevance.29 
29The only possible legitimate use of suitability evidence 
would be as a backhanded way of attempting to show materiality --
in essence an argument that the underlying transaction was so 
suitable that a reasonable investor would not have minded being 
lied to. That argument is extremely weak in light of explicit 
testimony from all three individuals to the effect that they 
clearly felt that investments with future payments we -J not 
suitable for them at this late juncture in their lives, e that 
the existence of an obligation to make future payments was material 
to them because of their circumstances. 
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E. THERE WAS NO INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WITH RESPECT 
TO DONNA NAUSS' TESTIMONY 
Harry argues that he did not receive effective assistance of 
counsel because Donna Nauss, the Private Ledger compliance officer, 
was allowed to opine that Harry's conduct violated internal Private 
Ledger policies, and exposed Private Ledger to the risk of lawsuits 
by disgruntled investors. He argues that Nauss' opinions were 
legally irrelevant, and were based upon improper evidence. 
Ms. Nauss' opinion that Ron Harry was selling away in knowing 
contravention of Private Ledger rules was relevant because it 
showed Harry's state of mind. Putting knowledge in Harry's head 
that selling away was wrong is essential to showing that Harry 
willfully omitted to tell Private Ledger and his three investors 
that he was selling away, and it is strongly probative of the point 
that Harry knew his omission was material. 
Ms. Nauss' opinion was based upon much more than just the 
procedures manual. It was also based upon her review of Harry's 
weekly sales reports, R. at 727-729, the memorandum Harry signed on 
December 5, 1987 that states that selling away is prohibited, 
Exhibit P-17, the Series 24 exam that Harry took only days before 
he made the first Red River sale, and many other sources. 
Furthermore, contrary to the bald assertion in the defendant's 
brief, the jury could reasonably have inferred that Harry read the 
procedures manual before the sales to Isaacs and Brgoch were 
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consummated.30 
With respect to Ms. Nauss' statement that Harry's conduct in 
selling away could expose Private Ledger to lawsuits, that 
testimony was relevant and therefore properly admitted. The jury 
needed to know the ways in which selling away hurt Private Ledger 
in order to assess the materiality of Harry's omission. Exposure 
to legal liability is certainly a harm. Given the nearly strict 
liability nature of civil securities laws with respect to the 
broker-dealer's duty to supervise agents, this is a very real and 
palpable harm. See, e.g., Arrington v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner & Smith, 651 F.2d 615 (1981). The testimony was proper. 
V. COUNT 4, CONCERNING PRIVATE LEDGER, WAS PROPERLY 
PLED AS A SECURITIES FRAUD COUNT. 
Harry has claimed that Count 4 does not constitute a public 
offense because Harry did not commit fraud against Private Ledger 
"in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of any security" 
as required by Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (1989). He further claims 
that the State's theory of liability is so novel that it should not 
be allowed under State v. Burton, 800 P.2d 817 (Utah App. 1990). 
30This is why exact dates are important. The receipt for the 
procedures manual, Exhibit P-18, states in part that the recipient 
"has read and understood its contents." Harry's signature is dated 
"date received 5/3/88," and the receipt was received back by 
Private Ledger on May 10, 1988. The sale to Isaacs was consummated 
on May 10th, Exhibit P-4, and the sale to Brgoch on May 9th. 
Exhibit P-7. The jury could easily have believed that Harry read 
the manual before May 9th, considering that the returned receipt 
reached California on Ma} 10th. Thus the timing on the manual is 
harmful to Harry; it she that he was reading that selling away 
was prohibited at the very moment that he was consummating the 
Isaacs and Brgoch sales. 
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I 
A. PRIVATE LEDGER WAS A DIRECT VICTIM OF HARRY'S FRAUD. 
To reiterate the State's position in a nutshell, the evidence i 
established the following: 
1. Ron Harry was Private Ledger's agent, with fiduciary 
duties toward his employer, upon whom he depended for his ( 
legal ability to be a stockbroker; 
2. At all material times Ron Harry knew that "selling 
away" without prior written authorization was a violation of i 
his agreement with Private Ledger, and was contrary to the 
scheme of securities regulation generally; 
3. Ron Harry repeatedly represented to Private Ledger, 
before, during, and after the Red River sales, that he would 
not sell away, that he was not selling away, and that he did 
not sell away; 
4. Ron Harry knew that Private Ledger had not 
authorized selling away of Red River Mountain; 
5. Ron Harry expected to receive a 10 percent 
commission from the sale of Red River Mountain units; 
6. Ron Harry was in constant contact with the main 
office of Private Ledger, yet he deliberately hid his sales of 
Red River Mountain units from the main office when he 
submitted his weekly sales reports; 
7• At least part of Ron Harry's motive in selling away 
Red River units to Thornton, Isaacs, and Brgoch was to conceal 
the sales from Private Ledger, thereby defrauding Private 
Ledger of its legitimate share of the commissions; and 
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8. Private Ledger suffered a number of collateral 
harms, such as a risk of damage to its reputation or of civil 
litigation with investors, as a result of Harry's fraud. 
Thus, Private Ledger was a direct victim of Harry's fraudulent 
scheme to sell Red River to Thornton, Isaacs, and Brgoch. In 
essence, Private Ledger was a third party to each securities 
transaction because it had a right to receive commissions from 
every sale made by Harry. In a literal sense, there is a direct 
connection between the offer, sale or purchase of these securities 
and Harry's fraud against Private Ledger. 
In particular, when Harry made a misleading offer of Red River 
to Thornton, while concealing the fact that he was selling away and 
planning to keep the commission for himself, he defrauded both 
Thornton and Private Ledger at the same time. 
B. THE "IN CONNECTION WITH" REQUIREMENT ONLY MANDATES THAT THE 
FRAUD "TOUCH" A SECURITIES TRANSACTION. 
The facts fit the statute exactly, even if they do not present 
the more typical situation of a defrauded investor. Federal courts 
have interpreted the nearly identical "in connection with" language 
under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193431 and 
31
 It shall be unlawful for any person, directly 
or indirectly, . . . 
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security . . • any manipulative 
or deceptive device . . . 
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). While federal law is not controlling of state 
law, the Utah Uniform Securities Act "may be so construed as to . 
. coordinate the interpretation and administration of this 
chapter with the related federal regulation." Utah Code Ann. § 61-
1-27 (1989). 
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< 
Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-532 to require only 
that the fraud "touch" the sale: 
The Supreme Court has said that section 10(b) is to 
be read flexibly. When there is a sale of a security and 
fraud "touches" the sale, there is redress under section 
10(b). Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life and 
Casualty Co. , 404 U.S. 6 (1971). It does not matter that 
the fraud is not of the "garden variety" associated with 
securities sales. Id. 
Arrinqton, 651 F.2d 615, 619 (1981). See also Alley v. Miramon, 
614 F.2d 1372, 1378 n.ll (5th Cir. 1980). The "in connection with" 
element prohibits claims based upon the extremely attenuated links 
between plaintiff's injury and defendant's conduct." In re 
Financial Corp. of America Shareholder Lit., 796 F.2d 1126, 1130 
(9th Cir. 1986) (holding that an accounting firm is not liable to 
investors when it changed a client's accounting methods, thereby 
causing the company to report bigger losses). In this case there 
is no attenuation between Private Ledger's injuries and Harry's 
conduct; his conduct directly caused those injuries. 
The Alabama Supreme Court, construing the anti-fraud 
32
 It shall be unlawful for any person, directly 
or indirectly, . . . 
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to 
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which 
they were made, not misleading, or 
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business 
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any 
person, 
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 
17 C.F.R. § 240.10B-5. 
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provisions of the Alabama Uniform Securities Act33 in Buffo v. 
State, 415 So. 2d 1158, 1164-1165 (Ala. 1982), demonstrated how 
loose the "connection" between the fraud and the sale of securities 
can be. In Buffo, a criminal case, the defendant gave two 
fraudulent real estate appraisals on some California land. The 
land covered by the appraisals was to be sold to an insurance 
company in exchange for issuance of notes. The insurance company, 
however, was in serious financial difficulty. Without additional 
capital, the Alabama Insurance Commissioner indicated that he would 
declare the company insolvent. The appraisals were given to the 
Insurance Commissioner to persuade him not to take action against 
the company and to allow the company to issue notes to acquire 
additional capital. The court found that the issuance of the 
surplus notes was the sale of a security, and it held that the 
Alabama Insurance Commissioner had been defrauded by the false 
appraisals prepared by the defendant. The Alabama court stated 
that: 
When nexus is the issue to be determined, the 
essence of the question becomes whether the fraud has a 
sufficiently close relationship to the purchase of sale 
of the security to make it actionable. The cases make it 
apparent that the fraud does not have to be intrinsic to 
the specific securities transaction." 
415 So. at 1164. The court concluded that the fraud on the 
Insurance Commissioner had the necessary nexus with the sale of 
notes to come within the anti-fraud provisions of the Alabama 
33Alabama's anti-fraud statute Ala. Code § 8-6-17 (1975) is 
identical to Utah Code Ann. § 6 1 - 1 (1989). This Court should 
construe Utah law in a uniform way. Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-27 
(1989). 
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Securities Act. Certainly, the securities transactions in this 
case "touch" Private Ledger more closely than the securities 
transactions in Buffo touched the Alabama Insurance Commissioner. 
C. THIS CASE IS NOT A NOVEL CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF A MERE CIVIL 
CONTRACT DISPUTE, LIKE THE CASE IN STATE V, BURTON. 
The defendant argues that Count 4 is merely a civil contract 
dispute. Not so. By definition, securities fraud, and most other 
forms of commercial fraud, almost always involve contractual 
relationships. Count 4, however, focuses on the defendant's 
fraudulent behavior in connection with the sale of securities, and 
not on the defendant's possible breach of contract per se. Harry 
was convicted of defrauding Private Ledger by depriving it of 
potential commissions and exposing it to liability. Selling away, 
which violated Harry's contract with Private Ledger, was merely a 
device used by Harry to conduct the fraud. The fact that selling 
away violated Harry's contract with Private Ledger was relevant 
because it showed that Harry knew selling away was wrong, knew that 
concealment of selling away was a material omission, and had an 
additional motive for hiding the selling away from Private Ledger. 
The case of State v. Burton, 800 P.2d 817 (Utah App. 1990), 
can be easily distinguished. In that case, this Court found that 
a failure by a home seller (Burton) to forward payments from a home 
buyer (Waldron) to the seller's creditor (Valley First Security, 
who had a lien on the home) was not simple theft under Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990). Theft under that statute requires the 
unauthorized control over the property of another. In order to 
prevail, the State had to show that Burton was controlling 
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Waldron's money in an unauthorized manner. The Court expressly 
found that Burton was under no contractual obligation to forward 
Waldron's payments themselves, but had merely agreed to make 
payments to Valley First Security with any money Burton chose to 
use. Thus, Burton had a right to use Waldron's money any way he 
chose. In essence, the theft charges in Burton could only have 
been upheld if there had been an explicit contract regarding the 
application of Waldron's money to pay Valley First Security. If 
anything, Burton supports the State's position in the case at bar 
because Harry expressly violated his contract with Private Ledger 
that prohibited selling away and required that he share 
commissions. 
Burton talks about the dangers of a "unique theory of criminal 
liability." Certainly, using a garden variety theft charge to 
criminalize a failure to make a payment on a contract is a unique 
theory of criminal liability. There is no public policy in favor 
of such a broad expansion of the concept of "theft." 
Securities law, on the other hand, is designed to create an 
environment of trust and fair dealing in the offer, purchase, and 
sale of securities. That environment is essential to the sound 
functioning of our capital markets. It is not surprising that the 
Supreme Court has taken a very expansive view of the scope of 
federal anti-fraud provisions: 
"[We do not] think it sound to dismiss a complaint 
merely because the alleged scheme does not involve the 
type of fraud that 'is usually associated with the sale 
or purchase of securities.' We believe that §10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 prohibit all fraudulent schemes in connection 
with the purchase or sale of securities, whether the 
- 43 -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
artifices employed involve a garden type variety of 
fraud, or present a unique form of deception. Novel or 
atypical methods should not provide immunity from the 
securities laws." 
Superintendent of Insurance, 404 U.S. at 11, n.7 (quoting, A. T. 
Brod & Co. v. Per low, 375 F.2d 393, 397 (2nd Cir. 1967)). 
Furthermore, "Congress made clear that 'disregard of trust 
relationships by those whom the law should regard as fiduciaries, 
are all a single seamless web' along with manipulation, investor's 
ignorance, and the like." 404 U.S. at 11-12. If the securities 
laws are broad enough to encompass accounting firms (that neither 
bought nor sold securities) as defendants, Roberts v. Peat, 
Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 857 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1988), they are 
certainly broad enough to include a brokerage house as a victim 
where the stockbroker schemed to defraud the brokerage house as 
part of a securities transaction. 
One final factor distinguishes this case from Burton. If the 
theft conviction in Burton had been allowed to stand, it would have 
criminalized all sorts of routine breaches of contract, behavior 
that is not normally thought of as criminal. In contrast, if 
Harry's behavior vis a vis Private Ledger had not been "in 
connection with" a securities transaction, it would clearly have 
been communications fraud, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-
1801 (1990): 
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or 
artifice to defraud another or to obtain from another 
money, property, or anything of value by means of false 
or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or 
material omissions, and who communicates directly or 
indirectly with any person by any means for the purpose 
of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice is 
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Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
guilty of: 
(d) a second degree felony when the value of 
the property, money, or thing obtained or sought to 
be obtained is more than 10,000 but does not exceed 
100,000 . . . 
Thus, Harry's conduct is clearly criminal, and if anything he has 
benefited from being charged under the lesser penalties of the more 
specific securities fraud statute.34 
VI. COUNTS 2 AND 3, CONCERNING SEYMOUR ISAACS AND 
FRANK BRGOCH, INVOLVE CONDUCT THAT IS IN CONNECTION 
WITH" SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS. 
Harry alleges that Counts 2 and 3, concerning Isaacs and 
Brgoch,35 must fail because any fraud by Harry occurred after Harry 
had irrevocably committed those investors to Red River and 
therefore the fraud is not "in connection with" the securities 
transactions. The State's view is that there are three separate 
factual theories under which Harry's fraud predates the time that 
Isaacs and Brgoch became irrevocably committed to Red River, and 
that in any event the "in connection with" phrase should be read 
3AUnder communications fraud, Harry would have been subjected 
to a second degree felony charge because that statute aggregates 
the total amount that the defendant sought to obtain from all 
victims, whether the defendant intended to keep that money for 
himself or not. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(2) (1990). Thus, 
Harry sought to obtain at least the total initial investments of 
$76,500 from the three investors. Securities fraud, by contrast is 
always an undesignated felony with lower penalties, regardless of 
the size of the fraud. Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21 (1989). 
35Harry, in his brief, has treated the situations with Isaacs 
and Brgoch as being the same and has not made any attempt to 
differentiate the two counts. The State agrees that given the 
similarity of their testimony, their longtime mutual friendship 
which extended to meeting with Harry togethe m occasion, and the 
nature of the counts, no distinction should be made between Isaacs 
and Brgoch. 
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< 
liberally enough to encompass some post-transaction frauds of a 
lulling nature. i 
A. A SCHEME OR ARTIFICE TO DEFRAUD, OR AN ACT, PRACTICE, OR 
COURSE OF BUSINESS THAT OPERATES AS A FRAUD, IS "IN CONNECTION 
WITH" THE PURCHASE OR SALE OF SECURITIES EVEN IF PARTS OF THE 
SCHEME ARE NOT CARRIED OUT UNTIL AFTER THE SECURITIES TRANSACTION 
IS COMPLETE. < 
The jury in this case was instructed on all three 
possibilities under Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (1989), namely (1). a 
scheme or artifice to defraud, (2) a fraudulent misrepresentation i 
or omission, and (3) an act, practice, or course of business that 
operates as a fraud. As a result, the jury could have relied upon 
either theory (1) or theory (3) with respect to Isaacs and Brgoch. i 
A scheme or artifice, or an act, practice or course of business, 
does not necessarily require a misrepresentation. The jury could 
lawfully have convicted Harry on Counts 2 and 3 without finding 
that he made any misrepresentation or omission to Isaacs or Brgoch. 
If the jury chose to believe that Harry devised a scheme or 
artifice to defraud Isaacs or Brgoch, or engaged in an act, 
practice, or course of business that operated to defraud them, then 
by definition Harry's wrongful acts must have been conceived of and 
initiated no later than the moment when Harry purchased the Red 
River units in the name of Isaacs and Brgoch. Because Harry's 
fraud under these two portions of Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (1989) 
does not postdate the securities transactions, it is actionable 
even under the theory put forth in Harry's brief. Indeed, the 
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Rudolph v. Arthur Anderson & 
Co., 800 F.2d 1040 (1986), while agreeing in general with Harry's 
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argument, established that even misrepresentations or omissions 
that occur after a transaction is completed are "in connection 
with" the transaction if they are part of a scheme that was devised 
before the transaction began. 800 F.2d at 1046-1047. 
B. BEFORE THE INVESTMENT WAS COMPLETED, HARRY OMITTED TO TELL 
ISAACS AND BRGOCH THAT HE WAS INVESTING IN RED RIVER IN VIOLATION 
OF THE LIMITS THEY PLACED UPON HIS DISCRETION. 
Isaacs and Brgoch met frequently with Harry to discuss their 
investments. After they retired in 1985, their investment 
strategies changed and they became more cautious investors• By 
1988 they had limited Harry's authority by requiring that 
investments be safe and liquid; they expressly prohibited Harry 
from investing in any more limited partnerships or investments that 
had potential future payments. Harry agreed to these limits. At 
the moment that Harry decided to invest in Red River for Isaacs and 
Brgoch he knew that the investments would exceed his authority. At 
that time, before the investments were made, Harry was under a duty 
to contact the investors, inform them of the true nature of Red 
River, and obtain from them permission to make the purchase, which 
was beyond the scope of Harry's discretionary authority. Instead 
of contacting the investors, however, Harry (to paraphrase Utah 
Code Ann. § 61-1-1(2) (1989)) omitted to state material facts (the 
true nature of Red River and his intention to invest in it) 
necessary in order to make his previous statements to Isaacs and 
Brgoch (that he would only invest in accordance with their 
instructions), in the light of the circumstances under which they 
were made, not misleading. Under this theory, which was presented 
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to the jury, Harry's omission precedes the consummation of the 
securities transactions, and is therefore "in connection with" 
those transactions even under the reasoning in Harry's brief, 
C. HARRY MADE MISREPRESENTATIONS AND OMISSIONS TO ISAACS AND 
BRGOCH AT A TIME BEFORE THEY BECAME "IRREVOCABLY COMMITTED" TO 
THEIR RED RIVER INVESTMENTS. 
Isaacs and Brgoch met with Harry on a number of occasions in 
the two months following Harry's purchase of the Red River units. 
Harry repeatedly mischaracterized the investment. For example, 
when Brgoch first met with Harry in May, around the time of the 
investment, Harry left Brgoch with the impression that it was a 
real estate development bond. Even when Brgoch learned a month 
later that Red River was a limited partnership, and confronted 
Harry about the investment, Harry did not disclose the obligation 
to make future payments. Neither Isaacs nor Brgoch learned of the 
possibility of future payments until they received their first 
dunning letters nearly a year later. R. at 838, 928; Exhibits P-6, 
P-9. 
These misrepresentations and omissions to both Isaacs and 
Brgoch, made during the two months after Harry purchased the units, 
were designed to lull Isaacs and Brgoch into accepting the Red 
River investments. They were made before the purchases were truly 
final. Of course, from Red River's perspective the purchases 
appeared final; the money had been received and the transactions 
registered. The transactions were not final, however, because 
Harry made the purchases without any authority. It is axiomatic 
that acts made by a purported agent without authority are subject 
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to revocation by the principal. Such acts are not final until they 
are ratified by the principal, either expressly or by implication. 
Because Isaacs and Brgoch had at least a colorable right to rescind 
the Red River purchases at the time when Harry lied to them 
(shortly after the purchases had been made), the transactions were 
not irrevocably complete, and his misrepresentations and omissions 
were in connection with the still unratified purchases of 
securities. 
D. THE "IN CONNECTION WITH" REQUIREMENT SHOULD BE INTERPRETED 
LIBERALLY TO APPLY TO SOME TYPES OF POST - PURCHASE OR SALE 
MISREPRESENTATIONS AND OMISSIONS. 
As demonstrated by the foregoing arguments, the question 
of whether the phrase "in connection with" can apply to 
misrepresentations or omissions made after exclusively a purchase 
or sale should not be relevant to this case. To the extent that 
the issue may be deemed relevant, it is the State's position that 
the requirement should be liberally construed to include the type 
of conduct demonstrated in this case. 
The general rule, as discussed at length in Point V.B., 
supra, is that the "in connection with" language of securities 
fraud statutes should be liberally construed to include cases where 
the fraud "touches" upon the offer, sale, or purchase of a 
security. There is some federal case law to the effect that a 
misrepresentation or omission is only "in connection with" the 
purchase or sale of a security if it occurs before the purchase or 
sale is finalized. See, e.g., Rudolph v. Arthur And son & Co., 
800 F.2d 1040, 1046 (11th Cir. 1986) and cases cited tnerein. The 
- 49 -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
( 
specific language of the cases shows, however, that this 
restriction is not as rigid as it may appear to be. 
In Securities and Exchange Commission v. National Student 
Marketing, 457 F.Supp 682 (1978), a case relied upon by the 
defendant, there is an excellent discussion of the rule, its 
rationale, and its implications: 
The rationale for using the moment of commitment as the 
critical point in time derives from the underlying 
purpose of the anti-fraud provisions to protect the 
investment decision from inadequate disclosure and 
misrepresentations. Once the decision is made and the 
parties are irrevocably committed to the transaction, 
there is little justification for penalizing alleged 
omissions or misstatements which occur thereafter and 
which have no effect on the decision. 
Id., 457 F.Supp at 703 (emphasis added). If this were a case where 
the victims had been "irrevocably committed to the transaction," 
then the defendant might have a legitimate point, if you do not 
look carefully at the policy implications. As it is, both Isaacs 
and Brgoch could have taken steps to revoke or rescind the 
transaction except for Harry's misrepresentations. They were not 
"irrevocably committed," if they have ever been, until after they 
decided, based upon Mr. Harry's misrepresentations, to do nothing 
for a year. 
The facts behind the defendant's remaining three cases, 
Congregation of the Passion, Holy Cross Province v. Kidder, Peabody 
& Co., 800 F.2d 177 (7th Cir. 1986), Braka v. Multibanco Comermex, 
S.A. , 589 F.Supp 802 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), and Resource Investors v. 
Natural Resource Investment Corp., 457 F.Supp 194 (E.D.Mich. 1978), 
are readily distinguishable. The Congregation of the Passion case 
- 50 -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
involved a defendant who had "full discretion to develop and 
implement a prudent portfolio strategy." 800 F.2d at 181. In 
Braka, the court found that "[t]he alleged misrepresentation and 
nondisclosures could have had no effect on the plaintiff's decision 
to purchase the CDs." 589 F.Supp at 805. The alleged 
misrepresentations were made fully 10 months after the sales were 
finalized. Id. In Resource Investors, the defendant "had no 
relationship with any of the other parties in this lawsuit until 
one year after plaintiff's purchase." 457 F.Supp at 197. 
The policy behind the cases cited by the defendant is 
designed to limit the applicability of securities anti-fraud 
provisions to situations in which the fraud affected the securities 
transaction. In each case, the fraud alleged did not affect the 
transactions, either because the fraud occurred entirely after the 
transactions were irrevocably consummated, or the person committing 
the alleged fraud had the independent power and authority to enter 
into the transactions regardless of the fraud. This policy is in 
no way furthered by prohibiting the application of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 61-1-1 (1989) to a situation where the misrepresentations and 
omissions (to take the case most favorable to Harry) occurred after 
the transaction, but were part of a lulling technique designed to 
hide the fact that the defendant violated his authority in making 
the transactions. In that case, policy considerations should favor 
application of the anti-fraud provisions because they are necessary 
to ensure the integrity of the securities markets. This is 
particularly true wnere the defendant is a stockbroker, with 
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fiduciary duties to his clients. For our capital markets to 
operate effectively, people need to know that their stockbrokers ( 
are not trading their accounts without authority and then hiding 
that fact. Such fraudulent behavior falls within the plain 
language of Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (1989), and should be < 
prohibited under Utah law. 
CONCLUSION 
Only points I, II, III and IV of the defendant's brief 
would constitute grounds for a new trial. Because they do not 
challenge the verdict with respect to Count 1, points V and VI are 
only relevant to Counts 2 and 3 (point VI) and 4 (point V). 
Points I (expert testimony) and II (specific intent) are 
expressly resolved in favor of the State by the Larsen decision, 
which also effectively defeats the defendant's argument in point 
III (good faith defense). The argument that Mr. Barber's 
assistance was ineffective (point IV) is without merit, as the 
alleged errors appear to have been tactical decisions, and even if 
they represented actual errors the defendant has not shown with 
demonstrable evidence that there is a reasonable likelihood that 
the trial's outcome would have been different but for the errors. 
Count 4, concerning Private Ledger (point V), was properly pled as 
securities fraud because the statute by its language does not limit 
the class of victims to investors, and because the scheme to 
defraud Private Ledger of its commission was by definition in 
connection with the sale of the securities that generated the right 
to that commission. Point VI (concerning Counts 2 and 3) fails to 
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recognize that there was an ongoing scheme to defraud Seymour 
Isaacs and Frank Brgoch which by definition must have predated the 
actual purchase, and that Isaacs and Brgoch were in regular contact 
with the defendant prior to the actual purchase during which time 
the defendant omitted material facts. Point VI also argues for an 
overly restrictive reading of the "in connection with" requirement, 
particularly in a case where the victims did not expressly 
authorize the purchase, and could have reasonably attempted to 
rescind the purchase but for the defendant's misrepresentations and 
omissions shortly after the purchase. 
The jury's verdict, and the trial court's ruling in this 
case, should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this2^day of May, 1993. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
DAVID N. SONNENREICH 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Red River Mountain Limited Partnership, 
an Arizona Limited Partnersnip 
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Mesa, Arizona 35210 
(602) 834-7400 
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PARTNERSHIP OBJECTIVE 
The objective of RED RIVER MOUNTAIN LIMITED PARTNERSHIP is 
to combine two diversified properties in the attempt to take ad-
vantage of a young land market (Red River 160 acres), and also 
to follow the dynamic growth and transportation corridors (Red 
Mountain Expressway 13.4 acres) witnin the Phoenix metro area. 
The 160 acres in Stanfield, Arizona is located within the 
old John Wayne Ranch which he named "Red RiverfT. The 13.4 acres 
is situated in the Mesa area along a future freeway referred to 
as the Red Mountain Expressway. Hence, the partnership combined 
the names Red River and Red Mountain Expressway to form Red River 
Mountain Partners. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
THE EAST VALLEY 
RED MOUNTAIN 
The East Valley is growing at an increasingly greater 
rate than any other region in the Greater Phoenix Metropolitan 
area and represents a major urban center in its own right. One 
reason for the popularity of the East Valley is the excellent 
reputation of the school systems. Moreover, six major east-west 
transportation corridors are separated by only three miles. 
University Drive, Main Street, Broadway Road, Southern Avenue, 
the Superstition Freeway and Baseline Road provide transportation 
corridors throught the heart of the East Valley. 
Mesa was founded in 1378 and incorporated in 1883. The 
city grew an estimated 53% between 1980 and 1985 and is Arizona's 
third largest city with a current population of approximately 
233,000. Mesa covers more than 90 square miles, and is located 
approximately 4 miles east of Phoenix, the Arizona state capital. 
Mesa is considered the retail, trade and medical center of the 
East Valley which includes the cities of Mesa, Tempe, Chandler, 
Gilbert and Apache Junction. The East Mesa area is expected to 
become an attractive area for families and businesses in the 
future due to the completion of the Superstition and Red Mountain 
Freeways which will provide residents with ^uick access to 
downtown Mesa and Phoenix. 
i 
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Western Savings' 1,680 
Superstition Springs and the i 
in the primary stages of 
region will be the completion of 
acre masterpianned development, 
. a s t Valley Town Center, which are 
development. Included within the 
project plans is a one million square foot regional mall with 
anchor tenants expected to include major retail stores such as 
Goldwaters, Dillards, Sears and J.C. Pennev's. 
AD0T (Arizona Department of Transportation) has 
committed the funds for the completion of the Superstition 
Freeway Extension as well as the Red Mountain Freewav and the San 
Tan Freewa y. 
The Superstition Freewav currently ends at Power Road, 
five miles southwest of the Property. Current plans call for 
construction to begin at Power Road in early 1988 and end at U.S. 
Highway 60 in 1991 with an off-ramp located at Ellsworth Road, 
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less than two and one-half miles south of the Property. The 
comoietion of the Suoerstition Freewav will connect the 1-10 
Freewav and the East Vallev with Apache Junction and the further 
eastern regions of Arizona. Also being engineered is a major 
stacked interchange west of Ellsworth Road (2 miles south or the 
site) This would serve as the confluence of three freeways in 
Maricopa County: the Superstition Freeway, the San Tan Freeway 
and the Red Mountain Freeway. 
set for 
downtown 
access 
de ve iopments 
The Red Mountain Freewav has a proposed completion date 
the year 2000; it will connect Sky Harbor airport, the 
Phoenix with Mesa's industrial core, providing easy 
to Falcon Field and east Mesa's new residential 
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CASA GRANDE/STANFIELD AREA 
RED RIVER 
The Casa Grande/Stanfield area is a midway point 
between Phoenix, 53 miles to the Northwest, and Tucson, 59 miles 
to the Southeast, Arizona's two largest metropolitan cities. 
The area has a population of about 20,000 with 
projections indicating a growth of an additional 55,000 people by 
the turn of the century. Major laboratories have moved into the 
Casa Grande area in recent years and planners and developers 
expect that this influx will continue. 
Landowners in the area are so convinced that the Casa 
Grande/Stanfield area will emerge as a bona fide suburb of the 
greater Phoenix area that they have undertaken a cooperative 
effort to formulate masterplans for almost 50,000 acres of land 
in the area. The result will be known as StanMar Valley. A 
subsection of the Stanmar Valley area is an 11,000-acre self-
contained community known as Red River, which is on the site of a 
ranch formerly owned by John Wayne. 
\ 
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THE PROPERTY 
RED RIVER 
The property is an easily accessible 160 acre site 
located in the area known as Red River. Red River is now 
included in the StanMar Valley Masterplan. The site has frontage 
on both White Parker Road and Highway 84 and is contiguous to the 
11,000 acre Red River Masterplan, but is not subject to the 
masterplan assessments. 
The southeast quadrant of metropolitan Phoenix is 
experiencing tremendous growth. Both the Northwest and Southeast 
Valley have excellent transportation routes. The Black Canyon 
Freeway and Interstate 1-17 serve the Northwest Valley and the 
Superstition Freeway (State Highway 360) and Interstate 1-10, the 
Southeast Valley. An expansive new freeway system funded by a 
one-half cent sales tax increase will further enhance development 
in the Northwest and Southeast Valley. 
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Red River, 23 minutes from the edge of development in 
the Southeast Valley, is one of the few large parcels closest to 
this area available for development. The majority of the land in 
between Red River and the southern edge of the Southeast Valley 
is Indian Reservation or Federal lands with the exception of the 
small town of Maricopa. 
Casa Grande has already been experiencing a tremendous 
amount of "spin-off" growth from the Southeast Valley. Because 
of its strategic location at the intersection of Interstates I-10 
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and 1-8, businesses are easily able to access the large Southern 
California and Southwest markets. In addition, its location 
approximately half-way between the State's two major metropolitan 
markets, Phoenix'and Tucson; its rail access; and its cooperative 
growth-oriented city officials all will continue to fuel 
development in the Casa Grande area. 
Red River, 10 miles closer to Phoenix than Casa Grande, 
offers an attractive alternative lifestyle to the Southeastern 
Valley as well as numerous residential, retail and employment 
opportunities. 
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PROPERTY DATA SHEET 
RED MOUNTAIN RED RIVER 
TYPE OF PROPERTY: Unimproved 
Farm land 
LOCATION: 
SIZE: 
ZONING: 
PRICE: 
TERMS: 
NWC 90th St, (Red 
Mountain Freeway) 
and University Dr 
Mesa, Arizona 
13.437 acres 
Rural 
$1,300,000 
$260,000 down 
$870,658 first 
deed of trust 
interest only 
payable at 10Z 
for first 10 
years, thereafter 
3 annual instal-
lments beginning in 
1999 of $350,104 
$169,342 second 
deed of trust, 
interest at 10Z 
payable in 5 annual 
installments of 
$44,672 
SW 1/4 of 
Section 24 
T6Sf R3E of 
the G&SRB&M 
Stanfield,AZ 
160.3313 
gross acres 
Agriculture 
$1,037,874 
$175,000 down 
$479,874 first 
deed of trust, 
interest at 
101, payable 
interest only 
in 1988 and 89 
thereafter in 
10 annual 
installments 
of $83,326 
$168,000 sec-
ond deed of 
trust, 10Z 
interest, no 
payments until 
1991, there-
after in 9 
annual instal-
lments of 
$35,006 
$220,000-101 
interest pay-
able in 5 
annual instal-
lments of 
$58,035 
D~ ~« 19 
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THE PROPOSED OFFERING 
The Par 
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chart below 
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th an 1 nit 
nits). U 
initial 
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of the offering, 
be raised. The 
of additional 
o make should the 
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IS TO SELL THE 
NO ASSURANCE THAT 
IP MAY HOLD THE 
LIMITED PARTNER'S CONTRIBUTION SCHEDULE 
Initial Capital Contribution: 
(Per unit - minimum 3 units) 
$5,100 
April 
April 
April 
April 
April 
April 
April 
April 
April 
April 
April 
April 
April 
25, 
25, 
25, 
25, 
25, 
25, 
25, 
25, 
25, 
25, 
25, 
25, 
25, 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
$ 2,885 
2,885 
2,885 
2,885 
2,885 
2,885 
2,235 
2,235 
2,235 
2,235 
2,875 
2,875 
2,875 
$39,975 
The maximum p o t e n t i a l c o n t r i b u t i o n per unit i s $39,975 
payable in 13 i n s t a l l m e n t s through Apri l 25, 2001. I f , as 
a n t i c i p a t e d , the Property i s s o l d a t a p r o f i t prior to the f i f t h 
year from c l o s i n g , then no a d d i t i o n a l c a p i t a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s would 
be due a f t e r the date of s a l e . 
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PARTNERSHIP CAPITALIZATION 
Initial Capital Contribution $ 561,000 
from Limited Partners 
Term Financing $3,836,250 
Total Capitalization $4,397,250 
USES OF PROCEEDS 
Selling Expenses $ 59,500 
Organization and syndication fees 25,000 
Purchase price of property 2,337,874 
Interest expense 1,590,023 
Syndication costs 31,500 
Net operating expenses 308,680 
Reserves 44,673 
Total Application of Funds $4,397,250 
PARTNERSHIP OBJECTIVES 
Red River Mountain Limited Partnership will be a 
private placement limited partnership designed to offer the 
sophisticated investor the potential for capital appreciation as 
part of a diversified investment portfolio. To achieve this 
objective, the Partnership has acquired for investment a 160 acre 
parcel in the Stanfield, Arizona area and a 13.4 acre parcel 
along a proposed freeway referred to as the Red Mountain 
Expressway, in Mesa, Arizona. The Partnership's objectives are 
to: 
* Provide capital appreciation 
* Preserve and protect investor's invested capital 
* Provide build-up of Partnership equity through the 
reduction of mortgage indebtedness encumbering the 
property• 
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DISTRIBUTION OF PROCEEDS 
Net proceeds from refinancing or sale of the Properties 
shall be at the discretion of the General Partners until such 
time as both Properties have sold. Upon the sale of the 
Properties, proceeds shall be distributed 100Z to the Limited 
Partners until they have received all of their invested capital 
and thereafter 80Z to the Limited Partners and 20Z to the General 
Partners. 
PROJECTED CASH RETURN FOR A ONE-UNIT LIMITED PARTNERSHIP INTEREST 
FOR THE PERIOD MAY 1, 1988 THROUGH THE HYPOTHETICAL DISSOLUTION 
OF THE PARTNERSHIP ON MAY 1, 1993 ASSUMING A SALE OF THE 
PROPERTIES AT MARKET VALUE. HOWEVER, THERE IS NO ASSURANCE THAT 
THE PROPERTIES WILL SELL DURING THE SAME YEAR. IF THE PROPERTIES 
ARE SOLD IN DIFFERENT YEARS, THE CASH INVESTMENT AND PROCEEDS 
WILL DIFFER FROM THE HYPOTHETICAL CASE PRESENTED BELOW. 
YEAR 
CASH 
INVESTMENT 
CUMULATIVE 
CASH 
INVESTMENT 
ESTIMATED 
NET SALE 
PROCEEDS 
CASH 
RETURN 
Subscription 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 sale 
$5,100 
2,885 
2,885 
2,885 
2,885 
n/a 
$ 5,100 
7,985 
10,870 
13,755 
16,640 
16,640 $25,192 $23,481 
The projected amounts do not reflect any income tax consequences. 
i 
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THE MANAGING GENERAL PARTNERS 
ROSS N. FARNSWORTH, JR. 
One of the General Partners of Red River Mountain Limited 
Partnership is Ross N. Farnsworth, Jr. who is 31 years old. Ross 
graduated from Brigham Young University with a Bachelor of 
Science degree. Ross supervised the entire commercial department 
of Farnsworth Realty and Development from 1980 untii 1984. 
During this time he invested client funds in various real estate 
projects ranging from syndicated land, commercial and industrial 
property and the development and management of multi-family 
projects. ' 
From 1984-1986 Mr. Farnsworth was President of Farnsworth, 
Perkinson & Smith, Inc., a commercial real estate company who 
acquired nearly 1000 acres of multi-use land, closed 4 of its own 
syndicated offerings, constructed two multi-family projects, a 
retail shopping center, medical office building, entered into 
several raw land joint ventures and initiated the development of 
the largest deed restricted medical park in Arizona. 
In 1986 Mr. Farnsworth opened his own office, 
Holdings, Inc. which specializes in the acquisition, 
and syndication of raw land. In November 1986, 
Holdings moved into the largest office complex in 
sixteen-story Western Savings Financial Center. 
Farnsworth 
develo praent 
Farnsworth 
Mesa, the 
CREGG CANNON 
Cregg Cannon, also a General Partner, has worked as in 
Investment Banker with the Wall Street firm of Smith Barney 
Harris Upham, Inc. a New York Stock Exchange member. Mr. Cannon, 
during his time at Smith Barney, managed funds in areas such as 
commercial real estate located in the sunbelt area, tax free 
municipal bonds, oil and gas and other fixed income investments. 
Mr Cannon served as Vice President of Investments for 
Prudential Bache Securities from 1984 until 1987. He managed 
individual and institutional accounts in fixed income and real 
estate. Some of the large real estate syndicators with which he 
worked were First Capital, The Related Companies, Century 
Properties and Consolidated Capital, Inc. 
In 1987, Mr. Cannon opened his own office, Cannon Capital, 
Inc., located in Salt Lake City, Utah. He also is the manager of 
a major New York Stock Exchange firm in Salt Lake City, Utah 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
THE INFORMATION HEREIN WAS OBTAINED BY THE GENERAL PARTNER 
FROM SOURCES DEEMED TO BE RELIABLE. NO ASSURANCE MAY BE GIVEN 
WITH RESPECT TO THE ACCURACY OR ADEQUACY OF INFORMATION OBTAINED 
FROM PERSONS WHO ARE NOT AFFILIATES OF THE GENERAL PARTNER. 
THIS PRE-OFFERING SUMMARY IS, THEREFORE, QUALIFIED IN ITS 
ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO THE CONFIDENTIAL PRIVATE PLACEMENT 
MEMORANDUM, A COPY OF WHICH WILL BE PROVIDED AND RECEIPT 
ACKNOWLEDGED BY EACH PERSON WHO SUBSCRIBES FOR SECURITIES OF RED 
RIVER MOUNTAIN LIMITED PARTNERSHIP (THE PARTNERSHIP) BEFORE SUCH 
SUBSCRIPTION. 
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RCSS N FfiRNSHCRTH JR AND AFFILIATED COTANIES AND PARTNERSHIPS 
PRIOR EXPERIENCE IN THE PURCHASE AND SALE OF LAND 
PROPERTY 
POWER ROAD 1 
POWER ROAD 2 
QUEEN CREEK 
ARIZONA AVENUE 1 
ARIZONA AVENUE 2 
SILA BUTTE ESTATES 
CASA GRANDE 
QUARTER SECTION 
SOSSAMAN 40 
DATE OF 
FtfiCHASE 
03/01/83 
06/01/33 
10/31/84 
01/03/85 
01/03/85 
05/31/85 
03/15/85 
05/19/85 
MONTHS 
HELD 
16 
13 
i 
1 1 
3 
7 
3 
1 
GROSS 
PURCHASE 
PRICE 
$864,013 
775,000 
2,200,000 
3,585,504 
3,676,590 
2,320,000 
800,000 
450,000 
GROSS 
SALES 
PRICE 
51,365,485 
1,073,777 
2,504,000 
5,712,562 
J , 4 v 6 , /•>/ 
3,191,563 
1,230,000 
535,000 
5R0SS 
AMOUNT 
OF SAIN 
$501,472 
298,777 
304,000 
2,127,058 
1,730,347 
871,563 
430,000 
35,000 
CRISHCN XARTER SECTION 03/15/55 
FCAX HAWES RD LTD PTSHP 
ATC STAfflELD LTD PTSHP 
NOTE: 
13 4,050,000 5 ,30,000 1,330,000 
08/07/84 27 1,453,000 2,880,343 1,427,343 
01/14/88 N/A 1,744,000 N/A N/A 
The inforaation contained in the table should not be 
considereo ind ica t ive of the possib le resul ts froa the 
operation of the par tnersh ip . This intoroation in no aanner 
l tp i ies or indicates that investors in the offering M i l l 
experience returns or cash d i s t r i b u t i o n s , i f any, ccmparable 
to those experienced by the owners ot the projects speci f ied 
in the table. 
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SUPPLEMENT 
( 
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Rincil recommends 
ite for freeway leg 
Ity Council Monday recommended a route 
n leg of the Red Mountain Freeway that 
northeast side of the Central Arizona 
I and the Spook Hill flood control dike, 
leted, the Red Mountain Freeway will run 
ft northern boundary and will connect 
th Tempe and Scottsdale. It also will hook 
rotitioo Freeway near Ellsworth Road, 
nendation, numbered B~l from a series of 
iutes proposed by Tempe consulting firm 
Jterfcoff, Quade and Douglas, will go to the 
urtment of Transportation, which will 
I determination of the route. 
:il rejected the arguments of a 
t of the Spook Hill Homeowners' 
rho asked that the freeway follow an 
rig the southwest side of the canal 
a, 1220 N. S2nd St, said the southwest 
uld have less of an impact on the area 
d be built below ground level like parts of 
* Freeway. 
m the northeast side of U * canal would 
rated because it crosses a flood plain, he 
lid a freeway in the northeast side would 
open the area to industrial commercial and 
high-density development, while the homeowners 
would prefer it to remain as natural desert and 
low-density housing. 
David Udall, attorney for Bellamah Community 
Development Co., which is planning a three> 
square-mile community northeast of Bush Highway 
and McDowell Road, supported the B-l alignment. 
"Freeways exist to serve people, and this route will 
open up land to be served," he said. 
The council voted unanimously for the B-l corridor, 
saying the alternative on the southwest side of the canal 
would have a greater impact on existing and future 
developments, including a city water treatment plant; 
city park and proposed community college . ~-
^ In other action, the council approved annexation of 
1,570 acres of state-owned land along McKellips Road 
east of the CAP canal, which would be crossed by the 
Red Mountain Freeway and could become the site of a 
large planned community in the future. 
The state plans td auction off the property alter a 
master plan is drawn up for the area. 
""The council also approved an ordinance that would 
provide for removal of abandoned vehicles on private 
property, and approved joining the Arizona Moncipal 
Finance Pool which will provide cities and school 
districts with a |450 million fund to borrow from. " '.. 
S R . 360 
BASELINE I 
• • • • ' ' • 
GUADALUPE 
ELLIOT RD. 
LEGEND 
• • COMMERCIAL 
EPS RESIDENTIAL 
K m MOBILE HOME 
^~^PAfJK 
EM R.V. PARK -
ED PUBLIC-
QUASI PUBLIC 
Courtesy: Parsons Brinfcsrnoff 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
HKiii 
liiiilii 
i Piili m I 
Ijliliilniliilli 
:ij|<;iijl3!!i!il Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CASA GRANDE DISPATCH 
11-19-87 
County Panel OKs 
Red River Proposal 
By LINDA COULSON 
Stiff Writer 
FLORENCE - A plin that one 
day could convert 20,0X10 acres 
surroundinc the late John 
Wayne's Red River Ranch Into a 
bustling self-contained communi-
ty received approval from a coun-
ty planning and zoniag commis-
lion Wednesday. 
The Pinal County Planning and 
Zoning Commission voted unani-
mously to send the Red River 
Area Plan to the county board of 
supervisors with a favorable 
recommendation. 
Red River is part of the 46,000-
acre StanMar ValWy, a series of 
area plans in the Startfield/Mari-
cofia area scheduled to complete a 
Gtchwork quilt of development tween Casa Grande and south-
east Phoenix. 
Planners from A. Wayne Smith 
It Associates have been workina 
with county planning staff and 
Slanfield area landowners since 
last February, following the com-
mission! initiation of the Red 
River Area Plan. 
The land use guide Includes ap-
proximately 12,050 acres owned 
by Karl Eller, chief executive offi-
cer of the Circle K Corp., and his 
partner In the joint venture, Timo-
thy R. Olson, of Paragon Homes. 
Also included are 2,$0 acres of 
state-leased land. 
Eller bought the land from 
Wayne's former partner, Louis 
Johnson of Stanfield, In 1979, and 
sold a portion to Olson last year. 
Since then, approximately 5,000 
acres have been sold, said Chris-
tin Laraway, Red River vice 
president 
The majority of the proposed 
area plan lies west of Stanfield be-
tween White Parker and Mari-
copa Roads. 
Beginning a half-mile north of 
Interstate 8, the property extends 
approximately 3V4 miles north to 
the southern boundary of the Mar-
icopa Indian Reservation. The re-
maining portion, approximately 
20 percent of the total area devel-
opment, lies east of Stanfield, be-
tween Highway M and Interstate 
1 
County officials Intend the land 
use plan to serve as a blueprint for 
development in the Standfield 
area, approximately 23 miiea 
south of Phoenix. 
The area Is scheduled to Include 
residential, commercial, Industri-
al, recreational and community 
uses, including seven public 
schools sites and inter-connecting 
parkway boulevards. 
However, several developers 
during the planning process ex-
pressed concern about odor pro-
duced by a cattle feed lot In the 
middle of the plan. 
Michael B. Withey, Phoenix at-
torney representing Red River, 
said Bennedict Feed Lot now Is 
highlighted In red to alert pro-
spective land buyers they may be 
In an "odor" zone. 
Meanwhile, Withey said plan-
ners added four sections to the 
plans narrative to protect Benne-
dicta by spelling out "In no uncer-
tain terms they have a right to 
remain, in operation and anyone 
who wants to develop around 
them should be aware of that.'9 
Withey said In the future, a 2'i-
mile odor zone will be drawn 
around the lot 
Timothy Kaehr, Red River Re-
sources, Inc., said another feed lot 
within the plan owned by his com-
pany is scheduled to be phased out 
once development In the area 
begins! 
"it may not be viable 1015 
years from now," he said said of 
the Red River Feed Lot. "Over 
the last 10-15 years there has been 
a drastic reduction in the number 
of feed Iota in the United States." 
In other business Wednesday, 
the commission: 
— Unanimously favored a pro-
posal U> rezone the Town of San 
Manuel from general rural to 334 
acres of residential, one acre mul-
fiift,n« •"*•«•» acres of ml bile home park. 
The remainder of the town 
would remain general rural to acs 
commodate churches and schools 
San Manuel formerly was 
owned by Magma Copper Co., and 
his been zoned general rural 
MS. 9 8 2 , Mld Gwge ° , M * . S 
O'Brien said now that the com-
el i te business, it Is trying to set 
- inTEr?" - 1 —»"•» -
. ~ pbled a request from EllM. 
beth Bryant of Maricopa to retone 
10 acres from suburban ranch to 
«
PJ!!.?w e , ,!n« s t0 bu ,w «'"clen. 
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Red River Mountain Limited Partnership 
2855 East Brown Road, Suite 14 
Mesa, Arizona 65213 
(602) 832-4114 
August 29, 1989 
\M EXHIBIT 
P-3 
BY FAX 
Mr. Virl Thornton 
c/o Ron Harry 
Private Ledger 
139 E. South Temple, No, 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Dear Mr. Thornton: 
Pursuant to my conversation with Ron Harry, as General 
Partner of Red River Mountain Limited Partnership, I hereby 
consent to the following terms regarding your interests in the 
above referenced partnership: 
1. You will maintain your 3 units in the Partnership and 
will continue to make the yearly contributions for the 3 units for 
the years 1989 and 1990 in the amount of $2,885 per unit, per 
year • 
2. After the 1990 payment to the Partnership on your 3 
units, you will have no further obligation on these units although 
you will maintain your interest in the Partnership. 
3. These aforementioned items are agreed to providing I 
receive a check in the amount of $8,655.00 as the 1989 payment on 
your 3 units by Federal Express, overnight mail, to be received in 
my office the morning of Friday, September lf 1989. 
Please call me should you have any questions. 
Sincerely, 
^ jljr^Zq 
"I 
q A ' 
Accepted & Agreed to: 
Virl Thornton, TrusLee 
Virl W. Thornton Trust Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
FIRST NATIONAL BANK^i^1?7 
301 Leonard, Onaga, KS 66521 
913-889-4211 
OF ONAGA, KANSAS ACCT 341001358 
SEYMOUR W ISAACS 
IRA DTD 04-11-88 
PAGE 
TRANSACTION HISTORY 
INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT A£C0IMN"PERIOD ENDING 6/30/88 
SEYMOUR W ISAACS 
300 EVERGREEN AVE 
SUMMIT ?AR< UT 54060-Q00C 
DESCRIPTION CF TRANSACTION 
tANS. 
^TE 
CASH INVESTMENTS 
INCOME PRINCIPAL BOOK VALUE 
WITHHOLDING PAR/SHARES/UNIT 
;/01/Si eALANCE FORWARD 
:/0?/?,3 ROLLOVER CONTRIBUTION 
1n .00 
31000.00 
.00 
3/13/33 ASSET =URCHASSD 
RED RIVER MOUNTAIN LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP 
6/30/82 SAVINGS INTEREST 
FIRST NATIONAL 3ANK OF ONAGA 
IRA CASH ACCOUNT 
5.5% INTEREST 
6/30/S8 CUSTODIAL FEE 
3.31 
12.00-
30600.00- 30600.00 
6.000000 
NEW BALANCES .00 .00 30991.31 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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FIRST NATIONAL BANK 
OF ONAGA, KANSAS ACCT a«iooi358 P .SE 
301 Leonard, Onaga, KS 66521 SEYMOUR W ISAACS 
913-889-4211
 I R A 0 T D 04 -11 -88 
INVESTMENT REVIEW 
INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT ACCOUNT
 A S OF 6/30/88 
! VALUE/ TOTAL TOTAL UNIT ESTIMATED YIELD ON 
lES/UNITS COST MARKET MARKET ANNUAL INCOME COST MARKET 
REAL ESTATE 
HVER MOUNTAIN LIMITED 
IERSHIP 
6.000000 30/600.00 .00 .000 .00 * .00 .00 
,L 2EAL ESTATE 
30600.CO .CO. .00 .00 .00 
SAVINGS 
' NATIONAL SANK OF ONAGA 
ASH ACCOUNT 
INTEREST 
91.310000 391.31 391.31 1.000 21.52 5.50 5.50 
L SAVINGS 
391.31 391.31 21.52 5.50 5 .50 
E CASH .00 .30 
IPAL CASH .00 .00 
TOTAL 30991.31 391.31 21.52 
i 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
FIRST NATIONAL BANK 
ONAGA, KANSAS BSSZI 
Phon* 913 889-4211 
CUSTODIAL IRA TRADING AUTHORIZATION 
The undersigned accountholder hereby acknowledges that he/she has retained 
Ron A Harry 
_ _ of 
Account Representative 
Firm 
as Account Representative 
for the IRA custodial account referenced below, under the following conditions: 
Ron A Harry is hereby appointed my 
Representative with authority to buy, sell and trade in securities for cash for my account in ac-
cordance with your terms and conditions to receive duplicated confirmations and statements 
covering transactions for my account and to do all acts and give orders and instructions neces-
sary or incidental thereto. I hereby confirm al l transactions in my account made on my behalf. 
I indemnify the custodian against any loss sustained as the result of transactions by my agent 
for my account. 
2. tAy Representative will not place a trade for my account before the initial seven day period af-
ter the establishment of my IRA has passed. This will allow for my right to revoke my IRA. 
3. This Authorization is not transferable without my consent and may be terminated by written no-
tification from me. I acknowledge responsibility for any transaction initiated prior to receipt of 
a termination letter. 
4. The account will be established as follows: 
First National Bank of Onaga Custodian 
FBO Seymour W Isaacs 
301 Leonard Street 
Onaga, KS 66521 
Tax ID No . 48-0974280 
Date of Acceptance 
_, IRA 
Accbynt Representative's Signature 
Rep's Mailing Address 
SfiLx LAKJL [jn UTAH- &1'1 
City Stote Zip • 
<gOI- S37 -?kOP 
• - - L
 t^m re\A&\ 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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RA QfthlltfAN Oi TROMT* FIRST NATIONAL .'ANK O f O N J O A Rollover Certification AfUwniofi**^ 
A 10 IKA ROIXOVI:R K<r/r«r i'iu lax> ft 
PART 1. TIMELINESS * 60 Days Tlie funds you receixtd from the distributing IkA must be depuiitci wjtfiih 60 days after you teceive than. 
Date ymi received funds or property from the distributing IKA: _ J ij ZV ' ' , . 
tJ YES D NO U the date of deposit within 60 days* // YES, you tow mrt /fre fi*it ttquimnenl% plane continue. 
PART I. ONE YEAR RESTRICTION You may mukc only one IRA fo l low every « month*, pec iRA. 
Dale you received fund* or property from the distributing IRA (date listed under MiW 1): _ _ _ _ _ . _ 
Data you received your last rollover distribution (prkyr to thin rollmm distribution) from the dltftributinft mA? 
LJ YES II NO Have 12 months or more passed between the above two dates? 
"O Not Applicable If YIX or mrf §rphcMhtrf yrai aswr m«f iht mmd tt^uittmrnt. Piete mr<f §nd cvmnkk the Htpmtutt wcthm (*tom 
UALIHED FIHKEMfcNI PLAN OK tAX S H H T L R M ) ANNUITY IO IRA KOI LOVbR r/,,iv f t a w //u- /«y HJ, 
PART I. 
TART Z. 
PART\ 
Option A. 
Option 6. 
Option C. 
Option D. 
PART 4. 
PARTS. 
;NATUKI: 
ELIGIBLE PERSON lb certify you were an alfpble participant in a plan, pktfae check one of the items bcknv. 
Rcgaitiing file plan from which you received tbt money or property you Intend tu roll over, are or wen? you (check the one th*t Millies): 
U A participant in the plan, H The surviving spouse beneficiary of a deceased participant, or 
H Thf alternate payee identified in a Qualified Domestic Relations Order 
// ym* hax* mkiad mt cf iht items atot*, pittite continue.
 f 
ELIGIBLE PLAN To crrtify thnt your employer muinlained the prvper kind of }4an to allow a ntilover to an iRA, pirate the%k one or »KW 
of th Item bekm 
The plan from which you received the money or property you intend to mil over won a: 
U IVnsion Plan luaaar jut. Moi(a)) 
H Profit Sharing Plan or fctock Bonus flan [under IKC S40l(a), including iroy MOI<k) jibn) 
Q lax Sheltered Annuity |vnder IKC §401) 
Caution: if you are a participant in mof« than one o/ the same kind of pin". h« t*m»m|4i* yi»uf tutipkiyiT uitiuUincd Inoi i^twiun plaro, 
iptdal aggregation wk$ may apply. tou should consult your t#* advi** *<> *** if (!»**« ml** apply u> you. 
// you tumr teitettd one of tht §hwc Hem*, pi(**r exmiint*. 
ELICIDLE DlSlRlDLrriON Fkusc miirw tmh vf the dittributuni QfHiws outlined find choose the one that §ppli<* to this rtlowt. 
I 1 JVrttal Diatribution The dlatribution iu a Rntial Diaiributkm it the following axjuircments are met: 
1. a. The distribution is at least 50% of the balance to the credit of your account determii\ed immediately Won? the dl^hihutioiv 
b, The distribution was made berauaa of the participant'* Nitpamtkm from service, death, or disability. AND 
c. Vbu at* electing to rr^ at thin an a partial distribution rollover (under IRC fM2(ti)(S)(l»l OR 
2. Th# afwbal Employee Stock Ownenihip Han rule in IRC fr401(a)(28)(B)(u) applies, 
r
 Qualified Ibtal Dlabibution l"hU distributiort is a Qualified Total Distribution if the following reiuiiren\ema are met: 
1. "AJU received (or will recoil) the entire balance to tl^ e cnxiit of your account In one tax year. (Note tlutt the entire htthmrr 
ofttt lux uhcltcred annuities punhuscd while yuu wurked fur yuvr Emptiw must I* pitd to you in one tax yeatj AND 
2. YOU have received the distribution because of one of the following reasons (plcttBC chevk); 
D The participant's dcatti. I l Attainment of afte 59V*. 
f l 'firminaticm of employment or separation from KTvicu. 77>i* dw* nut upply tu wtif-ivr^yed individuals* 
I ) Pliability /as defined in IRK %7Hm)(7)L Vm only upplie* to netf-tfnjdayed vviivid*al». 
O The plan wus ternuiuited. Thh doe$ not i\yiy to ta% sheltered annuities flRC $40$). 
Cautiaa Atmut ce«wiUa§iing of ftiiuU: If i)w dMrilmtUHi you ractlved OH thla cti^ gory and you roil iha funds over to an iRA and mi* regular 
p*yii*»iift or hiTtdfi fa** mht^ w.u^n yi»u wiik not br able to mil tlir funds back U» •mitiirf qualified Mti»#m«ni plan oi iiu thcltcrrd annuity. 
U Distribution Uf Voluntary Deductible Emplovti Contributions this is a rollover that Consist* only of accumulated voluntary 
o^ductible employee contributions fm. dvfined m IRC i7Z(oH5HB)J. 
O Qualified Dumeatic Rclationa Order Diitributlufi Thlb is a rollover that eonsi»t» of funds or ^fopertv recvived front a qualified 
pension Or profit aiiaring ylu\ oursuaiit to a Qualified Dumestii; Relations Order las defined in IRC §4l4(l>)l. 
U $u\ please pnivide the Luiitouian or Trustee with a ivpy of the relevant portions of the Qualified Dumestk Relations Outer. 
ff yuN flair thmtod urn vf the /uwr yytwns iisitd *UAt. p/*Mr timttfUit 
EUOIBLU DEPOSIT 
G YES D NO Does the rollover deposit consist only of the amount of cash or the property distributed, or the proceeds 
from the sale of the distributed property? 
IJ YES (J NO Poc* the rollover deposit consist only of Employer contributions, Voluntary Deductible Rmplnytt 
Contrlbutions. ta* dofcrrcd earningSr or any combination thereof? 
IJ 7L$ to both Of Ow thmx itot*, y\cair vmtkm** 
TIMELINESS • 60 Days Thrjund* i*r pntpetiy you mnt*d mutt be dieted info tm IRA within 60 r/ays after yvu mxhxd them. 
Date Votl Rccciwd the Plan Ptmda or Prof^rty; * ... 
U YES O NO h tlte date of this deposit within 60 days? If YES. you Ha\x met the last vf the five reauimrKfd* for making a 
qualified wttment plan or tat sheltered annuity to IRA rollowr, Please ttad and complete the Signature section behmx 
I'U.iyi' lioul A'ut «_i>ift/*Vfr 
Due to the ioiporlant t^ x ^»I»SWUK'IKV> rvlatina •« roiling ovvf funds to m» lRA,. lhra,bevn iulvivvd h> sec a tiuc profvKsk>na). 
I certify that I satiafy thp rpquiremeniii for making a rollover into my 
a value of $ 'Of rem*. v» * , 1 hereby inwocably designate tltat this contribution is to be treated an «i rullover eontributi<m. 
The riMfrvtiaii iir Tmwhf iu iHititWI k\ n*lv fiillv on mv tiTixiuatum 1 iscoresidv itKiiume the nHinonffibilkv kir anv adverse constouencps reiatlnr 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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COUNTY/('MOW! 
KrCOUNTHOLDER 
INFORMATION 
DESIGNATION Or 
RFNLTlClARYflFS) 
iYima/y 
l3cntficiary(lff») 
0NA6A, KANSAS MS2t 
tmj iiMiii 
IRA STMPLMER INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT ACCOUNT APPLICATION 
^IW \35L8 .... art *Wf»ld»»»™( ffj *»i 
rjie,fi*$ IRA 
[.} Arntndmtnt 
Typt of IKA 
Contribution: 
H Regular 
G SpOUtll 
n SEP 
"65 Ruiiovff 
1.1 Tranirei 
ACttXfNTNO 
PI infill AMOUNT $ . 
DAM _ . 
MAlJt.ftM JAXVHAKW 
l)()MK AIWRISS J S . O D . ^ P e X < f l & £ . E V _ / * 0 ^ _ 
/ l l ' l t J J * 
CITY 
STATE -UTA' t t ^
 fl -
M.X lAl.SECl'KITVNO. fij2.-/»=ja^^V" _ DATEOIIIIKIH //ir/iV.. 
J designate the individual^) named below as my pritnfiry and continue?!! hVnWtciary(to) »>Mhk IRA. I ri'vuke all prliw »KA 
Beneficiary dtftignatior*. if any. made bv mf. I undertfanH thai I may dump* or add Bcwliriarics at any lime by tumplrting ami 
dclivcrdifji th* proper iorm to the Cu*tooi«»n. 
It any primary or contingent Bcnduiary d»f* before ma. his or her intend And the uiteirtt o( his o* hn heir* shall lenniiwu-
completely, and the perrrntaKc >iwre olany remaining Benriiuaiy(iKl *hall be imre*4fd on a pro i.tt* basis. 
The blowing i*^ividu.iJ(0 *ha)l be my I'rlwary Henrficlarydcs): 
MAMP C LAUQlk «5 , j5 / to££_ saciAi..«cuwiiYNi>. . . . 
ADDRFM - , IJATFOIWKTH 5 M A R l V ^ r ! 
.. _ . KMAUONSHIP Q>.rOU*£jSi 
NAME ... 
AlJUfttSS 
.scKIAt JiKllRITYNO . 
DAMUi DIKIli 
RFIATKJNSHU' 
MfARI. 
Contingent 
fteittficUrylira) 
Spousal Content 
SIGNATURES 
NAMr. . .
 r . M X I A l S U V k l T Y N O 
APDRISS.. IMTt'OI W i l l . 
. . kMAIKJNSiltl' . ._. 
If none of <he Primary pejirfifiarii* survive n* \ the following individual!*) khall l>e my BcmrtwMk*): 
NAMC . . 
ADDRWS 
soc;iAi.stcuon'NK>. 
DATFOrHIKlM 
R| IA HONSHU' 
SilAkL 
MlARl 
N A M F _ . . . ...... ttxiAI.St'CUKiiYNM. 
ADL)KIS> | )A!IOlMKUl . * SIIAWI-. . 
kllAUONWH* . 
1 am the ftpmjfic of the IKA a/rounthoider nami-d above. 1 a«rw t«» my spot** A naming ot a pi-iuury iknefk-wiy ot)>cr lhan myM'if. I 
acknowledge that I have received a fair and reasonable di»lo*unr o* my spouse* property and fiananoaJ »Migatkw J «I'N*> aeknowl 
edge that i ihiill liav* not claim whatsoever against thcCuvtiNJian ii» .my payment to mv «.poinen named licnefidMiyta*) 
r>J*C>U5t.'6M*^AHjH»- hATI 
/mporimif: P/easr rra/f f^/u/r >.^ K'^ >'K 
I unckTiUrKi the fltRibility ruquirviwnl* f»i ll>f tynr of IKA depict I *tm nuking jind i sUttv iki( I do qualify ««• nuki* the de|Kw». 
1 have received ,i copy ol the Application, f . W - A Plan ARrevnu'id and Distlonyrv St.tirrncm. I under.i.md that the len«% and 
condition* which anply to thiv Individual Ktfirtmrnt Account iue n>nt.nnrd in tfiiw Applu.uion ami IIK* 5A0.S-A Plan Ajwrmrni. 
I agree to b# bound by thowe i\:wv> ond rendition*. Within si'ven (7) days IKUI' ihe KU\C I open \h\* IKA I may revoke it without 
pm<dty by mailing or delivering ,i wntirn nctlcr to the (.'u'.toiliiili. 
t assume complete re^p«'>is»biliiy lor; 
0, )>l*rmininfi that I am eli^itle \e>r in IKA <NKII yiMt I make a contribution 
2. Insuring thiil iill contributions I rmike an- within the limits sel Inflh by thi- \ A \ laws. 
3. The tax ronv^urneeft of any ennhibution <inrhjdm|( rollover I'liottilMiliuns^ and <l^l/lbutions. 
I ixpre%^lywriify that I tike <.ytnplHH M<,ponsihiIity tor the tvj"1 »>i mvenment mstiumtntU) 1 cl»fu»se tn l\md my IRA. 
itnd that L«WA>todiHii \s?^Mk of Any liability re^ardintt tn# prrlonnatue «»i <«ny investment cl\niraj make. 
• FirsLtWianalBaliYoWDitra CuSL f»/tt 
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RA1 IVstrvaaM OR TMUVIU' 
r i R f l •^^• •wa^ i .^ .v ~ -
Rollover Certification 
ArfjtxjNniouTW, 
TO IRA ROIXOVI K 
PART 1. TIMELINESS - 60 Days The fund$ you received fntrn the distributing IRA miiaf be rf<p*if< 
Pat* ytm received fund* or property from the distributing IRA: , 4 
/V.M-V Kti'iV.*« 7/«- /ckt .n.H* uV. 
in 60 day* after ytm mv««r tftrtrt. 
FART 2. 
I)< YBS U NO h the date oi deport within 60 days? if YES, you ton* mef fhf fhtl requirement, p/m* cimftfiiaf. 
ONE YEAR RESTRICTION Yhu may make only one IRA rollovt r every 12 month*, per IK A. 
Date you r e r e a d funds ur property from the distributing IRA (date H**td under Part lh 
Date you received your iant rollover distribution (prior to thin rvlloxw distribution) hum the distributing lKAi_ .. 
Q YES n NO Have 12 month* or more passed between thf •bow two date*? 
9? Not Applirahlft If YES or net apfWiaWe. you tot* rot <** warna4 requirement. P/m* 'tYidarid comrto* <k Symturr stLtttilMcw. 
JAURI-i ) RETIRF.Ml N T FLAN Ol< TAX S t i l l Tt-RFD ANNUITY TO IK A ROLIOVI K \\ttf K . T W tin hrc l\i'k H. 
PARTI, 
PART 2. 
PARI 3. 
Option A. 
Option B. 
Option C 
Option a 
PART 4. 
mKT5. 
SIGNATURE 
ELIGIBLE PERSON 'lb certifv you were an eligible participant in a plan, plea** check o i * of the items below. 
Regarding the plan from which you received the money or property you intend to roU over, are or www you <chn* the <w Mai aftrfw*): 
D A participant in the plan, H The surviving apousc beneficiary of a deceased participant, or 
D The alternate payee Identified in a Qualified Domestic Relations Order 
// yw AiW attested vw cj 0* items afcuw, fi/at* wnlmue. 
ELIGIBLE PLAN To certify that your employer maintained the proper k\t\d rf }Man to ullow a tvllmrr to an IRA, filmic tha i w or mew 
of the item M(W 
The plan from which you raceived the money or property you intend to toil over wan a: 
D rVnaton Plan (under mc: W\{*)\ 
U Profit Sharing Plan or 5tock Bonua Tlan [unkt IRC HOl(a), includes »KC h401(k) pUni 
D TAX Sheltered Annuity [undtr IKC ftftQl 
CiutlOAl 1/ )vu «r<« » y«nk'lpitit in more than \\n* of the same kind o\ plan, ftw example vour employer maintained two pviwiun plans, 
special aajpeganon rulM any appiy. ftu ihut»W on mult your tax advivor to *«e if these rvVt apply to you, 
// yow i^#ur iWartM mv» «tf r hf atwr ir«w, pl«^ cmnniif. 
ELIGIBLE DISTRIBUTION View rrvieu* m'h tj the diMtibution options outlined and chw*e the one ihai allies tv thi* nrthwr. 
U hftial Diatribution The dlitrituuion is a Puxtiil Distribution if the followii\g requinrnienta are met: 
1, a. The distribution is at leciit 50% of the balance to the credit of your account determined immediately brktev the distribution, 
b, The distribution was n\ade because of the participant'a aeparation from service, death, or diMnilitv. AND 
C. You are electing to treat thif as a partial distribution rollover fwrtder IRC %402(a)($)(T»l OK 
2, The special Employee Stock Ownership Plan ruie in IRC M01(a)(28)(BXII) applien. 
L' Qualified Total Distribution thta distribution 19 a Qualified Ibtal Distribution if the following reouwemente arc met; 
1, \bu received (or will receive) the entire balance to the credit of your Account in one tax year. (Note that the entire tohmct 
of nil tax iiieltctd annuities purrhwd white yw worked for your Employer mu$t be paid to yov in one tax ,vrurj AND 
2. Yw hm* received the distribution because of one of the foNnwine/reawn* (plane dtuck): 
C The participant** death. LI Attainment U age 59V!, 
I 1 Jermination Of employment or separation from service This r/c*> n\H apply to scif-employcd indilnttual*. 
IJ Disability (a» defined in IRC %72(mH7)l This only a\ylin h sclf-nnyluyed individuals. 
G T1K plan was terminated. This does not apply to tax uhelterad annuities IIRC §403J. 
Ciotion About <Jommia§Hng of Pundst if the dMHbutkm you rectived lib this lAtpgory <od you mil the hind* mw to an 1KA and titU r%K\ik*i 
t* ur hit'd* fmm othtr sourcci, yuv will net b* ibif to roll the fundi bxk <u muKhtr qualiiied rvtK-m n^t fttn or tax rhHtfnnl annuity. 
I I PistriboHoxi Of Voluntary Deductible Employee ContrlbuUonn Thla is a rolktvei \\\*t consisu only of accomtjiated voiuntary 
deductible employee contribution? (an defined in IRC i72(o)(5HB)L 
n Qualified Domestic Relation* Order Distribution TluS Is a rollover that consists of fund* or property received fmm a qualified 
Ptiainn or profit sharing plan cumuant to a Qualified Domeatir Relatiuns Order iat defined m IRC tfl4(p)h i a Please pmvidc the Luitoalan or TruMae with a copy of the relevant portimi» uf the Qualified Domestic Relations Ordet. 
If yav now r+mixd imr vf th* four ciHKw lifted at***, plane ivnlinHt. 
RLIGIBLE DETOSIT 
H YES D NO Does the rollover deposit wi\%isi only of the amount of cash or the property distributed, or tha proceeds 
from the sale of the distributed proparty? 
Q YES U NO Doe* the n)lli>ver deposit COnsi* only uf Employer contribution A, X^luntary Dcdttctible r.mpkiyee 
Conrributioni, tax deferred earning*, or any combination thereof? 
If rf.5 tu U*h tf ihf abote Hem, pk** *>nii*u* 
TIMEtlNLbS - 60 Days The fundi or pnjperty you received mwsf be de}xxited into an IRA within 6(1 day* after you mriwd them. 
Oabc )AMI Received the Han Funds or Property; _ _ _ _ _ _ . . - . . — _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ — _ _ ^ . 
L) YFS (1 NO k the date of this deprmit within 60 days? If Yr$. you hut* met the last Of the five requirements fvr nuiktn^ u 
qualified retirement plan or tax sheltered annuity to IRA nAlover. Please read and eomplttr. the Signature u\Hon beim\ 
l»»«n advmtd to »cc a i&* professional. 
4
 ..in cash* and other fropeny with 
Due to the important I** consequences rvkititiy, tc» mlllnc; over funds to an IRA^ J Jv4v/v 
1 certify that 1 satia/y the rpqulrements for mating a mllover inh> my IRA uf $ 3 L £ S L 2 . 
a value of $ ^ O&O , _ | hereby irrevcxiably designate that IhU contributkin is to be treated a* a rollover cotirribution. 
*n%« #*ii«inriian AT Trustoi m »Q(ilkd to n»ly fully tm my ccrttftcation. i exprewiv awume the responsibility for any adwnte wnscqucntvv tvl\lu% 
. * L .ii i« „,% 14 t^J ^. RHimimalaV int those ainspquenccs. It this plover is 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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CUSTODIAL IRA TRADING AUTHORIZATION 
The undersigned accowntholder hereby acknowledge that he/she has retained 
Ron A Harry of 
Account Roproitntatlve 
as Account Representative 
Firm 
for the IRA custodial occount referenced below, under the following conditions? 
Ron A H&rry - - ~^- , Is hereby appointed my 
Representative with authority to buy, sell and trade In securities for cash for my account in ac-
cordance with your terms ond conditions !o receive duplicated confirmations and statements 
covering transactions for my account and to do all acts and give orders and instructions neces-
sary or incidental thereto. I hereby confirm ail transactions in my account made on my behalf. 
I indemnify the custodian against any loss sustained as the result of transactions by my agent 
for my account 
2. M y Representative will not place a trade for my account before the Initial seven day period af-
ter the establishment of my IRA has passed. This will allow for my right to revoke my IRA. 
3. This Authorization is not transferable without my consent and may be terminated by written no-
tification from me, I acknowledge responsibility for any transaction initiated prior to receipt of 
a termination letter. 
4. The account will be established as follows: 
First National Bank of O n a g a Custodian 
FBO Seymour V? Ieaace 
301 Leonard Street 
O n a g a , KS 66521 
Tax ID N o . 48-0974280 
AccountTi&lder'i Signature 
Dote of A«e»ptone« 
IRA 
'» Signature 
i l l £.. P° Is^f^.. ort ^m 
k LX4^ r*> 
Account Repreientative's Slgi 
Rep's Mailing Addftfti 
SALT (AKI On (AAH- W'l 
a t / Stat* zip 
Telephone (area code) Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
<f t4*.i+\ 
(c) Estimated adjusted gross income during ourrent 
yean 
L689 than $50,000 $200,000 - $300,000 
' $ 50,000 - $100,000 ,^ ___» $300,000 - $400,000 
, $100,000 - $200,000 . over $400,000 
(d) Estimated highest tax rate at which federal income 
taxes will be paid during the current year 
(without giving effect to an investment in the 
Partnership) will be twenty-eight percent (28%) 
(thirty-four percent (34%) for corporations): 
—___» yeB .___• n 0 
8. NET WORTH. 
(a) Current net worth is not less thant $. 
(b) Current net worth (exclusive of home, home 
furnishings and automobiles) is not less than: 
$ . 
(c) The current value of my liquid assets (cash, 
freely marketable securities, cash surrender value 
of life insurance and other items easily conver-
tible into cash) is sufficient to provide for my 
current needs and possible personal contingencies! 
yes _.. no 
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS TO BE PROVIDED BY OFFEREES WHO 
ARE INDIVIDUALS, OR BY TiJE PERSON MAKING THE INVESTMENT 
DECISION ON BEHALF"ti? CORPORATIONS, PARTNERSHIPS. TRUSTSOR 
OTHER ENTITIES. 
1# Mamet
 HRM NATIONAL BANK UF0NAGA<^ fy**** c^'.^s^ctl 
Business Addresj&l Leonard Street _ _ 
OHAGA, KANSAS bbb l^ 
HIUIW (813) 889411V —" 
Business Telephone Number: ( ) 
2. (a) Current Occupation or Profession', 
(b) Current Position or Title: _ _ 
(c) Nature of Duties:
 —
_______ 
(d) Period Employed: .  
5 
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Business or professional education: 
School or Field of Dates of Degree 
License study Attendance (if any) 
Prior employment, positions, business affiliations or 
occupations: (Please set forth employment history 
during at least the past five years, indicating 
employerr title, principal responsibilities and years 
of service*) 
Details of any training or experience in financial or 
business matters not disclosed in Items 3 and 4: 
6. Z have made the following investments which reflect my 
Knowledge and experience in financial and business 
matters: 
7. I have previously purchased securities which were sold 
in reliance on the limited offering or private offering 
exemptions from registration under the Act and state 
securities laws: 
yes no 
PPRCHASER REPRESENTATIVE. Does the purchaser intend to use 
6 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
FOR inrni nv mr™™""- OFFEREES 
signature!8) o£ Prospective 
Investor(a) 
> k »-• >. 
please 
Signature^) o£ prospective 
Investor(s) 
Please Vtuil lum 
Executed at 
on t h i s _^ <**Y o £ 
Iclty) 
. 19. 
• c 
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FOR EXECUTION BY CORPORATE, 
PARTNERSHIP OR TRDST OFFEREE 
FIRST WAI iONAL BMNK Or v/iwuA &fi gey*'*'- UJ, JZ***rf z&* 
301 Leonard Street * * * * W . 
QNAGA, KANSAS 66521 
Name of Corporation, ^ ^ ^ S ^ I p I S j 5 j u s t (Pleas* Print) 
"Sk, 
By* By;i ^.T^inwirai 
WfeUt 
Byt .. _.. 
T i t l e : 
U 
mmmtmm^^mmmm^u$tmmmmmmm^mmmmmmmmmatmmm 
Signature of person(a) making investment decision on behalf of 
the entity. 
Executed at &W*jfr , /£S 
. *tC- (city) ~ ~ (State) 
on this 9 day of }7tA^ 19 tf . 
' 56•QUEERED.79 
10 # 
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LIMITED PARTNER'S SIGNATURE PACE 
frOR TRUST INVESTORS 
TOITTHE 
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT OF 
RED RIVER MOUNTAIN LIMITEP PARTNERSHIP, 
CERTIFICATE OF LIMITED PARTNERSHIP 
• of 
RED RIVER MOUNTAINTlMITED PARTNERSHIP 
• AND 
SUBSCRIPTION AGREEMENT 
By execution of this signature page, the undersigned intends 
to subscribe for and, upon acceptance by the General Partners, to 
beoome a Limited Partner in RED RIVER MOUNTAIN LIMITED PARTNER-
SHIP, an Arizona limited partnership. The undersigned intends 
that this signature page be attached to the master copies of the 
Subscription Agreement, the LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT OF RED 
RIVER, MOUNTAIN LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, and the Certificate of 
Limited partnership of RED RIVER MOUNTAIN LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, 
which may be filed by the General Partners in order to evidence 
the admission of the undersigned as a Limited Partner of the 
Partnership* Said master copies shall be., -kept- i.n. fthfiusejotral 
files of the Partnership, together with th* signature pages 
executed by all other Limited Partners, and the master copies, 
together with the attached signature pages, shall each become 
fully signed documents with the same effect as if all parties had* 
Bigned the same document* 
Name of Trust (please print or type) ' J 
Name of Trustee (please print or type) 
v- // // . 
Date Trust was formed 
By: 
Trustee's signature 
Trust Addresst .?<?/ ^ ^ < u » W ^ 
<$A/AJ A xrs 6Csrz/ 
•Wnil f 'WWVMIWVMMWV* 
Attention! 
17 
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EXECUTED at . 
this <?*,' day of 
STATE OF >^f 
4* £££. *£.,, Mityty) iM. (State) 
) ss. 
•a 
19{£, before 
state/ duly 
County of raJhuJaJomte. ) 
On this, the f ^ day of . . ^ * 7 
roe, the undersigned^ a Notary Publicot »o*u »*«w«, v.w*j 
commissioned and sworn, personally appeared Ak/,M Z.S&HA-m*. 
Ts£/4- QSZ/Z-/C&L , known to me to be Trustee of 
the trust that executed the within instrument, and acknowledged 
that he and the said trust were duly authorized to, and did, 
execute the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed 
my official seal the day and year in this certificate first above 
written. 
Jtie*. 
(MTHEfflNCLWARD 
State of Kansas 
My A.ppt Exp. April 2G, i?9? 
My Commission Expires: 
c in an nd-'for said 
18 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Data i 9/fio/rf 
Dtt*i tifopfe' 
56.SUB RED.81 
ACCEPTANCE OF SUBSCRIPTION: 
RED RIVER MOUNTAIN LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP, an Arizona 
limited partnership 
/jib** N. Fatfisworth, Jr. " 
^Ita General Partner 
19 
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Red River Mountain Limited Partnership 
2855 East Brown Road, Suite 14 
Mesa, Arizona 85213 
(602) 832-4114 
March 1 5 , 1989 
Seymour Isaacs Trust 
300 Evergreen Drive 
Summit Park, UT 84060 
Dear Seymour: 
As you are aware, according to the Offering Memorandum, the 
first annual payment on Red River Mountain Limited Partnership is 
due and payable on April 25, 1989. Therefore, we are requesting 
your contribution be in our office no later than April 15, 1989 
in order to have all checks clear the bank prior to the payment 
due date. 
Your check should be made payable to Red River Mountain 
Limited Partnership and sent to: 
Red River Mountain Limited Partnership 
2855 E. Brown Road, Suite 14 
Mesa, Arizona 85203 
You own 6 units so the total amount you need to send is 
$17,310.00. Please be sure to send it no later than April 15, 
1989. 
If you have any questions please don't hesitate to call. 
It's a pleasure to have you as part of this project. 
> A ^ 
o s s F a r n s 
4UUM 
Cre&fe/Cannon 
R F : F B / p a z 
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31 l\/\ I l\Ji\/\L HANK 
>F ONAGA, KANSAS 
301 Leonard, Onaga, KS 66521 
913-889-4211 
1 , 1 - r t " 0030 
ACCT S O 0 C 1 3 5 7 
FRANK 2RGCCH ' 
IRA OTD 0 4 - 0 4 - S S 
= A; 
i< 5RG0CH 
) SO 15QGE 
TRANSACTION HISTORY 
INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENTAQCOUNTERIOD ENDING 6/3Q/SS 
J T I F U L UT 34010-OGCO 
D E S C R I P T I O N OF TRANSACTION 
CASH INVESTMENTS 
INCOME P R I N C I P A L 20CK VALUE 
WITHHOLDING P A R / S H A R E S / U N I T S 
' 3 3 B A L A N C E FORWARD 
' S 3 ROLLOVER CONTRIBUTION 
.00 .00 .00 
- ^ <1 o ; 
_ 1 •- J • I 
'88 ASSET PURCHASED 
RED RIVER MOUNTAIN LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP 
'S3 SAVINGS INTEREST 
FIRST NATIONAL SANK OF CNA3A 
IRA CASH ACCOUNT 
5.5% INTEREST 
'S3 CUSTODIAL FEE 
NEW BALANCES 
.S3 
12.00-
.00 
30600.CO- 3Q60C.OG 
6.GC3000 
.CC 3 0 6 8 3 . 3 3 
I'-
l l 
r • U EXHIBIT 
i n n 
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* I M fIS UU1U o: '00001 
CUSTODIAL IRA TRADING AUTHORIZATION 
The undersigned ateountholder hereby acknowledge, that h . / . h e hat fotalned 
Ron A Harry _^___^_____. ._._ _ of 
Account Representative 
. . a» Account R»pre<entative 
Firm 
I. 
for the IRA custodial account referenced below, under the following condition,, 
Ron A Harry » hereby appointed my 
Representative with authority to buy sell and .rod. in — ^ J " ^ ^ ! 
sary or incidental thereto. I hereby confirm all transact™, m my J * * * * ^ ? ^ ~ 
[indemnify the cu,todian ogoimt any lot, su,tain.d a, the result of tramod.on, by my agent 
for my account* 
2. My Representative will not place a trade for my account before the ^ ™ % £ " * 
ter the e,tabli,hm.nt of my IRA ha, patted. Thh will allow for my nght to revoke my IRA. 
3. Thi, Authorization i , not transferable without my consent and may * < ^ * * J ^ ^ 
tiflcotion from me. I acknowledge responsibility for any t r a n s a c t s Initialed pr.or to rece.pt 
a termination loiler. 
4. The account will be established as followu 
First National Bank of O n a g a Custodian 
p j Q Frank ftrgoch _ _ _ _ _ IRA 
301 Leonard Street 
O n a g a , KS 66S21 
Tax ID No. 48*0974260 
/ Mfe&tT 
jAccpvnthold/r'i Signature 
e of Acceptance 
atlve'i ^fSrature 
Rep's Molting Address 
City ' State Up 
. % O J . - . A * . 3 ? : ? 4 ? 6 : 
Telephone (aroe code) Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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JNTHOLUK1I 
PORMATrON 
^NATION OF 
HCIARYUfcSi 
Primary 
BcncticiaryOti) 
C'fKwtir^htnm. (SlsyaiMiu 02700002 
I  STMPLIE1EK INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT ACCOUNT APPLICATION 
nmtnttmtmi to <m 
Chrtk 
1.3 Amendment 
Typt of IRA 
Contribution* 
!.] RvjtuUr 
iiSpOVMd 
GSti' 
P ftollom 
(M Triniftt 
ACCOUNT NO 4! (ID /3S7 
DU1JSITAMOUNT.5 3 Q j 7 Q Q 
_ IWIb 
MAhfKXUAXVFAKW 
*irmi>i: 
___. . . . . . UilSlNISM'HONU J | 
lUJAH 
NAMP. 
|IC>MEAI)OHU»S 
CI1Y 
MATI: 
SOCIAL.SEC UK! IY N O 
I U c v k A l t f tht Individual!*) named below , n m y primary and contingent Hrori t t laryhe*) «»t this U<A. I tewtfc* all pr ior J K A 
Bcnrttrlnry d t i i i tn i t iunv if i n y . made l»\' m r . 1 uruler>t.ind thai J m a y i t a n g r or a d d VeWi'lf U r t o at any time b y complet ing a n d 
delivering t h i proper fo rm to ihc Cuv iudwiv 
II ii\y p r imary or c o n t i n e n t tlencfKiarv d«f% before me, h i * or hrr Intern! u»*d flit interest t4 his or her heirs J«ull U-rmisute 
U»fll|if#l#rv, and the percentage share of any remaining JJertetfttiarydef) th<iU be increased mi »i p m rata h u t * . 
The Mlnwu 
NAME 
ngindividualfc) Ouh be ro^i'mnary 8cndkijry(tf4); 
J&Jrfj*„ _£ &£& PCM. 
ADDRESS lSVO._lMa \S0QJE. . 
.SUCIAI si* tram- yo « S L 2 2 - * ? 4 V * ^ K . : 
lUTECVWKIrViy^^/fctLMIAKtyDP '* 
KlUTIONSlUT &PtH<a> jL / 
NAM* 
ADOKFSS 
SCMIA! SliCUKJIVNO 
UAIMX K1KIH 
RFI.Allf.aNM III' . 
Ml AW 
Contingent 
ft»ft*fMasy(ica) 
NAMP. _ . . SOClAtSiniKITYNO 
ADUKLSS . . - ~ ~ DAlMir l l lR l l l 
. .... - . . . .—. . KIIAHONSHIP 
If none uf the Pr imary Benefit tor ie* turvivc m r , thr fol lowing JndivinSia>l(a) iha i l k - tuy H«'ne{iciary<ie*>. 
NlAkty g*2£tfrlt- . . ^ . . S(XIAI..Sr.C.UHnVNO 
ADOflESS. LWitOI'HIKlM 
K I J A I I O N S I H T 
tflAUl 
flfAKI. 
NAMIv. 
AUUKIttf. 
SOnAI.SUUKIIYNU. 
DAII.OI MIRTH 
kfcl.AMON.SI III* 
fJlAUL 
MMJUI Content I Am thi ftpouse of the IUA arcouniholder IMIUMJ above I agiw to my H H , M * * K naming W a pnnury Heneiii tory other than ntytfii I 
ftrknowiedgc that I liave received i lair 4irid returnable tiikclvHue ni my ^pouv'< prtqtTty ,ind fianamiul «*li)i«*Ui»rv. 1 al><» «itimtH'i« 
Ki|tft that I ihaU haye not riaim uhatRiewrr against the Qittvdkin h« any payment to my .pouv* naiiK\i IW»ncfiriary(ie»K 
IGNATURES 
slOtlSISSKJSAIUXH 
hnpt*tit*ni: Pit*** lead brfnrv *ix*wifi. 
1 undentand the fligibllity requtrcmeni> hx* thr typt of 1I(A deposit 1 «IHI nukim; and I sdite ih.it I do qualify in m.iki< tin- itefHMl. 
1 have tttffivfd a copv oi the A|»j»l»vaUon. 5 My A Plan A^revmrnt ^nd Di;»cio»urv Statrmrnt. 1 undeintAnd thai the leftnv anil 
condition* which apply to this Individual Retirement Acuntitt <»»e rontained in this Application and ihe* 5 . W A I'Inn A K I H W I H I . 
1 i&tt to bt bound by thove ierm$ and condition*. Wilhin i /vfn <7) days if urn the date ! o|n.*n ihit IK A I may icvttU it without 
penalty by mailing vt delivrritiK A wnucn nvlitv tu (lie Ciutodian. 
I ii iumc complete responsibility lor: 
]. tVttrmining that I am eligible lor an IRA ed»h yiMt I make a itwtrtUitioo 
7. In^urini? that all <oitird>«ilion* i maki jre williin ihr llmilx M*4 lorlh 1>V the t.vc bw». 
i . The Ux w(»n»ecp»en)h« ok any conlribi^ion (iin ludiliH tolloVIt coMlrthufmm) jiul dr^tnhotionK. 
I cvpavvKi^ertify trjftt I j /ke eomplete f'M>r>n*iblhty lor the tvi«c oi invrsiment instiuovnitsj I CIKHIM* |i%futul my IKA. 
^Habiltty rexardlny. in* |»erlormance of yiiy investment tlnA* lAnakr. 
. . - - _ , B 1 « & & * - . 
WITNLii li/OI 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TO IRA ROI l.OVtR 
ft\RT 1. TIMBUNIHK .WDfJhefunbyou received fmm ike distntmiing IRA must be debited within M days afltr you 
Date yuu received hind* or property from the distributing IRA: .. « " — 
^ YES O NO It the date erf deposit within 60 days? // YE& you have met Ihe fimt 1*4*1*1*01*, pfcijt eoMrimir. 
PART 2. ON* YEAR RESTRICTION >tui may mate only une IRA rollover every 12 montits, par IRA. 
Date you received funds or property hum the distnbutu* IRA (dale listed undei Art V. 
Date you received your last rollover distribution (prior to (hit nrtkm distribution) from the distributing IRA;. 
M YH» n NO Hav« 12 months or num.- passed between the ehow two dated 
f t Not Applicable i /Ytt«*i i i* i^MM.yt*k^ 
itcfise t nfnt* 
,LIFIFD KKHRIMIM II AN OK MX SHI 111 RID ANNUITY TO IKA KOM-OXfcK .1.. K.'. , . . l 1/ 
PART 1. EUOIBLB PERSON Tb certify yuu were an eligible participani in a plan, please chock ont of the llama^Mt>W 
l ^ i i ^ the plan tamtwhtt 
U A participant tn the plan. n The surviving spouse betwfvaiy ol a dcceaned participant, or 
I1 The alternate payvc identified in a Qualified Domestic Relations Order 
If you sewasks**ear•/ine <»rm> as** ptameeammm. 
PART 2. BUCIBIE FLAN % crmfr Mai your employer maintained ihe proper kind of pUm m etfrw • 10JJ0IW to an !RA. sfaar ehttk one m mm 
of the items belom 
The plan from which you mtlvwi tf *e money or property ymi intend to roll ov«f was a: 
U IVnsian Plan funder IKC HOKeH 
* n Profit Sharing nan or Stuck Bonus Man [under"Itcc nous), tnctudim mc ltot<k) p M 
C Ux Sheltered Annuity iundcf 4ftC 1403) 
CsutftMM M you eiv i participant m imm tJun one «tf the i*m» kind of |4a», k* stamp* vuor etnpUyar mMfiiAtwd ttm pension etswv 
ipaciai i v i a a i M rulM may «ppiy. lou should cvmu yuui tax advisor at MM a these mW# apply to you. 
// ym ham tmcki one ei the it*** *«*«, yUmmconimut. 
PART 3. EUGIBLC DISTRIBUTION Ptow review etch of Ihe distribution vytions OHilwed and thOOH l#* one thai ap\dm to thk ndh**% 
Option A. n Partial Dlitribllttoi The distribution is a Partial l)isirihutton tf the W»o^-lng iwulrcmew anj met: 
1. a. The distribution i* at least 5U% erf the balance to the credit of your account determined immediately before the duxribuuon. 
bt Ihe distribution wa$ made because uf the participantfa separation from service, death, wdisabilKy. AND 
c. *>u are electing to treat thU aa a partial distribution rollover iunder IRC UOUiHSml OR 
7. The special fimpkiyve Stock Ownership Plan rule in IRC S401(a)<2B)(B){ii) applk*. 
Option B. O Qualified Ibtsl UlatrttHiUon Thts distribution is a Qualified TuUl Distribution if the following reouuuncnts ate mat: 
1. %u rrceivtd (ur wiil receive) the entire balance to the credit t* yotir eaamnt in ont tax year. (Note that Ihe eniim balance 
of all to sheltered tnnwtta purciiosed uMt you worked fnr your Empbyef mind bc paid to you in out to ymr.) AND 
2. \bu have reottvtd the distribution because of one of the foUowing reason! (pitdk (Htck): 
I) The partictpinn daath. Q Attainment of age 59%. 
U lermmahttn uf employment or separation from service. Thit does not o^y to self^midenfed mdividunl». 
Q Disability (as dcfimsl in IRC $72(mH7)l. Thi$ only aypites to aelf*mphytd tWiWuais. 
H The plan wai terminated. This does not appiy k> Mir sheltered annuities HRC 6403/. 
Ciutien Abeet UAmiaaiina of Fundi: U U* dtstiibutkw you auwad fiu UUl catctxicy «nd ynu roU the funds tnrr a» «n IRA and tni\ n>y%dm 
p*ymcn» or hind* (mm othtt (outcrt. ytfu wtU not bc *bic to rvW Hit iwods hack to snothrv i{u«ltfitd ivurcmrrU jtm or u« thtiteied snmNty 
U Distribution Of VblunUry Deductible bmpluyee Contributions This is a rollover that cunaisb unly of acrumuiatcd vuhintary 
deductible mmpkymm cimtributions /ai defined in IRC %72(oH5>(R)l 
U Qualified Domestic Retattons Order Dlttrtbution This is a roikiwr that cunilstt of funds ur property recstved from a qualititil 
pension or profit sharing olan Pursuant hi a Qualified Dofnentk Relations Order Ian defined m IRC MWpti. 
If s a please provide the Custodian or TVustee with a copy of the relevant portions of Ihv Qualified Domestic Rriatkmh Order. 
If yo* hawikmmdmt of ike fattr 9t*K** Ivtd about pieateemlinm 
EUG1BLE DEPOSIT 
U YES H NO Duct the rollover deposit consist only of the amuunt of caih or the property distributed, or the pnnwvds 
twm the tale of the distributed property? 
U Yfch H NO Doei the roduver deposit consisi only of Cmpitftvr cuntributions, Uiluntory Deductible hmpkiycc 
GuAtribuliona, Ux dchrned earnings, or any combination thereof? 
tf Y19 to k*k yf the atece torn*, etas* &*«Um 
PARI I. TIMELINESS - 60 Dayi Vnfund* or pvprrry you remved must be deposited into an IRA within 60 days e/fc>» y*M ttxehxd them. 
Date Vbu Received the Plan Funds ur Property: , — . — . . . - _ _ _ — M « - ^ _ . . 
Li YES II NO Is the date of thu deposit within 60 days? tf YES, wu haw met Ihe last of the five mniintneni$ fin making a 
qualified reitremrnl plan or tat SheiUred annuity to IRA rvihw. I'lmse read and eompiete Ihe Signature section bdu\ 
Option C. 
Option D. 
PART a. 
2! 
CO 
Dua to tha important tax confluence* n*U«ioA Ki roiUnc over fund* to ai% IKA. Lhivr Jhcen advised to SCO S Uk pftW«mmm«l. 
I onttfy that I satisfy the r^uuvmcru* ior making a ruilover into my IKA of $ ^ D r rPO • |p cash| and othai prwpvrty with 
a value of $ S P / l O P J hereby irrevocably designate that this ivfttributinn ia to be treated as a rollover contribution. 
The Uniodian or Truutvc is entitled to rely fully/n my centhfatton. i expresviy luiunve the rttponsibffiry fur any adw^ne cw^ouenccs rektus^ 
to this rollover contribution ar*i yigiet fist tMLCustodian ft Inistae sksJl in no way be fesrjoaoble kir thusc cwttquenre*. It this rolUvr u 
beint made during or aitLT/fl^J>in XhkH&nJOVt, l/eplfy that I haw satisfied the rrqujwen* csf Tieasuiy Kditi|>n §1401(a)(9>lC. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
n?~ 00004 
(c) Estimated mdjusted gross income during current 
year t 
Less than $50,000 $200,000 - $300,000 
~ ~ ~ $ 50,000 - $100,000 $300,000 - $400,000 
"~~" $100,000 - $200,000 _ ovet $400,000 
(d) Estimated highest tax rate at which federal income 
taxes will be paid during the current year 
(without giving effect to an Investment in the 
Partnership) will be twenty-eight percent (28%) 
(thirty-four percent (34%) for corporations)! 
_, yes «___• n 0 
8. WET WORTH, 
(a) Current net worth is not less than: $ 
(b) Current net worth (exclusive of home, home 
furnishings and automobiles) is not less thant 
$ . 
(c) The current value of my liquid assets (cash, 
freely marketable securities, cash surrender value 
of life insurance and other items easily conver-
tible into cash) is sufficient to provide for my 
current needs and possible personal contingencies: 
___ v e s _ n0 
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS TO BE PROVIDED BY OFFEREES WHO 
ARE INDIVIDUALS, OR BY THE PERSON MAKING THE INVESTMENT 
DECISION ON BEHALF OF CORPORATIONS, PARTNERSHIPS, TRPSTS"OR 
OTHER ENTITIES. ~ 
1 . Name: ' 
a . MJM FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF O N A G A ^ ^ ^ M Business Address: <nn-I*-* e^m &fmAtM* 
ftNAEA KlH*t**M9\ «4lC>0t*r> 
Business Telephone Numberi ( Phone «13) 889-4211 
2. (a) Current Occupation or Profession: T4A CUtUett*** 
(b) Current Position or Title: ' 
(c) Nature of Duties: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ — ^ _ — -
(d) Period Employed: ' 
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3. Business or professional education: 
School or Field of Dates of Degree 
License Study Attendance (if any] 
4. Prior employment, positions, business affiliations or 
occupations: (Please set forth employment history 
during at least the past five years, indicating 
employerf title, principal responsibilities and years 
of service*) 
5. Details of any training or experience in financial or 
business matters not disclosed in Items 3 and 4: 
6. I have made the following investments which reflect my 
knowledge and experience in financial and business 
mattersx 
I have previously purchased securities which were sold 
in reliance on the limited offering or private offering 
exemptions from registration under the Act and state 
securities laws: 
— —
 v e B
 _
 n o 
c
* PURCHASER REPRESENTATIVE. Does the purchaser intend to use 
6 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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FOR EXECOTION BY INDIVIDQAL OFFEREES 
Signature*s) of Prospective Please frint .Www 
Investor(s) 
Signaturess) of" prospective Please Print Waroe 
Investor(s) 
Executed at
 f_l_ -r _ ^ZtT 
on this day of t *• • 
9 
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FOR EXECUTION BY CORPORATE, 
PARTNERSHIP" 6R Tft UST 6F>BREE' 
FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF ONAGA 4 ^ £**»* ^ " ^ , -&** 
301 Leonard Street "^  *itoo its? 
ONAQA, KANSAS 66521 
Name or Corporationf E or Trust (P l ease Pr int ) 
Byi 
T i t l e : 
Byt 
Tit let 
Signature of person(s) making investment decision on behalf of 
the entity* 
Executed at (Ots/lQA , /^ ST 
- ^ (ClEy) (State) 
on th is 7** day of /TO* 19 a?/ . 
56.QU£_RED.79 
10 » 
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FOR THE 
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP 'AGREEMENT OF 
RED RlVER MOUNTAIN Llritffip PAkTOEKSHIP, 
CERFIMCATE 6F LIMITED PARTNERSHIP 
OF 
RED RIVER MQONTAINTIMITED PARTNERSHIP 
AND 
SOBSCRIPTYOT? AGREEMENT 
By execution of this signature page* the undersigned intends 
to subscribe for and, upon acceptance by the General Partners* to 
become a Limited Partner in RED RIVER MOUNTAIN LIMITED PARTNER-
SHIP, an Afitona limited partnership* The undersigned intends 
that this signature page be attached to the master copies of the 
Subscription Agreement, the LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT OF RED 
RIVER, MOUNTAIN LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, and the Certificate of 
Limited Partnership of RED RIVER MOUNTAIN LIMITED PARTNERSHIP/ 
which may be filed by the General Partners in order to evidence 
the admission of the undersigned as a Limited Partner of the 
Partnership* Said master copies shall be kept in the central 
files of the Partnership, together with the signature-pages 
executed by all other Limited Partners, and the master copies, 
together with the attached signature pages, shall each become 
fully signed documents with the same effect"as^tf I'll parties had 
signed the same document. 
r,«h c/f 
Name of Trust (please print or 'type) ' 
/y*A»;k &*.&•«c/•* Z/L* *-V/6Q /ST 7 
Name or Trustee (please print or type) 
f/w 
Date Trust was formed 
Byt 
Trustee's signature 
Trust Addressi 
rj^^&e. 
By: Anrti fl 
3Q/ / ^ K W 
&*S*QA . /rr b&ru 
Attentloni /&//7* *< J&L~^ 
17 
f j / 9 ' d 
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EXECUTED at 
th i s f** day of 
STATS OF VS 
IClty) —* 
T" 19££. 
(State) 
) ss< 
County of rA/huuJAir?*'* 
On this, the 9 day of /ffifr/ _ 
ma, the underaigneHT a Notary Public or" said . staje^ dul 
commissioned and sworn, personally appeared //AStmS.SM+Jr^ 
the trustthat executed 
, I9ftf, before 
<T t s ly 
, known to me to be Trustee of 
the within instrument, and acknowledged 
that he and the said trust were duly authorised to, and did, 
execute the same* 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed 
my official seal the day and year in this certificate first above 
written. 
ts; CMMtMNELWAftD SUte of Kansas 
tt>A*L£i»A*i2MKZ 
My Commission Expires: 
HoEHy 
State 
Public in and for said 
18 
t 
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I 
y 
Date j '9/t*M 
* 
S6.8UB_JRS0.8X 
<>2700010 
ACCEPTANCE OF SUBSCRIPTION t 
RED RIVER MOUNTAIN LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP, an Arizona 
limited partntrshi; 
Byt 
19 
• 
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£ FIRST NATIONAL SANK 
^OFONAGA,KANSAS, BGSZI. 
'.---^i T^m-'^^'I-R.A:;DEEARIMENT^"H^'- • 
ONAGA, KANSAS 66521; 
ACCOUNT NO. yy. />Q , /3 5 ^ FDiC 
NAMEJ-7^/7 .'.; /> . r /V! ' ./7£ l^74/ltlk-< 
i : ' ••«>>.. ^£4^ 
ADDRESS : ' ; 4 J $ @ G ^ l l ^ - « •; • 
CITY ' * - ' r.^u*.&$&**•;; . - -^; V r v . . . 
COIN I - - ' v - s y i 
CURRENCY-^ 
CHECKS N^'^t^y^
1
^^^' - - - '^" 
:-^:y<^,^^..-V^::.-:^;: ~ 
^£g)0;p^M 
10 iv d 
:-£:\|. 
* ' . ^ W „ ^.- *?£ ."J^*** Tri-'-: 
LESS CASH 
. * » * * * . £ • 
TOTAL DEPOSIT 
Jffi-*:"/.«tV.. 
• ^ • ^ i - H * * : * ? , ! 
£W£ 
i?S)-,--.j,.'-v«?t^j' 
v,^?-^i2-;i^?y-
•:i-i;v-^ 
; • : : .« !?>• • 
:-
- , • , » ' 
* . « » 7 •-—#?•;' 
££ 
i7^:-;*>l 
IFV. 
£v:-'i ;-
L 
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Red River Mountain Limited Partnership 
2855 East Brown Road, Suite 14 
* Mesa, Arizona 85213 
(602) 832-4114 
March 15, 1989 
Mr. Frank Brgoch 
1580 S. 1500 East 
Bountiful, UT 84010 
Dear Frank: 
As you are aware, according to the Offering Memorandum, the 
first annual payment on Red River Mountain Limited Partnership is 
due and payable on April 25, 1989. Therefore, we are requesting 
your contribution be in our office no later than April 15, 1989 in 
V. order to have all checks clear the bank prior to the payment due 
date. 
Your check should be made payable to Red River Mountain 
Limited Partnership and sent to: 
Red River Mountain Limited Partnership 
2855 East Brown Road, Suite 14 
Mesa, Arizona 85203 
You own 3 unit(s) so the total amount you need to send is 
$17,310.00. Please be sure to send it no later than April 15, 
1989. 
If you have any questions please don't hesitate to call. 
It's a pleasure to have you as part of this project. 
Sincerely, 
Ross N. Farnsworth, Jr. 
• ' EXHIBIT I 
RNF/paz 
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RESTRICTED - - SEE REVERSE 
If 
£81 
SI 
NUMBER 
22 
RED RIVER MOUNTAIN LIMITED PARTNERSHIP 
^ 
F i r s t N a t i o n a l Bank of Onaga, C/F Frank BrgOch, 
®fjts Certifies % t IRA NO. .41001357 ^ / w , , , , , , , / 
~ S I X -fuMu/ui<J<i*ul 
notv-u&<ieA<i4i&le'fylni{.i-o£{/t*fibii'€ ffiniifot/'iiPfitfne.ii/ti/i /u^nj/rta^/ron/a ortf/i^Aoo/ido/^/Zte-' 
*jFi*njfe.el' iytit/nesu/u'ft Ay tfif ho/</fi hr-wof- in fwtMin ot Ay <ht/y (ttt//ioiijeff ,?///<>*ney u/torv 
miwnrlrr o/''//tit <$eiti/'icaU/ito/t*>t/y<>nf/o*±4'*/. 
Ae iign**/' Ay iAif/u/u rtti/Aotixr*/ ;/rti/tn>i~l: 
S W * v / M a Y 9 ' 1 9 8 8 
^m 
m& JcBCVOSk+uahk 
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ARNSWORTH HOLDINGS, INC. ROM N. Ftntsworth jr. 
President-Broker 
January 16, 1990 
Mr. Ron Harry 
c/o Private Ledger 
139 East South Temple, No. 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Dear Ron: 
Pursuant to our conversation, I'm submitting the following 
alternatives for final resolution of the limited partnership 
situation pertaining to the interests of Frank Brgoch and Seymour 
Issacs. 
1. Mr. Brgoch and Mr. Issacs will each release to the 
Partnership 4 units of the 6 units they own. In 
exchange for their release of the 4 units, they will 
each retain 2 units which will be considered paid in 
full until disposition of partnership assets. They will 
have no further obligation to the Partnership but will 
retain their partnership interest in the two units. 
2. Mr. Brgoch and Mr. Issacs will release 3 units of the 6 
units they own. In exchange for their release of the 3 
units, thev will have no annual payments for 5 years 
(1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993) on their 3 units of 
partnership interest they will retain. If the 
partnership property is not sold by the time the 1994 
payment is due, Mr. Brgoch and Mr. Issacs will again 
begin paying the partnership annual payments as 
indicated in the Private Placement Memorandum. 
Ron, as you are aware, the time is drawing near for the 
annual payment on the partnership and my goal is to have these two 
releases finalized by January 31. I don't feel this is an 
unrealistic goal. The alternative is not pleasant. 
Please pursue 
cooperation. 
this expeditiously. Thank you for your 
Sincerely, 
Ross N. Farnsworth, Jr. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Representative ID # J>U 662 
Office ID # 3 7&<? 
REPRESENTATIVE AGREEMENT - 90% Commission Schedule 
This Agrttrpspt is entered into berween Private Ledger Financial Services, Inc. ("Private Ledger") 
and iLoyAcdLcL A. fuk^fc/ , ("Representative"), 
who has been accepted as a Registered Representative and agent for the limited purposes set fonh 
below. This agreement is effective J^2}^f^u^c^ty // , 19JSLX 
1. Privnte Ledger's Oblieations. Private Ledger: 
(A) Hereby appoints the Representative as its agent to solicit purchases of securities 
and investments offered through Private Ledger. 
(B) Shall pay the Representative 90% of the commissions from transactions 
generated by him/her as such commissions are set forth in Schedule A attached. 
Payments hereunder shall be made only with respect to commissions Private 
Ledger actually receives while Representative is registered with Private Ledger. 
No payments shall be made to the Representative unless he/she is registered 
with Private Ledger on the date the commission is received. 
(C) Is not obligated to provide any services to Representative (such as clerical 
assistance, office expense, postage, telephone costs, or other expenses) unless 
Private Ledger and the Representative agree on such services and Representative 
pays for such services. 
2. The Representative's Obligations. The Representative: 
(A) Shall pay all fees per Schedule B attached. 
(B) Shall pay each calendar month in advance a Monthly Contract Fee as specified in 
Schedule B to this Agreement. The fee for the first and last month of the term 
hereof, if less than a full month, shall be prorated on the basis of a 30 day 
month. 
(C) Shall pay any balance owing to Private Ledger within 10 business days of 
receipt of Private Ledger's statement unless other arrangements are made in 
writing with the Controller of Private Ledger. 
(D) Shall provide to prospective purchasers a current prospectus or other offering 
materials when required by the federal and/or state securities laws, shall explain 
fully the terms of any security or investment offering for sale to a customer, 
shall make no untrue or misleading statements or representations, shall not omit 
any material information or facts pertaining to any aspect of the transaction or 
sale, and shall comply with all laws respecting offers and sales of securities and 
advising persons on such matters. 
T« EXHIBIT 
PLFS031987RA • ' n 
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I 
(2) 
(E) Shall pay all expenses of the Representative's business and conduct such i 
business in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), the National Association of Securities Dealers 
(NASD), the National Futures Association (NFA), the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission (CFTC), any state agencies regulating the Representative's 
activities and the policies of Private Ledger, and shall not conduct business or 
receive funds until fully licensed as required by such.laws. ( 
(F) Shall pay Private Ledger an annual compliance fee in the amount of $ ^ ^ . 0 0 . 
This fee is S50 for all Representatives located within 1,000 miles of Private 
Lediiers principal office, SI00 for all Representatives located from 1,000 to 
2,000 miles and $150 for all others. 
(G) Shall not mail any correspondence, make any communication or cause any 
advertising to be made respecting investments or the investment business unless 
said correspondence, communication or advertising is approved in advance by 
Private Ledger, and the Representative shall provide copies of such 
correspondence, communication and advertising to Private Ledger in accordance 
with SEC regulations. ^ 
(H) Shall accept payments from customers by check or money order only. All 
checks shall be made payable to the underwriter, investment company or 
insurance company designated by Private Ledger in connection with the 
offering. 
(I) Agrees to indemnify Private Ledger and hold it harmless from any loss, cost or 
liability, including attorney's fees and costs, which result from the 
Representatives negligence, violation of securities rules or regulations, or other 
misconduct. Attorney's fees, adverse settlements and/or judgement imposed on 
the Representative and/or Private Ledger where fault is determined by a court of 
proper jurisdiction, shall be shared by Private Ledger and the Representative in ^ 
the same proportion as the commissions on transactions such as the one in 
dispute were shared. 
(J) Agrees to conmbute monies, on a basis proportional to his/her earned 
commissions, to any effort by Private Ledger to recover unpaid (delinquent) 
commissions from issuer/general partners for the benefit of the Representative. * 
(K) Shall not act in any manner whatsoever as an agent for any individual or 
company competiuve in any respect with Private Ledger. 
(L) Shall represent to all customers and prospective customers, whenever he/she is 
soliciting purchases or interviewing customers or otherwise, that he/she is acting 
as a Representative of Private Ledger and that orders for securities will be placed 
through Private Ledger. 
(M) Shall pay all costs of client reneges, failures to comply with margin calls and all 
other losses resulting from the failure of a client to meet his financial 
responsibility; and pay all attorney's fees and other fees and costs incurred by 
Private Ledger in dispute(s) involving the Representative's clients in which the 
dispute(s) arose from actions by the Representative and not from actions by 
Private Ledger. 
• MX CKoll /^*~\r*A. *r*t UI mool f/V\arot*]f r\r\r\ hic/V\Ar i f f i i r c in o r\rr\fV»cci/"\ni1 m a n n e r 
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(3) 
3. Independent Contractor Relationship. 
(A) The Representative shall maintain his/Tier own offices and conduct his/her business in 
such manner as he/she shall see fit, consistent with all regulatory requirements and 
his/her jbligations hereunder. The Representative is an agent only, and has no 
authority to bind Private Ledger in any way except to communicate to clients materials 
supplied by Private Ledger and to accept purchases of securities offered through 
Private Ledger. 
(B) For the purposes o( the Federal Insurance Contributions Act, the Federal 
Unemployment Contributions Act, and the laws respecting the collection of state and 
federal income tax at the source of wages, the relationship between Private Ledger and 
the Representative is that of a company and an independent contractor. The 
Representative shall pay his/her own expenses, is not required to work a set number of 
hours, is not required to attend meetings, shall control the manner of doing his/her 
business within the framework outlined herein, and may pursue other non-securities 
related business opportunities. The Representative is paid on a commission basis only. 
(C) The Representative is required to conform to the rules and regulations of the NASD, 
SEC, NFA, CFTC and the various states, to the applicable federal and state laws, and 
to conform to the established customs and procedures of the securities industry. In 
complying with such laws, rules and regulations, Representative shall accept such 
supervision and control by his/her branch manager and officers of Private Ledger as is 
necessary to enforce such laws, regulations and rules. 
4. Termination of Agreement. 
(A) This Agreement shall be effective on the date of execution set forth below and shall 
automatically renew the April 15 next following and each April 15 thereafter until 
terminated. 
(B) In any event this Agreement may be terminated by either party at any time, without 
cause, by giving thn -.y (30) days written notice to the other party. 
(C) This Agreement is automatically terminated by cancellation of Representative's 
coverage by the surety company or upon cancellation or non-renewal of any required 
license. This Agreement may be terminated by Private Ledger at any time without 
notice for a breach of this Agreement by the Representative. 
(D) Death of the Representative shall terminate this Agreement but the date of termination 
shall be considered to be sixty (60) days after the date of death. 
5. Rights on Termination. 
Representative acknowledges that Private Ledger is not required to pay any commissions on 
termination except as specified herein, and that Private Ledger may elect to pay other 
terminated representatives bonuses in a manner inconsistent with these provisions and that 
such shall not give the Representative any right whatsoever to similar treatment. Private 
Ledger will offer to a representative in good standing a Terminated Representative Agreement 
(TRA). A TRA must be requested in writing within thirty (30) days after the effective date of 
termination. 
PLFS31987RA 
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(4) 
I 
In the event that death causes the termination o( this Representative Agreement (paragraph 4 
(D)], Private Ledger will offer a Back End Participation Agreement (BEP Agreement) to the 
estate or designated beneficiary o( the deceased Representative. This offer will be subject to 
all laws, regulations, terms, and practices governing such an offer, and Private Ledger will 
have no responsibility to make BEP payments if such payments would be in violation of any 
such laws, regulations, terms, or practices. 
Any branch manager agreements and override commission agreements entered into between 
the Representative and his^er Branch Office Manager also terminate upon the termination of 
this Agreement. 
Upon termination, the Representative shall cease using the name Private Ledger, shall no 
longer hold himselfVherself out as a representative and shall return all materials bearing the 
Private Ledger name to Private Ledger. 
6. Miscellaneous. 
The schedules attached arc subject to change on thirty (30) days written notice. Unless 
Representative notifies Private Ledger in writing prior to the effective date of the changed 
schedule(s) that he/she is officially terminating his/her registration with Private Ledger, 
he/she will be bound by the terms of the changed schedule(s). 
This agreement shall be construed in accordance with the laws of the State of California. If 
any legal action is necessary, to enforce any of the terms o( this Agreement, the prevailing 
party shall be entitled to reasoi.able attorney's fees in addition to any other relief to which 
he/she may be entitled. 
Any disputes under this Agreement, including interpretation o( us terms and conditions, and 
any rights and obligations o( tie p;inies hereunder shall be arbitrated in accordance with the 
Rules of the National Association of Securities Dealers with such arbitration to occur in San 
Diego, California, or alternatively in Los Angeles, California, if Private Ledger so elects. 
A waiver by Private Ledgu* ot any breach of this Agreement shall not be construed to be a 
waiver of any subsequent or oilier breach, and no waiver shall be deemed made, unless the 
same is so acknowledged by the Corporation in writing. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed their agreement in duplicate on 
this day of . , 19 , in 
CaliftjfnitU 
wk«7 
DATE 
NAME PRINTED 
PRIVATE LEDGER'FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC. 
By: 
J . A . <£fcl(lAdw. , \J'&L- The* °ATE 
TITLE V 
^-
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REPRESENTATIVE AGREEMENT - Schedule A- Commissions 
Payments to Representative. In Section 1 (B) of the Representative Agreement Private Ledger is 
obligated to pay the Representative 90% of the commissions generated from sales by the 
Representative and received by Private Ledger during the term of the Representative Agreement 
annexed hereto. The commissions received by Private Ledger to be multiplied by 90% to determine 
the payment due the Representative are: 
(A) 100% of commissions from the sale of mutual funds and variable annuities. 
(B) 100% of commissions from the sale of "public offerings" which are the subject of a 
registration statement filed with the SEC under the Securities Act of 1933 (the "1933 Act"). 
(C) 100% of commissions from the sale of public offerings qualified for sale in only one state 
pursuant to Rule 147 promulgated by the SEC under Section 3(a) (11) of the 1933 Act 
("intrastate offering"). 
(D) 85%'of commissions from the sale of securities offered pursuant to the provision of 
Regulation D promulgated by the SEC under the 1933 Act ("private placements"). 
Commissions on private placements are also subject to the following: 
(i) * In the event the Representative of Private Ledger generates more than $50,000 in 
commissions from private placements in one calendar year, in January of the following 
year the Representative shall be paid a bonus of 3% of commissions over $50,000, 
and an additional bonus of 3% of commissions over $100,000. 
(ii) In the event Private Ledger receives a portion of the general partner's profit or gain in a 
program as a result o( the sales generated by Representative, the 85% rate set forth 
above shall apply to the ponion of such amounts received by Private Ledger 
attributable to the Representative's sales ("back end participations"), if the 
Representative is registered with Private Ledger on the date Private Ledger is paid such 
installment. 
(iii) The 85% rate set forth shall apply to commissions from private placements paid to 
Private Ledger in installments, if the Representative is registered with Private Ledger 
on the date Private Ledger is paid such installment. 
(E) 50% of basis points received on client cash management accounts in excess of $10 per 
quarter (this commission amount will not be subject to the 90% multiplier). 
(F) 85% of commissions earned on sales of gems, precious metals, and collectables. 
(G) 85% of commissions from sales of general securities (stocks, bonds, options, government 
agency obligations, and similar securities) and commodities in routine broker transactions. 
Clearing costs and variable charges according to Schedule C attached shall be deducted as a 
general adjustment. 
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(i) Gross commission from general securities and commodities sales shall be subject 
to a special bonus as follows: 
Maximum Amount 
$ 0 
$ 3,750 
$ 3,750 
$ 10,000 
$ 10,000 
$ 10,000 
Unlimited 
0.00% 
2.50% 
3.25% 
5.00% 
7.50% 
10.00% 
12.00% 
0 
93.75 
140.63 
500.00 
750.00 
1,000.00 
Unlimited 
Gross Commissions/Month Computed Amount Bonus 
$ 0- 2,500 
$ 2,500- 6,250 
$ 6,250- 10,000 
$ 10,000 - 20,000 
$ 20,000 - 30,000 
$ 30,000 - 40,000 
$ 40,000 - +++++ 
(ii) The Representative may negotiate commission rates with clients as dictated by market 
requirements, but in no event shall discounts of more than 50% from the Private 
Ledger base commission (pre-May, 1975, fixed commission rates plus 30%) be 
allowed except by prior arrangement with the Head Trader or a Private Ledger officer. 
In any event, the commission retained by Private Ledger on any discounted transaction 
shall not be less than the retention Private Ledger would earn for the same trade with a 
50% discount in commission. 
Paragraphs A through G are subject to change upon thirty (30) days notice. 
Private Ledger's determination of the type of securities being offered or the type of program shall 
be conclusive. Private Ledger shall establish the percentage rate, to be multiplied by 90%, for 
programs or securities not specifically described above. Payments to the Representative (including 
Production Bonuses) will be reduced by Private Ledger by the amounts owed to Private Ledger. 
Production Bonuses 
Production bonuses will be paid in addition to the basic 90% commission referred to in Section 
1(B) of the Representative Agreement. 
1. The production bonuses apply to the gross commissions paid to Private Ledger during the 
period January 1 to December 31. Gross commissions from one calendar year may not be 
deferred to the succeeding calendar year for purposes of determining production bonuses. 
Gross commissions do not include any bonuses paid by Private Ledger. Private Ledger shall 
make final determination of gross commissions to be used as the basis for computing 
production bonuses. 
2. The production bonuses are as follows. 
A bonus of 1.% of gross commissions between $100,000 and $250,000.* 
§ A bonus of 2.% of gross commissions in excess of $250,000. * 
*Production bonuses are computed on incremental dollars only. There is no 
production bonus for gross commissions of less than $100,000. 
3. Production bonuses will be paid at the time gross commissions exceed the thresholds cited 
in paragraph 2 above (i.e. $100,000 and $250,000). 
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REPRESENTATIVE AGREEMENT - Schedule B - Fees 
The Representative shall be required to pay: 
MONTHLY FFFS BRANCH MANAGER REG1STFRFD RFPRFSFNTATlVF 
90% Contract Fee $125 $125 
ANNUAL RFNFWALS 
NASD Renewal 
Branch Renewal 
State Renewals 
Compliance Inspection 
State Branch Renewal 
(Where applicable) 
Administrative Assistant Fee 
(Initial and annual) 
MISCELLANFOUSFFFS 
NASD Examinations 
S1PC Branch Certification 
Commodities Associated Person 
(Initial and annual) 
Commodities Associated Person Grancn 
(Initial and annual) 
START-UP FFFS 
A deposit of $350 will be required for initial registration. (This deposit is non-refundable once application is made 
to the NASD.) 
Registration Fee $150 $100 
NASD Registration $ 64 $ 64 
State Registration $ 0-$132 $ 0-$132 
NASD Branch Fee $ 60 
Bonding $ 10 per month $ 10 per month 
Compliance Inspection $ 50 - $150 $ 50 - $150 
Establish Branch Office in State $ 0 - $ 50 
(Where applicable) 
$50 
$60 
$00-$132 
$50-$150 
$00-$ 50 
$ 50 
$ 00-$132 
$ 50-$150 
$100 
$ 50 $ 50 
$ 4 - $ 6 
$40 $40 
$16 $16 
PLFS31987RA 
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REPRESENTATIVE AGREEMENT - Schedule C - Fully Disclosed Business 
This Schedule sets fonh the clearing charges and brokerage charges for transactions executed 
through a Private Ledger clearing broker. 
This Schedule is subject to change upon thiny (30) days notice. 
CLEARING AND BROKERAGE CHARGES 
PERSHING 
Listed: 
Stocks 
Bonds 
Options 
OTC Agency: 
Stocks 
Bonds 
OTC Principal: 
Stocks 
GNMA, 
Muni, 
Corporate, 
Treasury 
Unit Trusts 
Order 
$23.50 
$25.00 
$18.00 
$23.00 
$25.00 
$35.00 
$35.00 
$35.00 
Variable Charge 
+ $0.025/share (1-4999 shares) or 
+ $0.015/share (5000 & over) 
+$1.35-$1.50/contract 
Option Exercise $ 23.50 Equitv 
$300.00 Currency 
Syndicate $35.00 
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June 1 1 , 1987 
M E M O R A N D U M 
TO: All P r i v a t e Ledger R e g i s t e r e d R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s 
FROM: Jona than A. Boynton 
Vice P r e s i d e n t - Legal & R e g u l a t o r y A f f a i r s 
SUBJECT: P r i v a t e S e c u r i t i e s T r a n s a c t i o n s / S e l l i n g Away 
The NASD has r e c e n t l y r e v i s e d and adop ted a new A r t i c l e I I I , 
S e c t i o n MO of the Rules of F a i r P r a c t i c e which f u r t h e r c l a r i f i e s 
t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of members and t h e i r r e g i s t e r e d 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ir. d e a l i n g w i t h p r i v a t e s e c u r i t i e s t r a n s a c t i o n s . 
The f o l l o w i n g i s s u e s c o n c e r n i n g p r i v a t e s e c u r i t i e s t r a n s a c t i o n s 
d e s e r v e s p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n : 
. The d e f i n i t i o n of a " s e c u r i t y 1 1 i s very b r o a d . Pr ivate 
Ledger must make the d e t e r m i n a t i o n on every t r a n s a c t i o n 
as to whether cr not a s e c u r i t y i s i n v o l v e d . 
. P a r t i c i p a t i o n by a r e g i s t e r e d r e p r e s e n t a t i v e in a 
p r i v a t e s e c u r i t i e s t r a n s a c t i o n r e q u i r e s w r i t t e n 
n o t i f i c a t i o n to and w r i t t e n a p p r o v a l by P r i v a t e Ledger, 
r e g a r d l e s s of w h e t h e r or no t t h e r e i s any compensa t ion 
i n v o l v e d in the t r a n s a c t i o n . 
What f o l l o w s i s a copy of t h e new r u l e in i t s e n t i r e t y . Please 
read the m a t e r i a l very c a r e f u l l y and r e t u r n a s i g n e d copy of 
t h i s memorandum to the a t t e n t i o n of t h e Compliance Department. 
This w i l l become a permanen t p a r t of our f i l e s . 
A d d i t i o n a l l y , p l e a s e p l a c e a copy in the f r o n t of your Pr ivate 
Ledger P r o c e d u r e s Manual . You w i l l be he ld a c c o u n t a b l e for i t s 
c o n t e n t s . 
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SECTION UP: PSTVATE SECURITIES ^ P A N S J 
(A) A p p l i c a b i l i t y - No person a s s o c i a t e d w i t h a 
.member s h a l l p a r t i c i p a t e in any manner i n a p r i v a t e 
s e c u r i t i e s t r a n s a c t i o n except i n a c c o r d a n c e w i th the 
requ i rements of t h i s s e c t i o n . 
( B ) Not i ce - P r i o r to " n any 
in 
no 
an 
v~, ,.. ^  ww^,. tlww^ „.. 4 . *w. ~~ participating *„ U1-/ 
private securities transaction, an associated person shall 
provide written notice to the member with which he is 
associated describing in detail the proposed transaction 
and the person's proposed role therein and stating whether 
he has received or may -receive selling compensation in 
connection with the transaction; provided however that, 
the case of a series of related transactions in which 
selling compensation has been or will be received, 
associated person may provide a single written notice. 
(C ) Transactions for Compensation -
(1) In the case of a transaction in which an 
associated person has received or may 
receive selling compensation, a member 
which has received notice pursuant to 
Subsection (b) shall advise the 
associated person in writing stating 
whether the member: 
(a) approves the 
participation in the 
transaction; or 
( b ) d i sapproves the 
participation in the 
transaction. 
pe r s o n ' s 
proposed 
p e r s o n ' s 
proposed 
(2) I f the member approves a p e r s o n ' s 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n a t r a n s a c t i o n pursuant 
to Subsec t i on ( c ) ( 1 ) , the t r a n s a c t i o n 
s h a l l be r e c o r d e d on the books 3nd 
reco rds of the member and the member 
s h a l l s u p e r v i s e the p e r s o n ' s 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the t r a n s a c t i o n as i f 
the t r a n s a c t i o n were execu ted on b e h a l f 
of the member. 
(3) I f the member d i s a p p r o v e s a p e r s o n ' s 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n pu rsuan t to S u b s e c t i o n 
( c ) ( 1 ) , the person s h a l l not p a r t i c i p a t e 
i n the t r a n s a c t i o n i n any manner, Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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(D) T r a n s a c t i o n s Mot For Compensa t ion 
of a t r a n s a c t i o n or a s e r i e s of r e l a t e d 
which an a s s o c i a t e d p e r s o n has no t and w i l l 
s e l l i n g compensa t ion , a member which has 
p u r s u a n t to S u b s e c t i o n (b) s h a l l p r o v i d e 
p e r s o n prompt w r i t t e n acknowledgment of 
may, a t i t s d i s c r e t i o n , r e q u i r e t h e p e r s o n 
- In the case 
t r a n s a c t i o n s in 
not r e c e i v e any 
r e c e i v e d n o t i c e 
th.e a s s o c i a t e d 
s a i d n o t i c e and 
to adhe re to 
s p e c i f i e d c o n d i t i o n s 
i n t h e t r a n s a c t i o n . 
in c o n n e c t i o n w i t h h i s p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
(E) D e f i n i t i ons - For p u r p o s e s of t h i s s e c t i o n , the 
f o l l o w i n g te rms s h a l l have t h e s t a t e d m e a n i n g s : 
(1) " P r i v a t e s e c u r i t i e s t r a n s a c t i o n " s h a l l 
mean any s e c u r i t i e s t r a n s a c t i o n o u t s i d e 
t he r e g u l a r c o u r s e or scope of an 
a s s o c i a t e d p e r s o n ' s employment wi th a 
member, i n c l u d i n g , though no t l i m i t e d t o , 
new o f f e r i n g s of s e c u r i t i e s which a r e no t 
r e g i s t e r e d w i t h t he Commission, p r o v i d e d 
however t h a t t r a n s a c t i o n s s u b j e c t t o t h e 
n o t i f i c a t i o n r e q u i r e m e n t s of A r t i c l e I I I , 
S e c t i o n 28 of t h e Rules of F a i r P r a c t i c e , 
t r a n s a c t i o n s among immedia te fami ly 
members ( a s d e f i n e d in t h e I n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
of the Board of G o v e r n o r s on F r e e - R i d i n g 
and W i t h h o l d i n g ) for which no a s s o c i a t e d 
p e r s o n r e c e i v e s any s e l l i n g c o m p e n s a t i o n , 
and p e r s o n a l t r a n s a c t i o n s in i n v e s t m e n t 
company and v a r i a b l e a n n u i t y s e c u r i t i e s , 
s h a l l be e x c l u d e d . 
(2) " S e l l i n g c o m p e n s a t i o n " s h a l l mean any 
c o m p e n s a t i o n pa id d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y 
from w h a t e v e r s o u r c e in c o n n e c t i o n wi th 
or as a r e s u l t of t h e p u r c h a s e or s a l e of 
a s e c u r i t y , i n c l u d i n g , though not l i m i t e d 
t o , c o m m i s s i o n s ; f i n d e r ' s f e e s ; 
s e c u r i t i e s or r i g h t s t o a c q u i r e 
s e c u r i t i e s ; r i g h t s of p a r t i c i p a t i o n in 
p r o f i t s , tax b e n e f i t s , or d i s s o l u t i o n 
p r o c e e d s , as a g e n e r a l p a r t n e r or 
o t h e r w i s e ; or expense r e i m b u r s e m e n t s . 
D3te : QkJi2. 
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If EXHIBIT 1 
I I . Compliance 
A. P r o h i b i t e d T r a n s a c t i o n s 
B. Rules of F a i r P r a c t i c e 
C. Branch Office O r g a n i z a t i o n and R e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s 
1. Superv i so ry R e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s 
2 . Records R e t e n t i on 
3*. Summary of R e q u i r e d Branch F i l e s 
D. Customer Complaints 
E. Regulatory Inquiries and Examinations 
F. Violati ons 
G. Compliance Q u e s t i o n n a i r e 
H. Outs ide Bus ine s s Q u e s t i o n n a i r e 
I . Compliance Notes 
J . Off ice V i s i t s 
K. A d v e r t i s i n g 
L. Business Cards and L e t t e r h e a d 
M. Correspondence 
N. P r i v a t e S e c u r i t i e s T r a n s a c t i o n s 
0 . Opt ions Trading 
P. Recommending S e c u r i t i e s 
Q. Blue Sky Requ i r emen t s 
R. Sale of R e s t r i c t e d S e c u r i t i e s 
S. D i s c r e t i o n a r y Accoun t s 
T. Employee Accounts 
U. R e p r e s e n t a t i v e S t a t e R e g i s t r a t i o n 
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I I . Compliancp 
V. Pu rchase r R e p r e s e n t a t i v e 
W. Secondary Sa les 
X. R e g i s t e r e d Inves tmen t A d v i s e r s 
Y. Money Managers and Market Timers 
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Prohibited Transactions 
Registered Representatives are specifically prohibited 
from: 
1. Accepting or receiving, directly or indirectly, from 
any person, firm, corporation or association other 
than the Company, compensation of any nature as a 
bonus, commission, fee, gratuity, or other 
consideration, in connection with any transaction, 
in the investment field or what might be construed 
to be an investment, except with the prior written 
consent of the Company. Sales of non-securities 
'made under state licenses, such as real estate or 
insurance licenses, are excluded. Many investment 
vehicles in the real estate and insurance areas are 
securities. (Please note "Private Securities 
Transactions'1, Section L.) A definition of 
investment for purposes of this rule includes any 
security, as defined in Section 2 of the Securities 
Act of 1933, real or personal property which can be 
construed in commonly used terminology to be an 
investment (an outlay of money for income or 
profit), e.g. gold, silver, diamonds, painting, 
antiques. 
2. Taking or receiving, directly or indirectly, a share 
in the profits or losses of any customer's account. 
3. Rebating, directly or indirectly, to any person, 
firm or corporation, any part of the compensation he 
receives as a Registered Representative. The 
Registered Representative will not pay such 
compensation or any part thereof to any person, 
firm, or corporation as a bonus, commission, fee or 
other consideration for business sought or procured. 
4. Accepting orders from a third party for a customer's 
account without the prior written authorization of 
the customer. 
5. Opening a securities account or commodities account 
with another firm for the representative or spouse 
without prior written approval of the Company. 
6. Warranting or guaranteeing the present or future 
value or price of any security, or that any company 
or issuer will meet its promises or obligations. 
7. Agreeing to repurchase at some future time a 
security from a client for the representative's own 
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account, for the account of the Company, or for any 
other account. 
8. Acting as.personal custodian of securities, stock 
power, nrbney, or other property belonging to a 
client. 
9. Borrowing money or securities from a client. 
10. Forwarding or agreeing to forward confirmations or 
statements of accounts other than to the official 
Post Office address of the client. 
11. Distributing to clients research material marked for 
"internal use only" or "for broker/dealer use only". 
12. Settling errors directly with a client without the 
approval of the Compliance Department. 
13. "Trafficking" or trading mutual funds. (See Mutual 
Funds ). 
14. Holding a discretionary power of attorney for a 
client's account. 
15. Soliciting or selling products which have not been 
approved by Private Ledger Financial Services, Inc. 
16. Soliciting or selling a security which has not been 
"Blue Skyed" in the state of sale. 
17. Soliciting or selling products in a state in which 
the Registered Representative is not properly 
licensed. 
18. 'Recommending investments to clients without 
thoroughly understanding their financial situation 
and investment objectives. 
19. Maintaining a joint securities account with a client 
or sharing in any benefit resulting from a 
securities transaction. 
20. Accepting a check from a client made payable to a 
representative rather than to the appropriate 
investment. 
21. Opening a trust account for a minor other than a 
custodial "gift to minors1' account. 
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Correspondence 
1. Statement Guidelines 
Statements to be avoided in correspondence are 
those: 
a. That may be construed as unreasonable, 
exaggerated or based on rumor. 
b. That forecast specific performance, 
c. That give assurance 3gainst losses. 
2 . Outgoing Correspondence 
All outgoing correspondence, including letters, 
memos and hand written notes pertaining to the 
solicitation or execution of securities transactions 
must be reviewed and approved in advance of mailing 
by the branch office manager unless such material 
(e.g. form letters), have previously been approved 
by the Compliance Department. 
3 . Incoming Correspondence 
All incoming correspondence, other than personal 
letters not related to securities business, must be 
reviewed by the Branch Office Manager prior to 
distribution, 
« . Correspondence Retenti on 
Copies of outgoing correspondence are to be 
initialed by the Branch Manager and retained in the 
Branch Office Correspondence File. 
5. ' Company Notification 
Any incoming item which might be construed as a 
complaint or a proposed agreement, assignment, lien 
or settlement must be brought to the immediate 
attention of the Compliance Department. 
Private Securities Transactions 
I t has been the NASD's expe r i ence tha t a number of 
respondents i n d i s c i p l i n a r y p roceed ings have argued that 
i f they engaged i n s e l l i n g p r i v a t e p lacements exempt 
from r e g i s t r a t i o n under the 1933 A c t , they had no 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to in form the member w i t h whom they are 
r e g i s t e r e d of t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s or to become a s s o c i a t e d 
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with another broker/dealer. This is not the case in 
that such activity must be reported to the member. 
Extreme caution should be exercised by members and 
associated persons in determining whether a sales 
activity involves a security and whether that security 
should be registerd prior to sale. 
Many individuals become involved in the sale of private 
securities without first notifying the member 
broker-dealer because they mistakenly believe or have 
been advised that the products they are selling are not 
securities. This belief may have arisen through 
conversations with attorneys, accountants, issuers 
and/or general partners who have taken a position that 
the product to be offered is not a security and can 
therefore be sold without first notifying the member 
firm. Most people are aware of the fact that stocks, 
bonds or debentures are considered to be securities. 
However, somewhat unfamiliar is the term "investment 
contract" which is also a security. Viewed in very 
broad, general layman's terms, an investment contract 
can be defined as, where one or more individuals invest 
in a common venture with the expectation of receiving
 a 
monetary return on their investment from or through the 
efforts of a third party. Examples of such investment 
contracts are the sale of limited partnerships in real 
estate, oil and gas, cattle producing and feeding, 
airplanes, worm farms, second deeds of trust where funds 
are pooled, etc. Therefore, if you are approached to 
sell a particular investment product that is not 
approved by Private Ledger you must request in writing 
that you be permitted to sell the product as a 
non-security. Do not sell the product until you receive 
written approval from Private Ledger. 
Options Trading 
The final review and approval of all options accounts 
remains with the firm's Senior Registered Options 
Principal. No trades are to be entered until final 
approval is obtained from the Home Office. 
1. Qualifications 
a. The Registered Representative must be Series 7 
registered. 
b. The Registered Representative must successfully 
pass the in-house administered NASD Options Exam 
prior to entry of any option orders. 
1) The exam must be administered by a Company 
Registered Options Principal. 
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D e f i n i t i o n s 
P r i v a t e S e c u r i t i e s T r a n s a c t i o n s 
S e l l i n g Away 
Purchase r R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s 
Order P r o c e s s i n g 
Due D i l i g e n c e 
1. New O f f e r i n g Submiss ion Procedures 
2 . S p o n s o r ' s P r o c e d u r e s 
3 . C o n s i d e r a t i o n C r i t e r i a 
4 . Review Time 
5 . Program Approval 
6 . S u i t a b i l i t y 
7 . R e j e c t i o n 
P r i v a t e Programs 
1 . S t r u c t u r e 
2. Disclosure 
3. Offering Restrictions 
4. Advertising 
5. Determining Interest 
6. Offer Suitability 
7. Offeree Questionnaire 
8. Warning 
9 . E x e m p t i o n - I n t r a s t a t e Of fe r ing 
Market ing Suppor t 
Summary 
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Defini 
Private Ledger Approved Program - A limited 
partnership for which Private Ledger has a 
current selling agreement. Each program needs 
its own selling agreement. 
Example: 
does not 
of XYZ-2. 
A signed selling agreement for XYZ-1 
permit a representative to sell units 
2. Direct Parti cipation Program - Any program that 
provides for flow through tax consequences 
regardless of the structure of the legal entity 
or vehicle for distribution. (e.g. Oil & Gas 
Partnerships, Real Estate Partnerships, 
Condominium Securities or Corporate Offerings). 
3. Private Offering - Any unregistered or exempt 
from registration offering which may only be 
offered to a limited number of specifically 
qualified investors. No advertising is 
permitted on a Private Offering. 
4. Public Offering -
a. SEC Registered: This is a registered 
offering which is usually available to the 
general public and may be advertised. 
b. Intrastate: This is a public program that 
may only be sold to residents of the state 
in which the program is registered. 
5. Prospectus - An Offering Memorandum, Offering 
Circular or other descriptive material for a 
partnership. Specific information must be 
contained in this document. 
Due Diligence - The process of determining the 
accuracy, validity and reasonableness of the 
economic and tax benefits that a "prudent man" 
would consider before investing. 
Priva.fc.g-S.ej i ^ -Transactions 
It has been the NASD fs experience that a number of 
respondents in disciplinary proceedings have argued 
that if they engaged in selling private placements 
exempt from registration under the 1933 Act, they 
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had no responsibility to inform the member with whom 
they are registered of their activities or to become 
associated with another broker/dealer. This is not 
the case in that such activity must be reported to 
the member. Extreme caution should be exercised by 
members and associated persons in determining 
whether a sales activity involves a security and 
whether that security should be registered prior to 
sale. 
Many individuals become involved in the sale of 
private securities without first notifying the 
member broker-dealer because they mistakenly believe 
or have been advised that the products they are 
selling are not securities. This belief may have 
arisen through conversations with attorneys, 
accountants, issuers and/or general partners who 
have taken a position that the product to be offered 
is not a security and can therefore be sold without 
first notifying the member firm. Most people are 
aware of the fact that stocks, bonds or debentures 
are considered to be securities. However, somewhat 
unfamiliar is the term "investment contract" which 
is also a security. Viewed in very broad, general 
layman's terms, an investment contract can be defind 
as, where one or more individuals invest In a common 
venture with the expectation of receiving a monetary 
return on their Investment rrom or through the 
efforts of a third imnlX. Examples of such 
investment contracts are the sale of limited 
partnerships in real estate, oil and gas, cattle 
producing and feeding, airplanes, worm farms, second 
deeds of trust where funds are pooled, etc. 
Therefore, if you are approached to sell a 
particular investment product that is not approved 
by Private Ledger you must request in writing that 
you be permitted to sell the product as a 
non-security. Do not sell the product until you 
receive written approval from Private Ledger. 
Selling Away , 
The sale of securities by a representative, not 
offered through and by Private Ledger, may subject 
the representative to a serious violation of Federal 
and State Securities Laws and Regulations. In some 
instances, serious sanctions have been imposed on 
representatives for engaging in securities 
transactions effected outside the scope of the NASD 
and not reflected on the books of the broker/dealer. 
The sale of securities by a representative not 
reflected on our books is prohibited. Such sales 
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will be grounds for immediate termination for cause. 
D. Purchaser Representative 
There is a clear conflict of interest when a 
Registered Representative acts as a Purchaser 
Representative on one of his own sales, therefore, 
he cannot do so under 2U,y circumstancea. A 
Purchaser Representative should be knowledgeable in 
securities matters, chosen by the client and not 
beholden in 
in the sale 
any manner to those having 
of the security concerned. 
an interest 
Order Processing 
Prior to soliciting any sales in a private or public 
limited partnership the representative should 
contact the Private Ledger Due Diligence Department 
to ensure that the product has been approved and 
that a current selling agreement is on file. Do not 
sell any program that has not been approved. 
Branch Offices may submit orders directly to the 
sponsor or underwriter provided the following steps 
are taken: 
1. Investment application and check are reviewed 
and approved by the branch manager prior to 
being sent to the sponsor. 
2. A new account form is completed for the client. 
3. A copy of the application, check and new account 
form is filed in the branch office client file. 
4. A copy of the application, check and new account 
form is forwarded to the Home Office with the 
Weekly Branch Sales Report. 
Due Diligence 
The Due Diligence Division of the Company reviews 
private and public limited partnerships with a view 
towards the following: 
Ensuring adherence to applicable laws, rules and 
regulations of the securities industry with regard 
to all issues sold through the Company. 
Protecting the Company, affiliated 
representatives and clients from undue liability 
and/or violations of law. 
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Branch O f f i c e S t a r t - u p K i t 
Becoming a Branch Manager 
B u i l d i n g a Branch O f f i c e 
1. Sponsoring a R e p r e s e n t a t i v e 
2. A d m i n i s t r a t i v e A s s o c i a t e 
Rec ru i t i ng Bonus 
F i n a n c i a l I n s t i t u t i o n S e r v i c e s 
Spec ia l S e r v i c e s 
1. P u b l i c a t i ons 
2. Research 
3. Automated Network 
4. Representative Employee Benefit Plan 
5. Forms 
Product Marketing Representatives 
Corporate Brochures 
Corporate Seminars 
Cashflo 
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Representative: (Please Print) 
Phone #:(*li) 
fBivateJedrerA *———** ^^ 
* ^ ^
r
" ^
r
 REPRESENTATIVE COMPLIANCE QUESTIONNAIRE 
)Q iW<*M J^ ,-^c, 
:
 {%S^Vm_ Qffice IDt! <$dm> Reo ID.: S S f c ^ t . : /O/H R^-
1. Have you read your copy of the Private Ledger Procedures Manual? (If no, 
provide explanation). 
2. To the best oivour knowledge, are you complying with company practices as outlined i 
this m a n u a l ? V £ > 2 _ (If no, provide explanation). 
3. Since joining PLFS, have you acted as an agent for a client.Individual or company 
(including insurance, real estate, etc.) other than PLFS? N T ) (If yes, provide 
explanation). 
Have you received any compensation (including commissions, finder's fees, etc.) from 
any person or company for the purchase or sale of non-securities investments which ar 
not offered through PLFS? f^ft
 t (If yes, provide explanation). 
5. Have you offered any Investment (either a public or private offering) not approved b 
PLFS that you have bdgn involved with in the last year as a representative, agent or 
general partner? r^U (If yes, provide explanation). 
6. Please provide the information listed below for ANY private offering not approved by 
PLFS that you have been involved with in the last year as a representative, agent or 
general partner. 
Number of Total $$ 
Clients Clients Commissions 
Date Offering Name Investing Invested Paid to You 
» .*» 1 «% * M A • 
~* ii*Hiii + v tn PI PS Qianpd bv vou and all of your customers for the 
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Havi you ever warranted or guaranteed the present or future price of anv security? 
rJQ (If yes, provide explanation). 
Have you ever warranted or guaranteed that any company or issuer of securities will me 
its promises or obligations? /0(9 (If yes, provide explanation). 
Have you ever agreed to repurchase atA some future time a security from a client for yc 
own account, or any other account? kjQ (If yes, provide explanation). 
Have you ever executed orders for a customer without his knowledge? 
(If yes, provide explanation). 
ik 
Have you ever used any clients' money or securities for your personal use? 
(If yes, provide explanation). 
Have you personally received money from a client or paid money to a client? M O 
(If yes, provide explanation). 
tionary accounts? 
/Jo. 
( I f yes , provi< 
Do you have any discretionary accounts? r-^^ (If yes, provide explanation) 
hold any powers of attorney permitting yoi 
sr? KJD' (If yes, provide explanation). 
Do you £\i ou to perform transactions for a 
customer 
Have 
secu 
you ever contribute^, as a loan or otherwise, to help a customer pay for 
nties purchase? A-A> (if yes, provide explanation). 
List any account in which your customer has received two or more Regulation T extensio 
in the past six months. (Explain circumstances of each). 
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Are you maintaining a joint securities account with any client (other than a spouse or 
immediate famil.yVember) or sharing any benefit witl 
transaction? K J 0 (If yes, provide explanation). 
th a client involving a security 
Have you ever entered into any business transaction jointly with a client? 
yes, please explain the transaction and with whom it was conducted). 
4 ave you ever held any customer funds or securities^vhich came into your possession? %J? If yes, were they transmitted immediately? Y ? L i ^ _ 
Have you acted^a^a. custodian of securities, stock powers, money or property belonging 
to a client? M O (If yes, provide explanation). 
Do you individually, jointly, or through any interest hold stock accounts with any other 
broker/dealer? pjT) If so, do you have written permission from PLFS and have you 
given full disclosure of your employment to the management of the office where the 
account is held? Is the account coded so that duplicate confirmations and 
statements are sent to PLFS? 
Have you in the past year caused any advertising /tfc be placed in newspapers, radio, TV 
or other similar media (Including/yel low pages)? | *Z>*? If yes, did you have each 
advertisement approved by PLFS? YzL^? 
Have you ever mailed a fftrfa 1^^ e r or printed mailer to ten or more persons without 
prior approval of PLFS? llJIi^jfjO (If yes, provide explanation). 
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6. Is al l written correspondence transmitted by you concerning secur 
approved in accordance with the Private Ledger Procedures Manual? 
provide explanation). m. 
and investments 
_ (If no, 
27. 
«S e-all copies of outgoing correspondence, whether typed or handwritten, retained? *9^2 If yes, where is it located for inspection purposes? ^ 
Co<&v> po^z&yz- ^ e 
28, Are you acting as an Investment advisor and/or providing investment advice for a fee or 
charge? AJft If no, you may proceed to Question 29. If yes, please complete the 
additional questions listed below. 
Are- you registered with the SEC, the appropriate regulatory agency in your state of 
residence and any other states 1n which you charge a fee for Investment advisory 
business? If yes, under what name are you registered? 
Do you utilize a written Investment advisory agreement or contract with clients? 
If yes, please provide a copy of the contract. Additionally, please provide copies of* 
any literature, agreements, forms, etc. that you utilize with your Investment advisory 
customers. 
Have you provided a copy of your Form ADV (parts I and II) as filed with the SEC and th 
appropriate regulatory agency in each state In which you charge fees to the PLFS 
Compliance Department? If no, please provide a copy of your most current Form 
ADV. 
Do you, as an investment advisor, have direct or indirect control of any client's 
assets? (If yes, provide explanation). 
29. PLEASE PROVIDE ONE OF YOUR BUSINESS CARDS AND ONE PIECE OF STATIONERY WHICH YOU ARE 
USING FOR SECURITIES BUSINESS, WHETHER OR NOT WE HAVE IT ON FILE. 
I hereby certify that all answers arejjuje and correct to the best of my knowledge, and that 
the statements and answers providpd^above) represent an accuratejdescnption of my present 
business activities. 
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jjj EXHIBIT 
II P-21 
Rea River Mountain Limited Partnership 13 
ho c^ri Srown Koad. .^Jite 
' \e<z. -.nzona 85213 
J u l y 1 0 , 1989 
Mr, Virl W. Thornton 
Virl W. Thornton Trust 
1520 KenRey 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108 
Dear Mr. Thornton: 
This is a reminder of the critical nature of compliance with 
your payment obligations to Red River Mountain Limited 
Partnership. 
We previously advised you of the amount and due date of the 
required payment. The partnership is under obligation for this 
year's annual payment on the underlying loans which is now 
delinquent. 
Your delay of payment is jeopardizing the entire partnership 
standing and threatens to throw our property into a foreclosure. 
Therefore, please see to it that your payment is in my hands 
within five (5) days from the date of this letter. 
Sincerely, 
RNF/paz 
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STATE OF UTAH, 
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C. DEAN LARSEN, 
Defendant-Petitioner. 
Case No. 920114 
Ct. Of App. No. 900473-CA 
Category No. 14 
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ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO 
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
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Attorney General 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 1 
Plaintiff-Respondent, s 
V. 1 
C. DEAN LARSEN, ! 
Defendant-Petitioner, i 
t Case No. 920114 
Ct. Of App. No. 900473-CA 
t Category No. 14 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari 
to the Utah Court of Appeals, This Court has jurisdiction to 
hear the case under Utah Code Ann. S 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1992). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Two issues are presented for review: 
1. Did the court of appeals correctly conclude that 
"intent to defraud" is not an element of securities fraud under 
Utah Code Ann. S 61-1-1(2) (1989) and properly uphold the trial 
court's instructions on the requisite mental state for a criminal 
violation of that statute? 
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law 
and is reviewed for correctness. Ward v. Richfield Citv. 798 
P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990). 
2. Did the court of appeals correctly conclude that 
the trial court had reasonably exercised its discretion in 
admitting expert testimony on the issue of "materiality"? 
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•'Whether a piece of evidence is admissible is a 
question of law, and [an appellate court] always review[s] 
questions of law under a correctness standard," but when the rule 
of evidence "vests a measure of discretion in the trial court,M 
the appellate court reverses only if it concludes that the trial 
court exercised its discretion unreasonably* State v. Ramirez, 
817 P.2d 774, 781-82 n.3 (Utah 1991). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions, 
statutes, or rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues 
presented for review is contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with numerous offenses, 
including eighteen counts of securities fraud under Utah Code 
Ann. S 61-1-1(2) (1989) and Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21 (1989) 
(amended 1990, 1991, 1992) (R. 511-26). After the trial court 
granted defendant's motion to sever (R. 1023), he was tried on 
the eighteen counts of securities fraud. A jury found him guilty 
on all counts (R. 1434-51). 
The court sentenced defendant to the Utah State Prison 
for a term of zero to three years on all eighteen counts, three 
of the terms to run consecutively to the others, which are to run 
concurrently, and ordered him to pay fines and restitution on 
each count (R. 1474-91)* The execution of the sentence was 
stayed until resolution of the other counts charged in the 
information (ibid.). Defendant filed a petition for a 
2 
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certificate of probable cause which was eventually granted, and 
defendant is currently free on bail. 
On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed 
defendant's convictions. State v. Larsen. 828 P.2d 487 (Utah 
App. 1992). This Court granted certiorari. State v. Larsen. 836 
P.2d 1385 (Utah 1992). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Given the questions presented for review, a statement 
of facts beyond that set forth in the Statement of the Case is 
unnecessary. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Criminal liability for a violation of Utah Code Ann. 
S 61-1-1(2) (1989) does net require proof of intent to defraud in 
addition to proof of willfulness. Therefore, the court of 
appeals correctly upheld the trial court's instructions to the 
jury which defined "willfully" as the culpable mental state for 
the crime of securities fraud under section 61-1-1(2). 
Additionally, because section 61-1-1(2) does not require proof of 
an intent to defraud, the court of appeals correctly upheld the 
trial court's refusal to give defendant's requested instruction 
on the defense of "good faith." 
Defendant fails to demonstrate that the court of 
appeals, applying an abuse of discretion standard of review, 
incorrectly upheld the trial court's admission of expert 
testimony on the issue of "materiality." In light of case law 
from this court and the federal courts interpreting rules 702 and 
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< 
704 of the Rules of Evidence, the court of appeals properly 
concluded that the trial court had reasonably exercised its 
discretion in admitting the expert testimony. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
( 
THE COURT OP APPEALS CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE 
TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING THE 
MENTAL STATE POR A CRIMINAL VIOLATION OF UTAH 
CODE ANN. S 61-1-1(2) (1989) WERE PROPER; IT 
ALSO CORRECTLY UPHELD THE TRIAL COURT'S 
REFUSAL TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED < 
INSTRUCTION ON THE DEFENSE OF GOOD FAITH 
Defendant argues that the court of appeals erred in 
holding that the trial court correctly refused to give two of his 
requested jury instructions concerning the elements of and 
defenses to securities fraud. The first of those instructions 
would have told the jury that, for purposes of Utah Code Ann, 
S 61-1-1(2) (1989) and Utah Code Ann. S 61-1-21 (1989) (amended 
1990, 1991, 1992)1, an act or omission -is done 'wilfully' if 
done voluntarily and intentionally, and with the specific intent 
to do something the law forbids; that is to say with bad purpose 
either to disobey or disregard the law[,] . . . the bad purpose 
• . . be[ing] the specific intent to defraud." Defendant's 
Requested Jury Instr. No. 5 (R. 1355) (Appendix B to Br. of 
Pet.). The second would have instructed the jury that Ma 
representation made by the Defendant in good faith constitutes a 
complete defense to a charge of Securities Fraud.- Defendant's 
1
 Hereafter, all references to Title 61 provisions are to 
the 1989 volume of the Code. 
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Requested Jury Instr. No. 30 (R. 1381) (Appendix B to Br. of 
Pet.). 
The trial court purported to give defendant's 
instruction no. 5 in substance, excising the references to bad 
purpose and intent to defraud and simply instructing the jury 
that the culpable mental state for securities fraud is 
•willfully." Jury Instr. Kos. 14, 17, 17A (R. 1309, 1312, 1313) 
(Appendix C to Br. of Pet.). The court refused to give 
defendant's good faith instruction; however, it informed the jury 
that "ignorance or mistake of fact which disproves the culpable 
mental state is a defense to any prosecution for that crime." 
Jury Instr. No. 17A (R. 1313). 
On appeal, the court of appeals upheld the trial 
court's instructions. Defendant asserts this was error. In that 
the court of appeals' holding is based on an interpretation of 
statutes, that holding is reviewed for correctness. See Ward v. 
Richfield Citv. 798 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990) (interpretation of 
statute involves question of law reviewed for correctness); State 
v. Maouire. 830 P.2d 216 (Utah 1992) (no deference accorded court 
of appeals' conclusion on question of law). 
Defendant claims that United States Supreme Court cases 
interpreting federal securities laws dictate that section 61-1-
1(2) be interpreted to require proof of "scienter" (i.e., intent 
to defraud, manipulate, or deceive)2, and therefore the trial 
2
 Defendant uses the term "scienter" as it was defined in 
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder. 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976): "intent 
to deceive, manipulate, or defraud." Hereafter, the State 
5 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
court and the court of appeals incorrectly concluded otherwise. 
Furthermore, he claims that because a good faith defense goes 
hand-in-hand with the intent to defraud element, the trial court 
incorrectly refused to give the requested good faith instruction. 
The court of appeals rejected defendant's arguments on 
the ground that the "Utah Code specifies willfulness as the 
culpable mental state for securities fraud" and the trial court's 
"instruction on willfulness mirror[ed] the statutory definition." 
State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487, 495 (Utah App.), cert, granted, < 
836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992). Although the court of appeals' 
analysis might have been more thorough, its approval of the trial 
Court's instructions is correct. < 
A. Intent to Defraud 
As defendant notes, in 1963 the legislature 
substantially adopted the Uniform Securities Act, calling it the < 
Utah Uniform Securities Act. See § 61-1-1 et sea.: Unif. 
Securities Act, 7B U.L.A. 515-680 (1985) (hereafter cited as 
Unif. Act, 7B U.L.A. ). Section 61-1-1, which is at issue in < 
this case, is nearly identical to section 101 of the Uniform 
Securities Act. Section 101 contains the same language as 
Federal Securities and Exchange Commission Rule X-10b-5 (rule 4 
10b-5). As the official comments to the Uniform Securities Act 
make clear, section 101 "is substantially the Securities and 
Exchange Commission's Rule X-10b-5, which in turn was modeled 4 
upon § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. S 77q(a)." 
generally will refer to "scienter" as "intent to defraud." 
i 
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Official Comment, Unif. Act, 7B U.L.A. 516. 
Section 61-1-27 provides that the Utah Uniform 
Securities Act "may be so construed as to effect its general 
purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it 
and to coordinate the interpretation and administration of this 
chapter with the related federal regulation" (emphasis added). 
Relying on this section and the history of the Uniform Securities 
Act, defendant argues that, because the United States Supreme 
Court has held that a civil action under rule 10b-5 requires 
proof of an intent to defraud, a criminal prosecution tinder 
section 61-1-1(2) necessarily requires proof of intent to defraud 
in addition to proof of willfulness. However, this argument 
ignores the plain language of the pertinent statutes and, 
alternatively, misapplies the Supreme Court decisions. 
1. Plain Language 
Defendant was convicted under section 61-1-1(2), which 
makes it 
unlawful for any person, in connection with 
the offer, sale, or purchase of any security, 
directly or indirectly to . • . make any 
untrue statement of a material fact or to 
omit to state a material fact necessary in 
order to make the statements made, in the 
light of the circumstances under which they 
are made, not misleading!.] 
Criminal liability attaches when a person "willfully" violates 
that provision. S 61-1-21. Nothing in the plain language of 
sections 61-1-1(2) and 61-1-21 gives rise to an intent to defraud 
element. Those sections are clear and unambiguous: securities 
fraud is committed when a person "willfully" makes a misstatement 
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or an omission of a material fact. "Willfully" is defined 
elsewhere in the Code to mean the same thing as "intentionally" 
or "with intent.- Utah Code Ann. S 76-2-103(1) (1990)3. There 
is no reference to the additional element of "intent to defraud." 
Defendant reaches far beyond the plain language of the 
statutes to construe section 61-1-1(2) as requiring an intent to 
defraud in addition to the element of willfulness. He ignores 
the settled principle that, in determining legislative intent, 
this Court begins with a statute's plain language and will resort 
to other methods of statutory interpretation only if the language 
of the statute is ambiguous. See Shurtz v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 
814 P.2d 1108, 1112 (Utah 1991); Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 
500 (Utah 1989) (per curiam). He also fails to acknowledge that 
when the terms of a statute are unambiguous, an appellate court 
construes those terms in accord with their usual and accepted 
meaning. State v. Menzies, 182 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 15 n.27 (Utah 
Mar. 11, 1992). This Court has correctly rejected defendant's 
approach in a similar case. 
In State v. Delmotte. 665 P.2d 1314, 1325 (Utah 1983) 
(per curiam), the defendant argued that the trial court "erred in 
failing to instruct that intent to defraud is a necessary element 
of a bad check charge." The Court rejected this argument on the 
ground that "the offense calls for no such element." Ibid. 
3
 Section 76-2-103(1) provides: "A person engages in 
conduct . . • [iIntentionally, or with intent or willfully with 
respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his 
conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage 
in the conduct or cause the result" (emphasis added). 
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Indeed, the legislature had eliminated the "intent to defraud" 
element from the statute, making it clear that "[t]he element of 
'knowledge' of the overdraft is now sufficient to support a 
conviction.11 Ibid. See also State v. Berowerff. 777 P.2d 510, 
511 (Utah App. 1989) (holding that intent to defraud an insurance 
company is not an element of aggravated arson because such an 
intent is not contained in the plain language of the statute). 
The court of appeals correctly looked to the plain 
language of sections 61-1-1(2) and 61-1-21 in concluding that the 
culpable mental state for a criminal violation of section 61-1-
1(2) is "willfully." It properly rejected defendant's argument 
that intent to defraud is a required, additional mental element 
of the offense. ££. State v. Facer. 552 P.2d 110, 111 (Utah 
1976) (identifying "intentionally" as the culpable mental state 
for securities fraud). Other courts interpreting similar 
statutes have concluded that the plain language requires nothing 
more than proof the defendant acted "willfully." For instance, 
the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, interpreting securities fraud 
statutes nearly identical to sections 61-1-1(2) and 61-1-21, held 
that Wisconsin's false statement provision did not require an 
intent to defraud because the statute "makes no reference to 
intent to defraud." State v. Tembv, 108 Wis.2d 521, 528, 322 
N.W.2d 522, 526 (1982). Relying on the principle that "[w]hen 
statutory language is unambiguous, th[e] court will arrive at the 
intent of the legislature by giving the language its ordinary and 
accepted meaning," the court of appeals concluded that "had the 
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legislature wanted to require specific intent to defraud, it 
would have explicitly stated so.- 108 Wis.2d at 530, 322 N.W.2d 
at 527. Rather, the legislature had identified -wilfully" as the 
culpable mental state. 108 Wis.2d at 529-30, 322 N.W.2d at 526-
27. 
In a similar context, the California Court of Appeal, 
construing California's securities fraud laws, stated: 
It is settled that the omission of 
-knowingly" from a penal statute indicates 
that guilty knowledge is not an element of 
the offense. Had the Legislature intended to 
require proof of guilty knowledge or scienter 
under section 25540, it could have so stated 
by using the word -knowingly.- Willfulness 
does not require proof of evil motive or 
intent to violate the law or knowledge of 
illegality. 
People v. Johnson, 213 Cal.App.3d 1369, 262 Cal.Rptr. 366, 369 
(1989). 
Additionally, a survey of the Utah Code reveals that 
when the legislature intended to make intent to defraud the 
culpable mental state for an offense, it used the words -intent 
to defraud.- See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. SS 23-20-27 (1991), 39-6-
104(4) (1988), 41-la-1319 (Supp. 1992), 76-6-506.1 (Supp. 1992), 
76-6-518 (1990), 76-10-706 (1990), 76-10-1006 (1990). Compare 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-302(9)(c) (1992) (-The commission or court 
need not find a bad motive or specific intent to defraud . . . to 
establish willfulness under this section.-). This further 
supports the court of appeals' plain language approach and its 
ultimate rejection of defendant's proposed construction of 
section 61-1-1(2). 
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2. Beyond the Plain Language 
Even if this Court were to accept defendant's 
invitation to look beyond the plain language of the statutes, he 
ignores pertinent language in the official comments to the 
Uniform Securities Act and misapplies the United States Supreme 
Court decisions he claims are controlling. 
Defendant contends that because the source of section 
61-1-1 — section 101 of the Uniform Securities Act — is 
substantially rule 10b-5, Utah's statute must be interpreted in 
the criminal context as the Supreme Court has construed rule 10b-
5 in civil actions. He bases this contention on section 61-1-27, 
which provides that Utah's securities fraud laws "may be so 
construed as to effectuate its general purpose to . . . 
coordinate the interpretation and administration of this chapter 
with the related federal regulation91 (emphasis added). 
An initial problem with this position is that section 
61-1-27 says Utah's securities act "may," rather than "shall," be 
construed to coordinate its interpretation with related federal 
regulation. The Uniform Securities Act contains a "shall" 
provision: "This act shall be so construed as to effectuate its 
general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which 
enact it and to coordinate the interpretation and administration 
of this act with the related federal regulation." Unif. Act 
S 415, 7B U.L.A. 678. Defendant does not note or discuss this 
significant difference between Utah's law and the Uniform 
Securities Act. Indeed, this distinction undermines the basic 
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premise of his argument: that "the Utah Act must be construed to 
effectuate this 'general purpose' f'to coordinate the 
interpretation of this chapter with the related federal 
regulation'1/ Br. of Pet. at 9-10 (first emphasis added). The 
truth is the legislature preferred a more flexible approach which 
does not bind Utah's courts to federal court interpretations of 
federal securities laws. 
But even beyond this defect in defendant's argument, 
neither the Supreme Court cases nor the official comments to the 
Uniform Securities Act dictate that section 61-1-1(2) be 
interpreted to require an intent to defraud. 
The Supreme Court Cases 
Defendant relies principally on Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). There, the issue was "whether 
an action for civil damages may lie under S 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . • • and Securities and Exchange 
Commission Rule 10b-5 . . . in the absence of an allegation of 
intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud on the part of the 
defendant." 425 U.S. at 187-88.* Based on a review of the 
4
 Section 10b, from which rule 10b-5 derives, makes it 
•"unlawful for any person . . . (b) [t]o use or employ, in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security • • • any 
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention 
of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as 
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the 
protection of investors.r" Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 195 (quoting 
15 U.S.C. S 78j). Rule 10b-5 provides! 
It shall be unlawful for any person, 
directly or indirectly, by use of any means 
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or 
of the mails or of any facility of any 
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plain language of section 10(b) and its legislative history, the 
Court held that a private cause of action for damages will not 
lie under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 "in the absence of any 
allegation of 'scienter' — intent to deceive, manipulate, or 
defraud.- 2d, at 193. 
Relying on this language from Hochfelder. defendant 
asserts that criminal liability under section 61-1-1(2) will not 
lie unless there is proof of intent to defraud in addition to 
proof of willfulness. Defendant erroneously views Hochfelder in 
isolation and fails to give due consideration to at least one 
other significant Supreme Court case. 
When the Court decided Hochfelder. it "was primarily 
concerned with rejecting Hochfelder'e contention that mere 
negligent omissions sufficed to establish a claim under Rule 10b 
5." United States v. Chierella. 588 F.2d 1358, 1370 (2nd Cir. 
1978), rev'd on other grounds. 445 U.S. 222 (1980). See also 
national securities exchange, 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or 
artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a 
material fact or to omit to state a material 
fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not 
misleading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or 
course of business which operates or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, 
in connection with the purchase or sale of 
any security• 
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. 
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Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 197. In concluding that a private action 
under S 10(b) and rule 10b-5 requires an allegation of 
"scienter," Hochfelder did not thoroughly analyze the specific 
language of rule 10b-5; rather, the Court focused primarily on 
the language of S 10(b) and its legislative history. See 425 
U.S. at 212. The Court noted that rule 10b-5 "was a hastily 
drafted response to a situation clearly involving intentional 
misconduct • . . [and,] [a]lthough adopted pursuant to § 10(b), 
the language of the Rule appears to have been derived in 
significant part from § 17 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. S 77q." 
425 U.S. at 212-13 n.32. Thus, if the language of rule 10b-5, 
which provided the model for section 101 of the Uniform 
Securities Act, is to be fairly interpreted in light of all the 
relevant Supreme Court case law, this Court must also examine 
decisions interpreting section 17(a) of the 1933 Act. 
Section 17(a) provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person in the 
offer or sale of any securities by the use of 
any means or instruments of transportation or 
communication in interstate commerce or by 
the use of the mails, directly or 
indirectly --
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or 
artifice to defraud, or 
(2) to obtain money or property by means 
of any untrue statement of a material fact or 
any omission to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements 
made, in the light of the circumstances under 
which they were made, not misleading, or 
(3) to engage in any transaction, 
practice, or course of business which 
operates or would operate as a fraud or 
14 
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deceit upon the purchaser. 
15 U.S.C. § 17q(a). The language of this statute is very similar 
to that of rule 10b-5 and section 61-1-1. In fact, section 61-1-
1(2) is a mirror image of section 17(a)(2). The Supreme Court 
determined what mental state is required for a violation of 
section 17(a) in Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980). 
There, the Court held that under section 17(a), 
"scienter" (i.e., intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud) is 
required for subsection (1) but not subsections (2) and (3). 446 
U.S. at 697. Focusing on the plain language of subsection (2), 
the language at issue in the instant case (see 61-1-1(2)), the 
Court said: 
[T]he language of S 17(a)(2), which 
prohibits any person from obtaining money or 
property "by means of any untrue statement of 
a material fact or any omission to state a 
material fact," is devoid of any suggestion 
whatsoever of a scienter requirement. As a 
well-known commentator has noted, "[t]here is 
nothing on the face of Clause (2) itself 
which smacks of scienter or intent to 
defraud." 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 
1442 (2d ed. 1961). In fact, this Court in 
Hochfelder pointed out that the similar 
language of Rule 10b-5(b) Mcould be read as 
proscribing . . . any type of material 
misstatement or omission . . • that has the 
effect of defrauding investors, whether the 
wrongdoing was intentional or not." 
Id. at 696 (citation omitted). 
In short, contrary to defendant's contention, the 
Supreme Court case law interpreting related federal regulation 
does not dictate that section 61-1-1(2) be construed to require 
proof of an intent to defraud. Aaron's analysis of section 
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17(a), which through rule 10b-5 was a model for section 101 of 
the Uniform Securities Act and therefore section 61-1-1, is at 
least as instructive as Hochfelder when it comes to interpreting 
section 61-1-1(2). Thus, it is not surprising that several state 
courts have relied on Aaron in holding that their 61-1-1(2)-type 
provisions do not require an intent to defraud. See, e.g., State 
v. Tembv, 108 Wis. at 528-29, 322 N.W.2d at 526-27; People v. 
Whitlow. 89 111.2d 322, 334-35, 433 N.E.2d 629, 634, cert, 
denied, 459 U.S. 830 (1982). 
Official Comments to the Uniform Securities Act 
An additional flaw in defendant's argument becomes 
apparent when the official comments to pertinent provisions of 
the Uniform Securities Act are examined. Section 409 of the Act 
provides that criminal liability attaches when a person 
"willfully" violates a provision of the Act. The Utah 
Legislature adopted a similar provision in section 61-1-21 which, 
as previously noted, sets forth the willfulness requirement for 
criminal liability. 
The official comment to section 409 refers the reader 
to the comment under section 204(a)(2)(B) for "the meaning of 
'willfully.'" Official Comment, Unif. Act S 409, 7B U.L.A. 632. 
That comment states in pertinent parti 
As the federal courts and the SEC have 
construed the term "willfully" in S 15(b) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 
U.S.C. S 78o(b), all that is required is 
proof that the person acted intentionally in 
the sense that he was aware of what he was 
doing. Proof of evil motive or intent to 
violate the law, or knowledge that the law 
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was being violated is not required. 
Official Comment, Unif. Act S 204(a)(2)(B), 7B U.L.A. 545. This 
passage expressly condemns the "specific intent to violate the 
law/bad purpose" element of defendant's requested instruction no. 
5 (R. 1355) (Appendix B to Br. of Pet.)* It also seriously 
undercuts defendant's argument that to establish a criminal 
violation of section 61-1-1(2) there must be proof of intent to 
defraud in addition to proof of willfulness. 
Significant State and Federal Criminal Cases 
Defendant also fails to give due weight to either the 
substantial state case law holding that an intent to defraud is 
not an element of 61-1-1(2)-type statutes or the handful of 
federal securities fraud decisions that have addressed the 
"scienter" question in the criminal context. 
On the state level, numerous courts have held that 
intent to defraud is not an element of the crime of securities 
fraud under statutes similar to section 61-1-1(2); proof that the 
defendant acted "willfully" is all that is required. See, e.g., 
People v. Mitchell, 175 Mich.App. 83, 437 N.W.2d 304, 306-08 
(1989), appeal denied, 433 Mich. 895 (1990); People v. Johnson, 
213 Cal.App.3d 1369, 262 Cal.Rptr. 366 (1989), review denied 
(Cal. Dec. 21, 1989); People v. Whitlow, 89 111.2d 322, 433 
N.E.2d 629, 633-34, cert, denied. 459 U.S. 830 (1982); State v. 
Tembv, 108 Wis.2d 521, 322 N.W.2d 522, 525-27 (1982); State v. 
Fries. 214 Neb. 874, 337 N.W.2d 398, 404-05 (1983); State v. 
Ross, 104 N.M. 23, 715 P.2d 471, 474 (N.M. App. 1986); State v. 
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Tarzian, 136 Ariz. 238, 665 P.2d 582, 585-86 (Ariz. App. 1983). 
See also Garvin v. Greenback, 856 F.2d 1392, 1397-98 (9th Cir. 
1988) (construing Arizona statutes); Van Duvse v. Israel. 486 F. 
Supp. 1382 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (construing Wisconsin statutes). 
Except for Illinois, all of the states represented in these 
decisions have, like Utah, substantially adopted the Uniform 
Securities Act. Unif. Act, 7B U.L.A. 509-14. Therefore, the 
decisions are instructive, if not persuasive, authority. See 
State v. Swenson. 838 P.2d 1136, 1138 (Utah 1992) (relying on 
decision from Michigan, another Uniform Securities Act state, 
when interpreting a provision of the Utah Uniform Securities 
Act). 
Although defendant criticizes these state cases as 
inconsistent with Hochfelder, the previous discussion of 
Hochfelder demonstrates that defendant's reliance on that case as 
the controlling authority is not sound. And, while defendant 
finds some support for his position in State v. Puckett, 
6 Kan.App.2d 688, 634 P.2d 144, 152 (1981), aff'd, 230 Kan. 296, 
640 P.2d 1198 (1982), and People v. Terranova, 38 Colo.App. 476, 
563 P.2d 363 (Colo. App. 1977) (but see People v. Blair. 579 P.2d 
1133, 1138-39 (Colo. 1978) (en banc) (which supports the State's 
position)), those decisions appear to represent a minority view. 
Furthermore, defendant's attempt to distinguish some of 
the contrary state decisions on the ground that they do not 
address statutory provisions similar to section 61-1-27, fails 
because he misreads section 61-1-27 as setting forth a "specific 
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legislative directive to construe [the uniform securities] 
laws In accordance with related federal regulation."1 Br oi 
Pet, at 13 (emphasis added) As previously noted, under secLion 
61-1-27 the courts "nay" construe Utah's laws to coordinate with 
the relau fil federal regi - not mandate 
that they do so. Therefore, as both the trial court and the 
court of appeals were free to do, this Court may interpret 
eecl if."1' 6 1 -1 - ' I ? I no' i J leqiiiit-1 t)\ lut.ei,1 ' ; defrai id , regardless 
of what conclusions the federal courts may have reached with 
respect to the related federal regulation. 
Finally, defendant overlooks se era 1! JJUB t -Hochfelder 
criminal 10b-5 cases that have upheld jury instructions similar 
to those gi ven :i n defendant * s case In United States v 
Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358 (2nd Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 
445 U.S. 222 (1980 major issue was "the level of intent 
necessary tn hi 1:ion for criminal, violations of Rule 
10b-5. 588 F.2d at 1370. Under 15 U.S.C, § 78ff, criminal 
liability attaches for "willful" violations of any securities 
rule or regulation (thii federal .uunterpai i no in:an," h 
section 61-1-21) The trial court had instructed the jury 
that it could not convict Chiarella unless it 
found that he had acted "knowingly" and 
"willfully," and defined these terms to mean 
that "the defendant must be aware of what he 
was doing and what he was not doing" and that 
he must be acting deliberately, and not as a 
result of "innocent mistakes, negligence, or 
inadvertence or other innocent conduct." 
588 defendant does here, Chiare not 
dispute the trial court's instruction on willfulness but, citing 
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Hochfelder, contended "that when the substantive provisions are 
$ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the Government must prove the additional 
element of specific intent to defraud." Ibid. 
Observing that "Chiarella was convicted under a charge 
requiring the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he 
engaged in 'knowingly wrongful' misconduct," the Second Circuit 
held that Hochfelder did not require more than this and the trial 
court "correctly refused to charge the jury that the Government 
must prove specific intent to defraud." Jjd. at 1371. The court 
relied in part on United States v. Charnav, 537 F.2d 341 (7th 
Cir.), cert, denied. 429 U.S. 1000 (1976), where in a similar 
vein, the Seventh Circuit held that an indictment was not fatally 
defective because it failed "to allege a specific intent to 
defraud," 537 F.2d at 351-52. 
Thus, the few reported decisions in criminal 10b-5 
cases have rejected defendant's intent to defraud argument. As 
noted in United States v. Chestman. 704 F. Supp. 451, 459 
(S.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other 
grounds, 947 4^** 551 (2nd Cir. 1991): 
In a criminal case alleging violations of 
SEC rules, § 78ff provides the level of 
intent required for conviction. The 
government must prove willful misconduct, 
which is to say that the defendant was aware 
of what he was doing, that his acts were done 
intentionally and deliberately and not as a 
result of an innocent mistake, negligence or 
inadvertence. See United States v. Dixon. 
536 F.2d 1388, 1395, 1397 (2nd Cir. 1976); 
United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 
1370 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 
445 U.S. 222, 100 S.Ct. 1108, 63 L.Ed.2d 348 
(1979). 
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704 F Supp. at 459. 
Defendants Strict Liability Argument 
Defendant suggests that if an intent to defraud element 
is not read into section 61-1-1(2), this "would permit sweeping, 
Bliict •11at1I"J f y prosecutions •+- *+ i* 'emphasis . 
added) This is simply wrong. To convict under section 61 J 
1(2)r the State must prove the defendant acted te;? 
S 61- ] • 23 i :I gh 1 j culpable mental state an offense is a 
strict liability offense only when "the statute defining the 
offense clearly indicates n e tu unpuiit1 
criminal responsibility for commission of the conduct prohibited 
by the statute without requiring proof of any culpable mental 
state." lit Ml Code .ft i m i S ? 6« 2 - 1 0 2 (II 9 9 0) 
B. Good Faith Defense 
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court 
i? JM" nuaeciiE Jl > i P lee led !"«:i f. instruction on a "good faith" defense. 
The court of appeals did not explicitly address this point; 
however , its holding concerning an intent tu rlefxaud eleiiif 
sect Io) i 61- I • 1(2) effectively disposed of the issue. 
As defendant notes, "[h]and-in-hand with the scienter 
element is the consister -dense*" 
B,:i : ' i>f P e t . a t J 11 I! e l : ., because intent to defraud is not an 
element of section 61-1-1(2), a good faith defense is not 
applicable. See , Sparrow v. United States. .2d 826, 
828-29 (10th Cir. 1968) (making clear that the good faith defense 
does not apply to "the defendant's good faith as in > 1 .1 :ie ex i st .ei n ::e 
21 
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< 
of any particular fact or situation," and cautioning that 
although a good faith defense exists with regard to the plan or 
scheme as a whole, "no matter how firmly the defendant may 
believe in the plan, his belief will not justify baseless, false, 
or reckless representations or promises"); United States v. 
Bover. 694 F.2d 58, 60 (3rd Cir. 1982). 
Therefore, the court of appeals correctly upheld the 
trial court's refusal to give defendant's good faith instruction. 
POINT " 
THE COURT OP APPEALS CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE 
TRIAL COURT REASONABLY EXERCISED ITS 
DISCRETION IN ADMITTING EXPERT TESTIMONY ON 
THE ISSUE OP "MATERIALITY" 
Defendant asks this Court to reverse the court of 
appeals' holding that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in allowing the State's expert to give opinion 
testimony concerning the "materiality" of information defendant 
failed to disclose to investors. (Materiality is an element of 
securities fraud which the State must prove under section 61-1-
1(2). Larsen, 828 P.2d at 493.) Although the State conceded 
below that the issue was a close one, defendant fails to show 
that the court of appeals erred. 
The court of appeals reviewed the trial court's 
evidentiary ruling on the expert testimony under an abuse of 
discretion standard, noting that it would not reverse "in the 
'absence of a clear abuse of discretion.'" Larsen. 828 P.2d at 
492 (quoting Lamb v. Banoart. 525 P.2d 602, 607-08 (Utah 1974)). 
See also State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 332 (Utah 1991) ("As long 
22 
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BIB the testimony 'will assist the trier of fact understand w.u 
evidence or to determine a fact issue,f Utai , 
admission is generally within the discretion of the trial court 
even If such teptimor.y addresses an 'ultimate issue, " £f. 
State v. Ramirez . 817 P,2d at 781-82 [w]hether a piece of 
evidence is admissible is a question of law, and we always review 
questions oil law under a correctness standard," but when the rule 
of evidence "vests a measure of discretion in the trial court,9* 
the appellate court reverses only if it concludes that the trial 
court exei: ci seel :I I: HE :! :I sex el: I on ' 1" 121 11: easona bl y") • 
Defendant does not challenge the court of appeals' 
standard of review. Moreover, he does not demonstrate that the 
court of appeals incorrectly concluded that I: I 
reasonably exercised its discretion. In fact, where the issue 
was necessa court of appeals correctly 
deferred to the trial court's decision which was reasonably 
supported by the analysis in United States v. Lueben, 812 F.2d 
m o d i f i e d , 11 I i,. V ,YI I! 0II ;• ' !:. I h C 1 r . ,1 9 H 7 j -md 
the broad construction this Court recently gave to rules 702 and 
704, Utah Rules of Evidence, in State v. Span, 819 P.2d at 33 2 
"Case law supports proposition that fin expert may render 
an opinion that certain actions constitute a crime. As long 
as the testimony will 'assist the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence to determine a fact issue,1 . . - itts admission 
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generally within the discretion of the trial court[.]").5 
In short, the court of appeals would have been 
justified in finding an abuse of discretion "only if there was no 
reasonable basis for the [trial court's] decision." Crookston v. 
Fire Insurance Exchange. 817 P.2d 789, 805 (Utah 1991) (applying 
the "abuse of discretion" standard in reviewing trial court's 
decision on motion for new trial) (footnote omitted). Defendant 
does not demonstrate that the court of appeals was compelled to 
find an abuse of discretion on the ground that there was no 
reasonable basis for the trial court's decision. 
The court of appeals relied heavily on Lueben in 
upholding the trial court's evidentiary ruling. In that case, 
the Fifth Circuit, reviewing a conviction for making materially 
false statements to a federally insured savings and loan 
institution, held that the trial court had erroneously excluded 
the testimony of a defense expert witness regarding the 
5
 Rule 702 provides: 
If scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge will assist the trier 
of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education, may 
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or 
otherwise. 
Rule 704 provides: 
Testimony in the form of an opinion or 
inference otherwise admissible is not 
objectionable because it embraces an ultimate 
issue to be decided by the trier of fact. 
24 
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materiality of false statements allegedly made to the financial 
institution. The court rejected the claim that the expert's 
opinions constituted legal conclusions and therefore were 
inadmissible under rule 704, Federal Rules of Evidence. It 
reasoned that "Lueben sought fin ask | the export] the factual 
question of whether false statements in this case would have 'the 
capacity to influence' a loan officer of a savings and loan 
j imp,!; i !' iii! inn n q u e s t Inn nl vihelhci 1 hie e t a I einenl, t 
were 'material. .2d at 184.* 
The court of appeals likened the testimony of the 
State' s exper t :I i > • ilefendaii t: s case t fact-oriented inquiry 
on materiality discussed in Lueben: 
[W]e are persuaded by Lueben that use < 
term ••material11 may be admitted as 
permissible fact-oriented testimony. Upon 
review of the record, we conclude that the 
expert in this case used the term "material91 
in a factual sense. 
Larsen, 828 P.2d at 493. 
D*11 a 11' J a n ! .«• \ 11 i i • 11 e i IJ i«• court I appeals' reliance on 
Lueben and focuses on three cases: S C O P V . United States, 846 
F.2d 135 (2nd Cir.), modified on rehearing, 856 F.2d 5 (1981 
Marx & Co.. Inc. v. Diner's Club, Inc.. 550 F.2d 505 (2nd Cir. 
1977), cert, denied, 434 U.S. 861 (1977); and Adalman v. Baker, 
* The Fifth Circuit's modification of its original opinion 
did not appear to disturb the substance of its analysis on this 
point. Although in its modifying opinion the court held that the 
question of "materiality* was a legal question for the judge, 
rather than a fact question for the jury* it did not criticize 
the original opinion's analysis of the rule 704 issue. Lueben, 
816 F.2d at 1033. 
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i 
Watts S Co., 807 F.2d 359 (4th Cir. 1986). The court of appeals 
correctly distinguished these cases from Lueben on the ground
 { 
that they illustrate the inadmissibility of legal conclusions by 
an expert under rule 704. For example, in SCOP, the court was 
troubled because the expert "made no attempt to couch the opinion
 { 
testimony at issue in even conclusory factual statements but drew 
directly upon the language of the statute and accompanying 
regulations concerning 'manipulation' and 'fraud.'" 846 F.2d at 
140. The court commented that "[h]ad the expert merely testified 
that controlled buying and selling of the kind alleged here can 
create artificial price levels to lure outside investors, no 
sustainable objection could have been made." Ibid. 
In Marx, the court held that the trial court erred in 
allowing an expert witness, who was qualified as an expert in 
securities regulation, to give his opinion as to the legal 
obligations of the parties under a contract. The court first 
noted that "[tjestimony concerning the ordinary practices of 
those engaged in the securities business is admissible under the 
same theory as testimony concerning the ordinary practices of 
physicians or concerning other trade customs: to enable the jury 
to evaluate the conduct of the parties against the standards of 
ordinary practice in the industry." 550 F.2d at 509. However, 
it concluded that the expert's testimony "did not concern only 
the customary practices of a trade or business;" the expert had 
improperly rendered legal opinions as to the meaning of the 
contract terms at issue. Id. at 509-10. 
26 
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And, in Adalman, a party sought to have a exyei t 
witness "testify as to his conclusion that the applicable law did 
not require Hie disclosure of omitted information [in a 
securities offering]." 807 P.2d at 365 In upholding the trial 
court's exclusion of such testimony , the court, relying heavily 
or Marx, observed tli/il ml J h obviouw thai | the party] proffered 
[the expert] to testify in substantial part t< the meaning and 
the applicability of the securities laws to the transactions 
here i givimj liLs expert opinion on the y 'iverri Lng law| ; "| thifii 
flies squarely in the face of the precedent and logic of that 
precedent - set out in Marx. Jd at 368. 
Reading S C O P , £tarx, Adalman . and Lueben together 
effort to apply them to the instant case is indeed a difficult 
task See Davidson v. Prince , 61! 3 1:: 2d 11 225, 1 231 (Utal App ) 
("There is no bright line between permissible questions under 
Rule 704 and those that call « overbroad legal responses."), 
cert, denied, I), At 11, i" B t bins hi it might-
appear that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting 
the expert's opinions. However, unlike the testimony in S C O P , 
Marx and Adalman, the expert's testimony here did not constitute 
a legal opinion. His testimony was more akin to the opinion 
testimony on 1 he factual question discussed i i i Luebens whether 
the false statements had the capacity to influence. While 11: 
clearly would have been better for the expert to steer away from 
the term "mater, iall ," iw appealB to id iv< re used the term not In iLliit.; 
legal sense but rather in the factual sense of what the ordinary 
•i 
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practice in the industry is, or what would be important to or 
have the capacity to influence an investor. In any event, the 
testimony appears to be well within the limits of rule 704 as 
defined in State v. Span. 819 P.2d at 332 n.l, where this Court 
noted that M[c]ase law supports the proposition that an expert 
may render an opinion that certain actions constitute a crime" 
and then cited with apparent approval the following cases: 
United States v. Buchanan, 787 F.2d 477, 483-84 (10th Cir. 1986) 
(officer of Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms was allowed 
to testify that a device was a firearm subject to registration 
with the Bureau); United States v. Loaan. 641 F.2d 860, 863 (10th 
Cir. 1981) (expert properly testified that funds were improperly 
taken from corporation); and United States v. Carroll, 518 F.2d 
187, 188 (6th Cir. 1975) (expert properly testified that certain 
drugs come within a particular statutory classification). 
In sum, in light of Lueben and this Court's expansive 
interpretation of rules 702 and 704 in Span (relying on federal 
cases), the court of appeals did not err in holding that the 
trial court reasonably exercised its discretion in admitting the 
expert testimony under rules 702 and 704. See State v. Banner, 
717 P.2d 1325, 1333-34 (Utah 1986) (the appellate courts of this 
state look to the interpretation of the federal rules of evidence 
by the federal courts to aid in interpreting Utah's rules of 
evidence). As the court of appeals correctly observed, *[i]n 
general, expert testimony is suitable in securities fraud cases 
because the technical nature of securities is not within the 
28 
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knowledge of the average layman or a subject within the common 
experience and w<. ider stand the IPBVIPS be fine 
them." Larsen, 828 P.2d at 492 (citing rule 702 and Dixon v. 
Stewart. 658 P.2d 591, 597 (Utah 1982)).7 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, the Court should 
affirm the court of appeals' decision. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this (9-1 day of December, 
1992. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON 0 
Assistant Attorney General 
7
 Defendant claims that the court of appeals "apparently 
read Rule 704 to mean that opinion testimony is admissible if it 
goes to an issue of ultimate fact because, by definition, it is 
not a legal conclusion." Br. of Pet. at 24-25. However, this is 
refuted by the court's clear statement that '[d]espite the 
appropriateness of expert testimony on an ultimate issue, Rule 
704 was not intended to allow experts to give legal conclusions." 
Larsen. 828 P.2d at 493. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Brief were hand-delivered to David L. Arrington, 
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy, 50 South Main Street, 
Suite 1600, P.O. Box 45340, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 and Larry 
R. Keller, 257 Towers, Suite 340, 257 East 200 South - 10, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111, this «^3 (day of December, 1992. 
/fc~cu>tJ/\ £ >^<r>»~*?*<n~ 
30 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ADDENDUM C 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
23 
24 
25 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * 
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vs. 
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Transcript of: 
Mi.it 11 in Herii L rifc' 
Case No. 901901580 
The above-entitled -i •?•• : action came on 
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Moffat, a Judge of the Third Judicial District Court of the 
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1 FRIDAY. APRTT. 10. 199? 2:25 P.M. 
2 i ± M ij. E.h-lL l_tL<i_S 
3 THE COURT: Once again. 
4 MR. BUGDEN: Good afternoon. 
5 THE COURT: You are half right, it is 
6 afternoon. How are you, Mr. Bugden? 
7 MR. BUGDEN: I am good, I think. 
8 THE COURT: All right. 
9 MR. BUGDEN nm -.-t positive. We are 
10 preparer! t. n pn forv - v . There >H'e >\\.iil(-: n 
11 few motions that are before you I would like to begin 
12 by calling Mr. Brass • * •-• - itness stand. 
13 1 - c -. . M r . Brass, come 
14 forward. 
15 EDWARD K. BRASS 
16 Cai . ert a? a witness on behalf of the defense, after 
17 having been first duly sworn, was examined and testified 
id as follows: 
19 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
20 BY MR. BUGDEN: 
21 Q Will vou Eitatve vour name tor the i ecoi'd , til . 
22 A Edward K. Brass. 
23 Q And when did you graduate from law school, sir? 
24 A 1977. 
25 Q Do you have any particular areas of expertise 
1 
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1 that are the focus of your practice? 
2 A Criminal defense. 
3 Q And can you tell me, sir, have you been a 
4 presenter at various seminars over the years? 
5 A On numerous occasions. Most recently in March. 
6 Q How many jury trials you think you have done 
7 over the years since your graduation from law school? 
8 A It would be in the hundreds. 
9 Q How many jury trials do you think you do a 
10 year? 
11 A Now? 25 maybe. 
12 Q Have you handled securities fraud trials in 
13 your practice, sir? 
14 A Yes. 
15 Q How many securities fraud trials have you 
16 handled? Trials, cases that have actually gone to trial? 
17 A That have gone to trial? 
18 Q Yes, sir. 
19 A More than ten. 
20 Q From your experience handling securities fraud 
21 cases, sir, is a securities fraud charge a technical case 
22 to defend? 
23 A They are more complicated than the average 
24 criminal case, if that is what you mean by "technical.M 
25 Yes, I would agree with that. 
2 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 Q As a general rule, ,!:j i r , yr<"U give <cun opening 
2 statement in jury trials? 
3 • MR. SONNENREICH: Your Honor, I don't see the 
4 relevance of Mi Brass ' £3 practice Li: I fact, Y our Honor, 
5 at this time it appears that this expert is going to be 
6' •' called for the purpose of discussing opening stater?- • 
7 and it WT. r.ikes • n le that that i s the question of whether >r 
8 not an opening statement is important to give, is one 
9." well within the Court's own ability u determine v itliout 
10 an expert witness, and also he hasn't been qualified. 
11 THE COURT: The Supreme Court in the question 
12'" on this issue nf the J.n"*k of »'ommudat ed rounse] at the 
13 time of trial has made several pronunciations over the 
14 years and one of them 1 hat i clearly recal 
15 you * h Li" h east1 if W H H , WHB hhat —• W e 1 1 "et s s-e they 
16 differentiated between "strategic and tactical." 
17 MR. BUGDEN: That is exact] y what I intei I ;:i to 
18 form- (m. 
19"' . THE COURT: We J 1 , you can focus on "it but it 
20 has always been my impression, Mr Hn^ ifer,, , 1 hat the 
21 question as to whether or not you give an opening 
22 statement was one that counsel could — it was purely 
23 ' within the preroRatu/p n| I'ounael rind jt depends upon 
24 their view of a particular case. I don't think you could 
25 make out a case of incompetence simply because they d:i ci 
3 
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1 or didn't do opening argument. 
2 MR. BUGDEN: Well, it is one of the factors 
3 that we are bringing before the Court. It is one of the 
4 issues where we think there was a defect under Strickland 
5 vs. Washington. The first prong requires that we give * 
6 you some specific instances, specific conduct, which we 
7 believe fell below an objective standard of 
8 reasonableness. 
9 Rule 401 of the Rules of Evidence defines what 
10 "relevant evidence" is. That apparently is the 
11 objection. "Relevant evidence," Your Honor, is defined 
12 under the rule as "Evidence having any tendency to make 
13 the existence of any facts — " let me stop there. Do we 
14 have representation by Mr. Barber which fell below an 
15 objective standard of reasonableness? That is the fact 
16 that I believe is relevant. That is what you have to 
17 decide in this law. 
18 THE COURT: I understand. 
19 MR. BUGDEN: Therefore, as we keep reading, all 
20 right. So "relevant evidence means any evidence having 
21 any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
22 consequence to the determination of the action," that is 
23 what this motion is all about, "more probable or less 
24 probable than it would be without the evidence." 
25 Now, maybe you will decide — 
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1 THE COURT: That is relevance. It js nmt 
2 materiality, but — We] 1, I will 1 et him get into it. 
3 v: - *- .ooking, I am sure, Mr. Bugden, at the overall 
4 e- - .*•? formal ice 1: lere, some nf which mm,/ hn^v n -— 
5 ma> oe relevant, some which may be material, and some of 
6 which may not U P either, or one or the other. But i am 
7 g o i njy t 11 1 c t _ in ii J g n i ] i}t. .i i i t , 
8 MR. BUGDEN: Thank you very much. 
9 ' 'Q ' (By Mi Bugden) Generally speaking i n a jury 
10 trial, do you give an opening statement, Mi Brass? 
A Generally speaking, yes. 
12 Q And what purposes a p-iahr arp aeeorop i ~t -tneu nv 
13 giving an opening statement? 
14 A Certainly the most immediate purpose is to 
1 5 outl i ne yen nr case t o the ji iry 
16 • Q Why is that important? 
17 A So that they understand what your defense is. 
18 Q A F P there rtny rl LI; £erent, g.ials, Mi:"1 Brass, in a 
19 securities fraud case than, for example, say in a 
20 burglary case? 
21 A I think not other than, as I said before, a 
22 more complex case. 
23 Q In a more complex case, do von think t h^ Iherp 
24 is a greater need to give an opening statement i •: 
25 familiarize the jury with certain issues? 
5 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 A I am certain that that would be true. 
2 Q Can you think of a time, sir, that you would 
3 not give an opening statement in a securities fraud case? 
4 A Sure. If it was a multiple defendant case and 
5 I represented a person who was culpable than other 
6 defendants or the evidence was much weaker against them, 
7 perhaps I wouldn't want to make one in that case. 
8 Q But what about in a situation where it is a 
9 single-defendant case, not a multiple-defendant case? 
10 One defendant, securities fraud, four counts, would you 
11 give an opening statement in that situation? 
12 A Just on the facts as you have outlined for me, 
13 I can't see any reason why not. 
14 Q If you thought, in your professional judgment, 
15 sir, that the jury was impatient — I have to actually 
16 give you a different predicate. If you had reserved the 
17 giving of an opening statement and as the time approached 
18 for the defense to open its case, you had an opinion or a 
19 perception that the jury was impatient or bored with the 
20 evidence that they had heard, would that be a reason, in 
21 your opinion, to forego giving an opening statement in a 
22 securities fraud case? 
23 A Again, limiting myself to the facts as you have 
24 outlined, then it might be a reason to shorten it, but 
25 might not be a reason not to give one. 
6 
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1 Q From your experience doing hundreds of jury 
2 trials lio yuw hai'i" m\ ipHiiMit .ihout whet-lifj ut ii MIM 
3 giving of an opening statement is an important part of 
4 the criminal defense trial? 
5 A' It can be, certainly. 
6 Q In a securities fraud case, Mr. Brass, if one 
7 of the State's arguments to show a material omission 
8 ; w'etiei 1 .-hat the defendant, a broker-dealer, failed to 
9 disclose the possibility of future payments to an 
10 investor Ibi it yen i ha d a (loci :i men t j i: I j our possess;] on 
11 signed by the investor disclosing the possibility of 
12 future payments, would you seek to introduce that signed 
1 ^  doc iiment thr ough the i i ive sto r ? 
I-1 A The answer to your hypothetical question, yes. 
l c « Q • Why would you do that? Why would yon «"'hoose to 
111 introduce that document through the investor? 
17 A Because I would vi ew that document as something 
18 that is poten11 a ] 3 y damaging to that w::i tness s 
1H credibility, and it is much more effective to introduce 
20 it through that witness. 
21 MR. BUGDENi Thoee fire I f\a questions I have for 
22 Mr Brass. 
23 THE COURT: You may cross. 
24 HR" SONNENREICH" Thank you, 'four Honor. Just 
25 one second. (Pause) 
7 
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1 CROSS EXAMINATION 
2 BY MR. SONNENREICH: 
3 Q Mr. Brass, when did you graduate from law 
4 school? 
5 A *77. 
6 Q And since that time, what type of legal work 
7 have you done? 
8 A Primarily, criminal defense work. 
9 Q Have you ever been a prosecutor? 
10 A No. 
11 Q What percentage of your practice would you say 
12 was criminal defense work? 
13 A 90 percent. 
14 Q You would agree, based on your earlier 
15 testimony, that there are certain types of cases in which 
16 you might choose not to make an opening statement? 
17 A Sure, I said so. 
18 Q And would you agree that an expert trial lawyer 
19 could reasonably choose not to give an opening statement 
20 in other situations? 
21 A Sure. 
22 Q Let me also ask you a hypothetical question 
23 about a signed Subscription Agreement. Let us say that 
24 you had learned through the preliminary hearing in a 
25 matter that there was a document that was a signed 
8 
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1 Subscription Agreement that the investor who signed it, 
2
 a r Ki thip lei -'I question nt niat.en al i t.;v nt an onu sp-ion in a 
3 • securities case, there is an investor who signed I t. bi it 
4 the investor testifies that t he way that signature came 
5 about 'WriB that, his bi: >ker „ whom he hful fi v^ry 
6 longstanding relationship with, chose to call him and 
7 say, "(Tome in and sign some papers." Showed him a couple 
8 o.1 Kjgnai.ure 1JIH*W nrnl that was • . :e signed only the 
9' signature lines. He did not read the disclaimer 
] 0 language. He was not shown the page wi th t he da sol ai mer 
1: 1 language on it, and that his testimony was he had no 
12 knowledge : che disclaimer. And that testimony all came 
14 circumstances, would you try to introduce that document 
15 into evidence? 
16 MR BI. -. : lei1 ; e form,, 
] 7 of the question because •* assumes facts that are n< >t 
18 only not in the record, but > contrary to the 
19 preliminary hearing record. The question assumes facts 
20 that are absolutely a hundred and eighty degrees contrary 
21 to the record from the preliminary heari ng Bi i t evex i " s 
22 facts are not before you at this ti me, but that is i lot 
23 what happened at the preliminary hearing, and I w. i 11 
24 object for that i eason "The" hypothet ICH J in based or i a 
25 false set of facts. 
9 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 MR. SONNENREICH: Your Honor, first of all, I 
2 am more than willing to read from the preliminary hearing 
3 transcript. I was going to save that till my case, but I 
4 am happy to do it now. I mean, maybe that would make it 
5 even a better hypothetical. 
6 THE COURT: Well, if we are going to do this, 
7 we might as well start this trial Monday morning and go 
8 for the next couple, three weeks. If you want to do 
9 that, we can do that, gentlemen. I will allow it. If, 
10 Mr. Bugden, you find later what you say is correct and 
11 the record doesn't back it up, you can bring it to the 
12 Court's attention. 
13 MR. BUGDEN: Then I can ask you to strike it? 
14 THE COURT: Sure. 
15 MR. BUGDEN: All right. 
16 THE WITNESS: Okay, that was a long 
17 hypothetical. And I am going to assume for the purpose 
18 of the hypothetical, that the prior relationship between 
19 the dealer and the customer was a favorable relationship. 
20 MR. SONNENREICH: All right. 
21 THE WITNESS: I am going to assume that. In 
22 assuming that and given the nature of the prosecution 
23 that we are talking about, I would be much more concerned 
24 about introducing the document because of the possibility 
25 that it might have been altered after the time that this 
10 
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1 signed portion of the document was appended to the rest 
2 of it. I would be concerned about that and I would 
3 certainly want to inquire into that. 
4 Q (By Mr. Sonnenreich) Might you be concerned 
5 also that if the — 
6 MR. BUGDEN: Your Honor, may I interrupt for 
7 just a moment? I noticed that Mr. Barber was here, but 
8 there was no cognitive process on my part and I missed 
9 the point. Mr. Barber may be a witness and I would ask 
10 he be excluded and wait in the hall until we have reached 
11 a determination as to whether or not you will hear from 
12 him. 
13 MR. SONNENREICH: I also don't know if Mr. 
14 Barber will or will not be a witness. That depends in 
15 part on whether or not he had an affidavit of his in, but 
16 I am also not sure whether the Exclusionary Rule would 
17 apply at this point. 
18 THE COURT: Well, I am not sure whether it does 
19 or not. Do you care one way or another? 
20 MR. SONNENREICH: I don't care one way or 
21 another. 
22 THE COURT: Mr. Barber, do you have — 
23 MR. BARBER: Your Honor, I just came here 
24 because actually Mr. Bugden asked me to. I don't have 
25 any desire to be here at all. (Courtroom laughter) I 
11 
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1 was trying to accommodate counsel and not have to make 
2 Mr. Hines come over and serve a subpoena on me. I am 
3 perfectly happy to go home and leave all of you gentlemen 
4 to your work. 
5 MR. BUGDEN: So that you understand at least 
6 why I perceived there was a need for Mr. Barber to be 
7 here is this: at the earlier hearing we introduced an 
8 affidavit which was not objected to and which was 
9 stipulated to. In this instance, the government has 
10 prepared an affidavit which I saw in the minutes before 
11 you took the bench. Mr. Barber and I had a conversation 
12 yesterday. Mr. Barber and I then had a conversation at 
13 lunch time. When Mr. Barber telephoned me at lunch time, 
14 he advised me as to what language he was willing to sign 
15 and accept in an affidavit form, and some language that 
16 he was not willing to sign or admit in an affidavit form. 
17 The affidavit that has now been prepared, I believe, is 
18 inconsistent with what Mr. Barber has discussed with me 
19 on prior occasions, and so I am not prepared to stipulate 
20 to the introduction of Mr. Barber's affidavit. And so 
21 since I am not prepared to stipulate, it is hearsay and I 
22 think it becomes necessary and incumbent upon the State's 
23 attorney to call Mr. Barber. And so if Mr. Barber is 
24 going to be a witness, then I would invoke the 
25 Exclusionary Rule. That is the procedural background. 
12 
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1 MR. SONNENREICH: I intend to move the 
2 introduction of the affidavit as a clarification of the 
3 prior affidavit which was admitted without objection. 
4 Furthermore, affidavits are regularly received in motion 
5 practice outside of trial procedure. I am not sure the 
6 hearsay rule or any of the evidence rules apply, or that 
7 evidence should be taken in this particular proceeding, 
8 as you correctly pointed out earlier. Furthermore, 
9 frankly, it is the defendant who has the burden of proof 
10 on the question of Mr. Barber and if the defendant wants 
11 to establish what Mr. Barber knew or didn't know, he 
12 probably should call Mr. Barber, if the affidavit isn't 
13 admitted. Why don't we get a ruling on the affidavit and 
14 then Mr. Barber may be able to go home or whatever. If 
15 that would be okay, Your Honor. If we can interrupt this 
16 and solve this problem. 
17 THE COURT: Yeah. 
18 MR. BARBER: Do I sit down? 
19 THE COURT: Yeah, go ahead. 
20 MR. SONNENREICH: Your Honor, I am going to 
21 move for the admission of an affidavit of Mr. Barber that 
22 flushes out and more fully explains some of the 
23 situations concerning the prior affidavit and concerning 
24 the issues raised in the case. 
25 THE COURT: Where was the prior affidavit? 
13 
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1 MR. SONNENREICH: The prior affidavit was 
2 introduced on the first thing. It is about a three-page 
3 deal. This gets into the question of — 
4 THE COURT: You have this in the form of 
5 evidence? 
6 MR, BUGDEN: We have this in the form of an 
7 affidavit that was not objected to on March 18th on the 
8 first hearing. 
9 THE COURT: Did we set up an evidence envelope, 
10 or did you put those in the file? 
11 THE CLERK: No, I have got evidence envelopes. 
12 I don't see it listed (referring to the exhibit sheet.) 
13 MR. SONNENREICH: It was a two-page exhibit. 
14 As I read that affidavit, there is actually one matter in 
15 this other affidavit that isn't in the first one, and 
16 that goes to the question of his not making an opening in 
17 the case. I thought there was a statement in the first 
18 one that he had not made an opening. 
19 THE COURT: I have got it. It is right here. 
20 It is in the file, okay. So now the document you want to 
21 introduce now is an affidavit which supplements this 
22 affidavit? 
23 MR. SONNENREICH: It says he didn't make an 
24 opening statement and explains why. I thought there was 
25 a statement in the first affidavit that said, "I did not 
14 
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1 make an opening statement." There is not. But then it 
2 goes on to say why he didn't introduce that limited 
3 partnership subscription booklet that we are discussing 
4 right now. Some more views as to suitability questions 
5 as to the limited partnership portfolio lists, which were 
6 those exhibits attached to the first affidavit and also 
7 attached to the memorandum here. 
8 THE COURT: Okay. Well, let's get his problem 
9 solved so he can get out of here. You have any more 
10 questions of him? 
11 MR. SONNENREICH: I think if I could finish 
12 this one. If you would be able to wait, Mr. Barber, for 
13 literally two minutes outside, I could finish the cross. 
14 I think that we could get Mr. Brass off. He needs to be 
15 in another court. Then we can address the issue of 
16 whether you need to be a witness. 
17 MR. BARBER: I will do whatever I am told to 
18 do. 
19 THE COURT: Why don't you wait in the hall for 
20 three or four minutes. 
21 (Mr. Barber left the courtroom.) 
22 MR. SONNENREICH: Let's go back onto this. I 
23 am going to ask this question correct, though. Your 
24 Honor, I am going to introduce an exhibit. It is the 
25 preliminary hearing transcript. You told me it was not 
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1 part of the record in the case as it sits before you now. 
2 THE COURT: I think that is true. 
3 MR. SONNENREICH: Your Honor, I move the 
4 admission of the preliminary hearing transcript in this 
5 matter. 
6 THE COURT: Any objection? 
7 MR. BUGDEN: No, sir. 
8 MR. SONNENREICH: This would be State's Exhibit 
9 No. 8. 
10 Q (By Mr. Sonnenreich) Mr. Brass, if you would 
11 please turn to page 37 of that exhibit and read the 
12 testimony from lines 17 of that page 37, through line 13 
13 on page 39. 
14 MR. BUGDEN: For starters, Your Honor, before 
15 he begins reading the testimony, I don't have any problem 
16 with reading the testimony, but the testimony is not 
17 helpful until counsel identifies what exhibit the witness 
18 is testifying about. 
19 MR. SONNENREICH: Your Honor, Defense Exhibit 
20 D-l is — the question here, it was done and one exhibit 
21 that was attached as an exhibit to this memorandum. What 
22 is the number? 
23 MR. BUGDEN: Well, how do we know that other 
24 than you saying that? 
25 MR. SONNENREICH: First off, and if you want me 
16 
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1 to get under oath to say it, that is certainly a 
2 collateral matter. I can get under oath to say it. 
3 MR. BUGDEN: No, I wouldn't agree to that. I 
4 wouldn't stipulate to that. I wasn't at the preliminary 
5 hearing. 
6 MR. SONNENREICH: I was and I can be a witness 
7 on that point. I believe, Your Honor, I can be a witness 
8 as to what Defense Exhibit No. 1 was at the preliminary 
9 hearing. I was there. It is a collateral matter to the 
10 case. 
11 THE COURT: I suppose you can. 
12 MR. SONNENREICH: So likewise, Mr. Hines who 
13 was also there. 
14 MR. BUGDEN: I would think that the best 
15 evidence is whatever the record evidence is rather than 
16 these people testifying because there is a genuine 
17 question, Your Honor, as to whether or not the witness is 
18 talking about the suitability questionnaire, or whether 
19 or not the witness is instead talking about a 
20 Subscription Agreement. They are two different 
21 documents. They are two different documents that I 
22 introduced to you and they were received into evidence by 
23 way of the affidavit at the earlier hearing, and I don't 
24 know what Exhibit 1 is that they are about to talk about. 
25 MR. SONNENREICH: Defense Exhibit 1, Your 
17 
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1 Honor, that was introduced as the complete group of those 
2 documents that fall under the subscription booklet, and 
3 they are listed as Appendix 1 and Appendix 2 to Mr. 
4 Bugden's motion: Memorandum in Support of Motion for a 
5 New Trial or in the Alternative a Motion in Arrest of 
6 Judgment. With all deference, Mr. Bugden, you know, if 
7 you would like, I could maybe call Max Wheeler in here to 
8 testify as to the nature of the exhibit. 
9 MR. BUGDEN: Well, I don't know that it is 
10 appropriate for him to be debating with me. I have made 
11 an objection, Your Honor. My objection is — 
12 THE COURT: Well, we have got a lot of other 
13 objections. I will overrule the objection. We will take 
14 that as being a true statement. If counsel can later on 
15 show that isn't true, we will have a problem about that 
16 then. 
17 Q (By Mr. Sonnenreich) Mr. Brass, as you read 
18 that you can then take it into account that we are 
19 talking about a complete Red River Mountain Limited 
20 Partnership Subscription Agreement Booklet which 
21 includes — 
22 MR. BUGDEN: Your Honor, if I could just 
23 interrupt to say on page 18 of the document that has now 
24 been introduced, which is the preliminary hearing 
25 transcript, the item that they are talking about is 
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1 something called a "Pre-Offering Summary." Mr. 
2 Sonnenreich — 
3 MR. SONNENREICH: S-l or D-l. S-l, it was a 
4 Pre-Offering Summery, I believe. D-l — S-l is the Pre-
5 Offering Summary. That was Exhibit 1 to our case, Your 
6 Honor. It is the maroon booklet. 
7 THE COURT: Yeah. 
8 MR. SONNENREICH: D-l was this exhibit in this 
9 case. D-l was the Subscription Agreement they are 
10 discussing here. 
11 THE COURT: All right. 
12 MR. SONNENREICH: Okay, may I proceed? 
13 MR. BUGDEN: Well, I am at a loss to know how 
14 we know that, Your Honor? And as I understand your 
15 ruling, you have placed the burden on me to convince you 
16 after we hear the testimony that he is wrong. 
17 THE COURT: No, we are not going to do that, 
18 Mr. Bugden. I will tell you what we are going to do. 
19 Mr. Brass, you may leave and we are going to have some 
20 discussions here as to what we are doing here today 
21 because we are really not doing what I think we ought to 
22 be doing. 
23 (Mr. Brass leaves the courtroom and Mr. Barber 
24 comes in.) 
25 THE COURT: I am really confused as to what we 
19 
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1 are doing here and the way in which we are doing it. 
2 Maybe that is my fault. I haven't sat down and tried to 
3 analyze this thing. Mr. Bugden, you have made a Motion 
4 for a New Trial or In the Alternative for Arrest of 
5 Judgment. Assuming that you don't have grounds for a new 
6 trial, I guess your Arrest of Judgment is so you can 
7 appeal. 
8 MR. BUGDEN: I am sorry. The Arrest of 
9 Judgment is not just a procedural step. I am hoping to 
10 present arguments to persuade you that that should be 
11 granted, but it is one of the steps that we have to go 
12 through to get to an appeal, if that was your question. 
13 THE COURT: That is what I am saying. I am 
14 saying, if I decide that you have no grounds for a new 
15 trial and deny your motion, then I assume your Arrest of 
16 Judgment Motion is so that you can make your appeal 
17 without the defendant being sentenced in this case. 
18 MR. BUGDEN: Well, I think the Arrest of 
19 Judgment procedurally exists so that even if there is not 
20 a basis for the granting of a new trial, so that the 
21 trial judge can still correct a problem at the trial 
22 stage if there is a legal reason to not enter judgment, 
23 and I think that there is, and we will get to that, or I 
24 assume we will. 
25 THE COURT: Well, you see, I don't think — 
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1 First of all, as far as I know, and again correct me 
2 because you are the one that filed the motion, there is 
3 no such thing as a Motion for a New Trial under the 
4 criminal procedure, Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
5 MR. BUGDEN: I think that is not right, with 
6 all due respect. 
7 THE COURT: Then tell me where it is. 
8 MR. BUGDEN: Well, I think it is Rule 24 and 
9 Rule 23, Your Honor, of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
10 THE COURT: Of the rules? Okay, I was looking 
11 at the Code of Criminal Procedure. Okay, let me get the 
12 rules. Now, what they have done by breaking rules up 
13 into substance and rules, because that is really what we 
14 have done, and they don't tell you where they are going 
15 to put them. Here they are. Rule 23 and 24, Arrest of 
16 Judgement and an Appeal. You are right. Well, I will 
17 tell you what I think, where I am having a problem, Mr. 
18 Bugden, is that I don't think, at least it doesn't appear 
19 to me from Rule 24, that the introduction of evidence as 
20 to the — Well, first of all, let me go back a step. 
21 Your Motion for New Trial specifies "(1) Facts proven at 
22 trial do not constitute the public offense of securities 
23 fraud." 
24 MR. BUGDEN: Yes, sir. 
25 THE COURT: "(2) Other good cause for arrest of 
21 
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1 judgment." Now, I think that is too broad. 
2 MR. BUGDEN: But I have been very specific in 
3 my memorandum of law. 
4 THE COURT: Well, I know, but you weren't in 
5 the motion. The motion is the functional document here. 
6 I guess that is where we get into this business of about 
7 ineffective assistance of counsel. 
8 Be that as it may, I don't think we need 
9 evidence on that. It seems to me that what we are 
10 talking about is whether or not the Court upon argument, 
11 and you pointed out where you thought the deficiencies 
12 are, can make a judgment as to whether your motion is 
13 well taken or whether it isn't. 
14 MR. BUGDEN: I am prepared to argue. I am 
15 ready to roll. 
16 THE COURT: All right. I don't think we need 
17 evidence on these matters. As a matter of fact, I don't 
18 see a provision in Rule 24 to the introduction of 
19 evidence. That is, evidence about how the trial was 
20 tried. I mean, I don't need any evidence. I was there. 
21 I wasn't the finder of fact, but I was there. I sat 
22 through the trial and you can tell me what you want to 
23 tell me, and I can take your argument under 
24 consideration, as well as opposing counsel's, and make a 
25 determination as to whether I agree or disagree on either 
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1 side. But I don't think I need, with all due respect to 
2 Mr. Brass, who I highly regard as a lawyer, I don't think 
3 I need him to tell me about the trial of lawsuits. All I 
4 am saying is, I don't think extrinsic evidence at this 
5 point really is proper. I really don't. I think the 
6 evidence that I have to make a decision on is present 
7 within the four corners of the record of this case. 
8 MR. BUGDEN: Well, as I have already 
9 articulated to the Court and I thought in fact you had 
10 agreed with me, I mean, I thought I heard you say that. 
11 THE COURT: You may have heard a lot of things, 
12 I agree. 
13 MR. BUGDEN: My motion, Your Honor, is that we 
14 have some guidance from the rules as to what is relevant 
15 and in this case one of the two prongs of the Strickland 
16 standard that I have to satisfy is that the 
17 representation fell below an objective standard of 
18 reasonableness. So Mr. Barbers subjective opinion is not 
19 relevant. I haven't asked this attorney to render an 
20 opinion about whether or not — I mean that is for you, I 
21 think, to decide whether or not objectively speaking 
22 certain things fell below an objective standard of 
23 reasonableness. 
24 Then prong two is "but for those omissions, or 
25 errors, or conduct, is there an undermining of confidence 
23 
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1 in the jury's verdict?" Is there a reasonable 
2 probability of a different result? Again, I believe that 
3 is your call. I think that that is your determination. 
4 But on the question of "will it be useful to the Court to 
5 have evidence with regard to two specific issues," is all 
6 I have talked about, I think, with regard to Mr. Brass, 
7 the significance of an opening argument. And then 
8 secondly, with regard to a Subscription Agreement. And 
9 we are talking about three different words we have heard 
10 not today, but I will refresh your recollection. There 
11 was a Pre-Offering Booklet. 
12 THE COURT: Yeah. 
13 MR. BUGDEN: There is a Suitability 
14 Questionnaire. 
15 THE COURT: Yeah. 
16 MR. BUGDEN: And finally, the — 
17 THE COURT: The Subscription Agreement. 
18 MR. BUGDEN: Thank you, the Subscription 
19 Agreement. Here we have Virl Thornton, Count 1, a signed 
20 document where he has signed a document that advises him 
21 of the possibility of future payments. Okay. So the two 
22 issues that I have asked Mr. Brass about are the opening 
23 argument and the significance in the securities fraud 
24 case. And secondly, the Subscription Agreement, whether 
25 or not that is something that you would want to put 
24 
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1 before the jury, that the investor himself, who is saying 
2 this is a material omission by the broker, by the dealer, 
3 whether or not the fact that the investor actually signed 
4 a document putting him on notice, is that important? I 
5 recognize that you can make those judgments. I recognize 
6 that, but as a defense counsel with vast experience, and 
7 as you said "with all due respect to Ed," someone that 
8 you respect, someone that I think you recognize to be a 
9 well-known, extremely competent and efficient defense 
10 lawyer. Okay, I am asking him some questions about those 
11 issues and then on the question of relevance and the 
12 Strickland standard talking about objective 
13 reasonableness, a standard of objective reasonableness, 
14 will this evidence, that is the testimony of Mr. Brass, 
15 assist you with regard to determining whether or not it 
16 is more probable or not that there was a deficient 
17 performance here; whether or not they reached level one, 
18 that is, objectively, reasonable, competent counsel. So 
19 I have put on competent counsel to say, to at least 
20 discuss the importance of that opening argument. 
21 THE COURT: The problem I have with that 
22 approach is don't we then have the other side putting on 
23 Mr. Barber himself or somebody else who says, "Well, we 
24 simply disagree under the terms and conditions that were 
25 present in this case at the time and place that it was 
25 
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1 tried. We think that the other strategy was better 
2 done." 
3 MR. BUGDEN: Okay, but here is the crux and you 
4 have said it today and we discussed it whenever we were 
5 here before, and that is, that case law talks at great 
6 length about whether or not a particular action was a 
7 strategic decision. And if it is a strategic decision, 
8 then historically the courts have said that the defendant 
9 himself is stuck with that result. 
10 THE COURT: That is right. 
11 MR. BUGDEN: If it is a strategic decision 
12 then, even if it is the wrong judgment call, we just 
13 can't have a remedy for that kind of a problem. Okay, I 
14 understand that. But in this case you had evidence last 
15 time and in fact Mr. Barber has made statements to me 
16 which would suggest this was not a strategic decision. 
17 MR. SONNENREICH: Now, we are getting really 
18 into hearsay. 
19 MR. BUGDEN: Well, that is why it is important. 
20 The evidence last time were that we had statements from 
21 Mr. Harry that Mr. Barber said that he forgot to give an 
22 opening statement, and that he forgot to introduce the 
23 document. Well, obviously, Your Honor, from a logical 
24 perspective, there is no strategic decision-making. 
25 THE COURT: In that case, you are right. 
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1 MR. BUGDEN: Well, that is why it is important. 
2 THE COURT: Well, all right, but Mr. Brass 
3 doesn't have to testify to that. 
4 MR. BUGDEN: He can testify as to — again, as 
5 to the second prong. I am not asking him his opinion, 
6 but I think that it is useful and helpful to the Court to 
7 know from a defense attorney's perspective why an opening 
8 argument might be important, why it might be considered 
9 important. 
10 THE COURT: Well, Mr. Bugden, how many cases do 
11 you think I have tried here? 
12 MR. BUGDEN: Tons. 
13 THE COURT: Yeah, a lot more than any trial 
14 counsel does. How many cases do you think I tried for 30 
15 years as a trial lawyer? I mean, I know the importance 
16 of an opening statement but there are times when I have 
17 waived them and I don't think — I think it is going to 
18 be awfully difficult for either side to present evidence 
19 which says that the waiver or non-waiver of the opening 
20 statement was an act of incompetence. Now, if what you 
21 are saying is Mr. Barber admitted at some point, the 
22 horrors of the record, that he plain forgot to do it, was 
23 going to do it but failed to do it, then you may have an 
24 entirely different question. Maybe you do. Maybe you 
25 don't. Maybe it is no harm anyway. But the point I am 
27 
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1 making is, I don't think we need evidence to make the 
2 determination as to why you give opening statements. I 
3 know why you give opening statements, so do you, so does 
4 everybody else that got out of law school and every tried 
5 a lawsuit. 
6 What I would think we ought to do here, because 
7 if we don't we are going to retry the trial of this case, 
8 and that is going to take as long as the trial did, and 
9 when we get through we are not going to get any better 
10 result, I'm afraid. I would like you to tell me in the 
11 form of an ordinary motion, like we do all the time, you 
12 can support it with all of your affidavits, valid 
13 affidavits, why you ought to be entitled to the relief 
14 you want. 
15 Now, we will let him do the same thing on the 
16 other side. If when we get through with that, either of 
17 you feel there are legitimate issues of fact about the 
18 trial itself that needs evidence, we will discuss that 
19 and I will decide whether or not we will allow that 
20 evidence to be put in at some point. Do you understand 
21 what I am saying? 
22 MR. BUGDEN: Not really. I don't have any 
23 other evidence I intend to present. I have presented 
24 what I intended to present on ineffective assistance of 
25 counsel. The other arguments are all questions of law. 
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1 THE COURT: All right, okay. Maybe we are 
2 getting to where we are going anyway. 
3 MR. BUGDEN: I am there. 
4 THE COURT: Well, you didn't get to cross. 
5 MR. SONNENREICH: Your Honor, it does occur to 
6 me that we have both briefed the matter about as fully as 
7 we re-brief it in a repeat briefing. The motion may not 
8 have been terribly specific, but the memorandum was 
9 adequate and I think I was able to adequately brief it, 
10 although I had to incorporate some stuff because I was 
11 short on time, that they incorporated in their earlier 
12 memorandum, in my memorandum. But given that, if you 
13 read through the whole package, I think there is adequate 
14 law on both sides. 
15 As for Mr. Barber, quite frankly it would be 
16 the defense who has the burden of putting on and showing 
17 that Mr. Barber forgot to put him on. Your ruling the 
18 other day with respect to Mr. Harry's testimony was that 
19 if Harry said he forgot, it can only go to state of mind, 
20 and that there are any number of reasons that Barber 
21 might have said that to Harry. 
22 THE COURT: That's true, right. 
23 MR. SONNENREICH: So I am not intending, if the 
24 affidavit doesn't come in, I don't think I am going to 
25 call Mr. Barber either and we won't have any additional 
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1 evidence and we can go straight to argument. 
2 MR. BUGDEN: Then they are ready to argue. I 
3 am ready to argue. 
4 THE COURT: If the affidavit does not come in? 
5 MR. SONNENREICH: Right, if the affidavit 
6 doesn't come in. If it comes in, great. I have already 
7 moved for its admission. If it does not come in, my 
8 feeling is and my argument is, that the burden of proof 
9 with respect to whether or not Mr. Barber forgot, with 
10 respect to whether — as to Mr. Barber's reasoning and 
11 all the rest, that is on the defendant clearly. I am not 
12 going to put him on. He can call him if he wants. He is 
13 sitting here. 
14 THE COURT: I think clearly the burden of proof 
15 — Well, it may not be proof at this point. It is burden 
16 of persuasion, at the very least, on these motions is the 
17 defendant's. I don't think there is any doubt about 
18 that. 
19 MR. SONNENREICH: So, I am ready to proceed 
20 unless — 
21 THE COURT: I will tell you what I am going to 
22 do. I sort of had to do what we did with Mr. Brass 
23 because he was in a world of hurt, if you'll pardon the 
24 expression. He needed some relief. We have to get him 
25 back here and hear the balance and let you cross at a 
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1 later date. We will afford you the opportunity to do 
2 that. 
3 Mr. Bugden, I am going to allow his testimony 
4 to stand. I am going to get the affidavit in. And then 
5 let's — What more do you want to do? 
6 MR. BUGDEN: Then I need to put on Mr. Barber 
7 and cross examine him, if you are going to allow his 
8 affidavit because I have had conversations with Jim. 
9 THE COURT: All right. 
10 MR. BUGDEN: And just for the record, my 
11 position is that with regard — this isn't just simply a 
12 question of what is good for the goose is good for the 
13 gander. When the affidavit was presented at the earlier 
14 hearing, counsel stipulated. He had no objection to the 
15 receipt of that affidavit. I object to this affidavit. 
16 I think it is hearsay. Whether it is notarized or not, 
17 it is something that counsel has prepared and it is 
18 something that I have had conversation with Mr. Barber 
19 and Mr. Barber has said other things to me, things that 
20 are not included in the affidavit. So it is not the big 
21 picture. It is not a complete picture. 
22 MR. SONNENREICH: Which is why I can introduce 
23 the affidavit. The witness is right here and he can 
24 discuss anything they want to do by way of calling him. 
25 THE COURT: Let's do that and then let me hear 
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1 your arguments. And then if there is something more that 
2 we need to do before I make a decision, and one of them 
3 is going to be I am going to go back and go completely 
4 through your memorandums again, but if before I do that, 
5 and before I make a final determination you need or you 
6 think you need to talk with the Court about other 
7 evidence coming in, or something of the sort, you can do 
8 that. I am not trying to short circuit anybody. I am 
9 trying to get a handle on this thing so that we don't re-
10 try the trial. That is, the procedure of trying the 
11 trial. 
12 MR. BUGDEN: Well, I wonder since Mr. Barber 
13 has been inconvenienced, if it would make sense to put 
14 him on the witness stand now. 
15 THE COURT: Yeah, let's inconvenience him some 
16 more. 
17 MR. BUGDEN: Is it your ruling that you are 
18 going to admit his affidavit over my objection, is that 
19 the ruling? 
20 THE COURT: Well, I will tell you what I am 
21 going to do. Let's put him on the stand and let him 
22 testify. When we get through, maybe we don't even have 
23 to use the affidavit. 
24 MR. SONNENREICH: Okay, you are calling him? 
25 MR. BUGDEN: I don't know. Who is calling him? 
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1 MR. SONNENREICH: You said you are calling him. 
2 I said all I need is in the affidavit. 
3 MR. BUGDEN: The Judge isn't allowing the 
4 affidavit in. 
5 THE COURT: No, I didn't say that. I said if 
6 anybody wants to put him on the stand, we will let him 
7 testify and maybe we won't even use the affidavit. On 
8 the other hand, he is going to offer the affidavit. I am 
9 probably going to grant it and then you can call him if 
10 you want. I mean, the reason you want to call him is the 
11 affidavit you say, needs to be explained and broadened, 
12 and so on and so forth. 
13 MR. BUGDEN: All right. Well, I will call Mr. 
14 Barber. 
15 THE COURT: All right. 
16 MR. SONNENREICH: Your Honor, is the affidavit 
17 in or out, or we don't know? 
18 THE COURT: We don't know. 
19 MR. SONNENREICH: Then I will withdraw the 
20 affidavit if he is going to put him on the stand. 
21 THE COURT: All right. 
22 JAMES N, BARBER 
23 Called as a witness on behalf of the defense, after 
24 having been first duly sworn, was examined and testified 
25 as follows: 
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1 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
2 BY MR. BUGDEN: 
3 Q Would you state your name for the record, sir. 
4 A James N. Barber. 
5 Q Mr. Barber, were you the attorney of record for 
6 Mr. Harry at the trial in this matter? 
7 A I was. 
8 Q And, Mr. Barber, as you think back to the trial 
9 proceedings, can you recall whether or not you gave an 
10 opening statement? 
11 A I am certain that I did not give an opening 
12 statement. 
13 Q Do you recall whether or not you reserved your 
14 right to give an opening statement? 
15 A Yes, I did. 
16 Q And do you recall whether or not you had a 
17 conversation with Mr. Harry concerning the decision to 
18 reserve that opening statement? 
19 MR. SONNENREICH: Foundation as to time of the 
20 conversation. 
21 THE COURT: Well, the question can be answered 
22 yes or no. 
23 Q (By Mr. Bugden) Did you have a conversation 
24 with Ron about whether or not you would reserve it? 
25 A I believe that there were comments exchanged 
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1 between us about that, the fact that I had not done so. 
2 Q Do you remember who was present? 
3 A Just he and I. 
4 Q Would it have been on the first day of trial, 
5 or when would it have been, Mr. Barber? 
6 A I think that I probably advised him, I don't 
7 recall a specific conversation in which I did it, but I 
8 think I probably advised him of my initial decision to 
9 waive. And the reason I did that — Oh, you didn't ask 
10 me that. And then I believe there was another 
11 conversation after no opening statements was given prior 
12 to the initiation of the calling of the defense 
13 witnesses. 
14 Q Let's talk about that conversation. That is a 
15 conversation you had with Mr. Harry about your failure to 
16 give an opening statement; is that right? Who was 
17 present? 
18 A I believe that such a conversation occurred. 
19 Q And do you remember where that occurred? 
20 A It was either in this courtroom — and you need 
21 to understand, Mr. Bugden, I am trying to reconstruct 
22 what occurred from the best of my recollection about it. 
23 But I think if such a conversation occurred, it either 
24 happened right there at counsel's table, we were sitting 
25 over there, I believe, or in the hall adjacent to the 
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1 courtroom. 
2 Q And when you spoke with Mr. Harry about not 
3 giving an opening statement, do you remember whether you 
4 told him you forgot to give it? 
5 A No, I do not specifically recall having said 
6 that. 
7 Q Again, you have already acknowledged you did 
8 not give an opening statement. With regard to not giving 
9 an opening statement, did you give — did you consider 
10 the merits of either giving an opening statement or not 
11 giving an opening statement before you didn't give the 
12 opening statement? 
13 A Well, in the first place I did, yes. At the 
14 first place, I elected not to give an opening statement 
15 because the witnesses in the case, I think, made somewhat 
16 inconsistent and difficult statements to deal with. They 
17 were all three hostile, and therefore I did not believe 
18 it advisable to stand up and tell the jury what I thought 
19 they were going to say when I didn't know what they were 
20 going to say. And in the second instance — 
21 Q Okay, now, let me just stop you so I 
22 understand. You are saying before the trial began, Mr. 
23 Barber, you are saying you decided that you were not 
24 going to give an opening statement? 
25 A I decided I wasn't going to give it at the 
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1 beginning of the State's case. 
2 Q Oh, all right. So you decided to reserve it? 
3 A That is correct. 
4 Q You used the word "waive," but you decided to 
5 reserve the opening statement? 
6 A Have it your way. That is what I meant to say, 
7 yes. 
8 Q And then so when you made the decision to 
9 reserve it, you apparently intended to give an opening 
10 statement at the start of your case; is that right? 
11 THE WITNESS: Your Honor, is that a question or 
12 not? 
13 MR. SONNENREICH: Your Honor, he is leading his 
14 witness. 
15 THE COURT: Yes, that is a leading question. 
16 Q (By Mr. Bugden) What were your intentions, Mr. 
17 Barber, when you reserved the right to give an opening 
18 statement? 
19 A I thought my general impression there was that 
20 if I felt at the end of the State's case that an opening 
21 statement was appropriate and helpful, I would give one. 
22 But I still had the right not to give one and therefore I 
23 had not made any electable determination one way or the 
24 other. 
25 Q When the defense began its case — 
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1 A I think I intended to give one though, Wally. 
2 Q Thank you. When you began your case and didn't 
3 give an opening statement, at the precise moment that you 
4 called your first witness, did you go through a thought 
5 process where you considered the merits of "Okay, I am 
6 not going to give an opening statement"? Or "Okay, I am 
7 going to give an opening statement"? 
8 A I do not believe I did. 
9 Q Thank you. 
10 A Which is just what I said in my affidavit. 
11 MR. BUGDEN: I will ask that be stricken and 
12 ask that Mr. Barber respond to my questions. 
13 THE WITNESS: I will. 
14 THE COURT: Well, I will strike it. We may get 
15 the affidavit in, but that is all right. Go ahead. 
16 Q (By Mr. Bugden) Mr. Barber, in a number of 
17 conversations you and I have had over the last several 
18 days, both yesterday and then today, did you tell me that 
19 you forgot to give the opening statement? 
20 A I may have used the words "I forgot." 
21 Q Thank you. You have answered my question. 
22 With regard to the introduction of the Subscription 
23 Agreement relating to Virl Thornton, do you acknowledge, 
24 Mr. Barber, that you had in your possession the 
25 Subscription Agreement at the time of the trial? 
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1 A I believe I did, yes, or Mr. Harry had it in 
2 his possession but I was aware of its existence and the 
3 fact that it was available to us. 
4 Q And were you also aware that it was signed by 
5 Virl Thornton? 
6 A Yes. 
7 Q And were you also aware, sir, that that 
8 Subscription Agreement set forth the possibility of 
9 prospective payments with the Red River? 
10 A Yes. 
11 Q And is it true, sir, that you didn't introduce 
12 the Subscription Agreement through Virl Thornton? 
13 A That is true. 
14 Q And would it be accurate to say, sir, that you 
15 forgot to introduce the Subscription Agreement? 
16 MR. SONNENREICH: Your Honor, leading again. 
17 THE COURT: Well, no, I think that is a fair 
18 question. I will allow it. 
19 Q (By Mr. Bugden) Would it be fair to say you 
20 forgot to introduce it through Virl? 
21 A I cannot answer that question in the form in 
22 which you place it to me. 
23 Q Let me ask a different question then, Mr. 
24 Barber. In conversations that you had with me both 
25 yesterday and today, did you advise me that you forgot to 
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1 introduce it? 
2 A In that form, no. I told you, and I used that 
3 word "undoubtedly" in connection with extended 
4 conversations about why it didn't get in. That I did do. 
5 Q Thank you. And did you also acknowledge in 
6 conversations with me, Mr. Barber, that if you had an 
7 opportunity to re-try this case, you would indeed attempt 
8 to introduce the Subscription Agreement through Virl 
9 Thornton? Did you tell me that oust yesterday? 
10 A What I told you was is that when Ron reminded 
11 me that I hadn't done it, I attempted to do it. And if I 
12 had it to do again, I would probably put it in. 
13 MR. BUGDEN: Thank you. That is all I have. 
14 THE COURT: Thank you. You may cross. 
15 MR. BUGDEN: Actually, let me just ask several 
16 other questions. 
17 Q (By Mr. Bugden) Mr. Barber, between the time 
18 that you were retained by Mr. Harry and the time that 
19 this case went to trial, did you have problems with or 
20 did you — Did you have a heart attack, let's start 
21 there? 
22 A Yes. 
23 Q And is it true that — 
24 THE COURT: Well, between the time you were 
25 retained and started to work on this case at the time it 
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1 was tried? 
2 THE WITNESS: That is my recollection of it, 
3 yeah. When was it tried? October? 
4 MR. SONNENREICH: December. 
5 THE WITNESS: December, oh, that's right. I 
6 think that I was retained early in the summer. Yes, the 
7 heart attack did come in that interim. 
8 Q (By Mr. Bugden) Is it also true, Mr. Barber, 
9 that you suffer from a diabetic condition? 
10 A That is correct. 
11 Q And is it also true, sir, that in the last six 
12 months you have been involved in an automobile accident 
13 where your diabetic condition contributed to the 
14 accident? 
15 A Within the last six months, yes. 
16 Q And what are some of the symptoms associated 
17 with your illness or with the diabetic condition? 
18 A Mobile unconsciousness. 
19 Q Would it be fair to say you are more forgetful 
20 now than you were prior to the onset of your illness, 
21 sir? 
22 A I have no way of knowing because I have had it 
23 since I was 11. 
24 MR. BUGDEN: That is all I have. 
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1 CROSS EXAMINATION 
2 BY MR. SONNENREICH: 
3 Q Mr. Barber, in your opinion what was the 
4 situation in this case at the time that the prosecution 
5 rested? 
6 A Well, specifically vis-a-vis what? 
7 Q Okay. First of all, what was your opinion with 
8 respect to the length of the trial at that time? 
9 A It was dragging unmercifully. 
10 Q And did you have an opinion as to the effect of 
11 that upon the jury? 
12 A Yes. 
13 jQ What was your opinion? 
14 A Though I did not have the sense that the jury 
15 was angry that it was dragging, I thought the jury might 
16 be prone to reward those who would get on with it. 
17 Q Did you have an opinion at that time as to 
18 whether you had been able to communicate the theory of 
19 your case to the jury through cross examination? 
20 A Yes. 
21 Q What was your opinion at that time? 
22 r A I believe that the jury understood the issues. 
23 Q How many witnesses did you intend to call? 
24 A Mr. Harry and I had discussed the witnesses and 
25 I think we'd decided that three or four representing 
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1 persons that had been subjected to the bamboozling 
2 blandishments of the offerer of the securities and then 
3 individuals in his own association of brokers who had 
4 sold them would comprise our witness list, as well as 
5 myself. 
6 Q But, in fact, you only called the two brokers 
7 and Mr. Harry, correct? 
8 A That is correct. Same guy. 
9 Q Yeah, okay, I understand what you are saying. 
10 Did you give a closing argument in the case? 
11 A Yes, I did. 
12 Q Did the fact that you only had a few witnesses, 
13 and then expected to give a closing argument, how did 
14 that relate to your not giving an opening statement? 
15 MR. BUGDEN: Your Honor, that is ~ 
16 THE WITNESS: I doubt that it did. 
17 THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Bugden? 
18 MR. BUGDEN: Well, I think that the question 
19 requires the witness after the fact to quarterback and 
20 reinterpret what he did, when he has now acknowledged, 
21 for example, with regard to opening statement, that he 
22 forgot to give it. 
23 THE COURT: I don't know that he really 
24 acknowledged that. By the same token, Mr. Bugden, the 
25 questions you asked him about, would he now introduce in 
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1 evidence the Subscription Agreement, is the same nature 
2 of question, looking back at it, has he got a view. And 
3 in this case, I think what is sauce for the goose is 
4 sauce for the gander. I will allow it. 
5 Q (By Mr. Sonnenreich) Let's discuss this 
6 Subscription Booklet that we didn't get in through Virl 
7 Thornton and attempted to get in through Ron Harry. 
8 A Actually, tried to get it in through you, Mr. 
9 Sonnenreich, but I knew it wouldn't come in through Mr. 
10 Harry and I needed your stipulation to get it in and you 
11 wouldn't give it to me. That is actually what happened. 
12 Q That is when Mr. Thornton had gone to Arizona, 
13 for the record. 
14 A That is correct. That is right. 
15 Q Did you cross examine Mr. Thornton during the 
16 trial? 
17 A I did. 
18 Q And did you cross examine him with respect to 
19 issues that were the same basically as the issues raised 
20 by that Limited Partnership Subscription Booklet? 
21 A Well, they were issues related to it. I don't 
22 believe I talked to him about most of the same issues, 
23 no. 
24 Q Did you feel that your cross examination of Mr. 
25 Thornton was adequate? 
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1 A It was insufficient to get Mr. Thornton to say 
2 what I wanted him to say, but I am afraid I had exhausted 
3 my ability to get him to say it. 
4 Q Fair answer. 
5 MR. BUGDEN: I wonder if we could just have Mr. 
6 Sonnenreich ask questions and not editorialize. I will 
7 object. 
8 THE COURT: Yeah, limit your comments, counsel. 
9 Q (By Mr. Sonnenreich) Now, did you receive a 
10 list of documents? (Off the record discussion between 
11 Mr. Sonnenreich and Mr. Bugden.) 
12 MR. BUGDEN: Ask him about the three sets of 
13 points and I will know what you are talking about. 
14 MR. SONNENREICH: Okay. 
15 Q (By Mr. Sonnenreich) In your earlier affidavit 
16 there were three sets of talking points or whatever about 
17 Mr. Isaacs, Mr. Thornton and Mr. Brgoch. They were 
18 attached as Appendix 3, 4 and 5 to the Memorandum in 
19 Support of the Motion for New Trial or in the 
20 alternative, a Motion in Arrest of Judgment. 
21 MR. BUGDEN: Actually, let me interrupt you. 
22 That is not accurate. In the affidavit, two documents 
23 were attached: the Suitability Questionnaire and the 
24 Subscription Booklet. That is from the — the third 
25 document was not discussed. 
> 
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1 MR. SONNENREICH: The Pre-Offering Summary? 
2 MR. BUGDEN: That is not one of the documents. 
3 MR. SONNENREICH: The points, not the Pre-
4 Offering Summary. The points, the talking points. 
5 These, is what I am talking about. 
6 MR. BUGDEN: Okay, I didn't understand what you 
7 are talking about. You mean the outlines, three of them, 
8 bearing the name of Ike Isaacs or Frank Brgoch or Virl 
9 Thornton, that is your question? 
10 MR. SONNENREICH: That is correct. 
11 THE COURT: May the Court see what you are 
12 referring to? 
13 MR. SONNENREICH: Let me check and see what we 
14 introduced them as. (Pause) They were in fact 
15 introduced, Your Honor. 
16 Q (By Mr. Sonnenreich) I give you Defendant's 
17 Exhibits 1, 3 and 5. Did you see those exhibits prior to 
18 trial? 
19 A I believe that I — you have given me 6 and 7, 
20 as well. 
21 Q Okay, well, put those aside. 
22 A But 6 is the list of limited partnerships on 
23 Thornton. 
24 Q Okay. 
25 A Yes, I received all of those prior to the trial 
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1 from Mr. Harry, whom I believe prepared them. 
2 Q Each of these exhibits, there is a list of 
3 suitability questions or issues or points, however you 
4 want to phrase them, one for Mr. Isaacs, one for Mr. 
5 Brgoch, and one for Mr. Thornton. Did you address 
6 suitability in your cross examination of the witnesses? 
7 A Yes. Well, using it in the plural, to my 
8 recollection I addressed the issue of suitability with 
9 considerable detail with Mr. Thornton. And perhaps 
10 somewhat less detail with the other two. 
11 Q There are also lists of limited partnership 
12 portfolios for each individual. You did not go in detail 
13 on each one of those limited partnerships with each 
14 individual, did you? 
15 A No, I did not. 
16 Q Why was that? 
17 A Well, a number of reasons. One is that most of 
18 them are not real estate limited partnerships, and I 
19 doubted that but for a reference to them they are very 
20 likely admissible. But secondly, I was familiar with the 
21 direct testimony of each of these investors, at least 
22 Brgoch and Isaacs, that the two of them claimed to have 
23 expressly instructed Mr. Harry not to put them in any 
24 more of those kind of deals before the Red River Limited 
25 Partnership was presented to them. And I knew that both 
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1 Mr. Brgoch and Mr. Isaacs were pretty much there to make 
2 a speech and that every time I raised the issue, they 
3 made their speech. And so I thought it was going to be 
4 damaging to go through the detail of those and that the 
5 return on that issue would not be very great. 
6 Q Final question, did your health interfere with 
7 your ability to participate in the trial? 
8 A Well, that is always a difficult decision and I 
9 will concede that I don't know that I had the same energy 
10 level then that I would have the prior year. But I felt 
11 that I did not feel the stated condition of my health to 
12 have imposed substantial inability to try the case. 
13 Q One last little minor matter. You mentioned 
14 that you told Mr. Bugden that you quote "forgot" to make 
15 an opening statement perhaps in the last couple of days. 
16 Can you elaborate why you used the word "forgot"? 
17 A Well, I think I did tell Wally, as part of a 
18 longer statement about the issue, that I forgot to make 
19 the statement. But what I intended to imply by that, 
20 counsel, was that at the time that I didn't stand up and 
21 commence to make an opening statement, I didn't engage in 
22 an act of mental process about the issue of making a 
23 statement at all. And in talking to Wally about it, I 
24 thought I have expressed what happened, you know, five or 
25 six different ways. And I have tried each time to convey 
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1 the same thing to him, and to you. And that is, that I 
2 did not engage in any mental process that I can now 
3 recall about whether to make an opening statement or not 
4 at the beginning of our case at the time that decision 
5 was made. But I disagreed with Wally that when I spoke 
6 with him this afternoon that the term Mforgot" covered 
7 all the issues that were fair to be presented in that 
8 respect because even though I didn't think about it at 
9 the time and therefore in that sense forgot. I don't 
10 think that, as he implied earlier, I had made a decision 
11 to make such a statement and then forgot that I had made 
12 the decision to do it. I think that the other factors 
13 had to do with the fact that I did not engage in the 
14 processes to make a conscious decision at that time and 
15 the extent to which they may have influenced that 
16 decision or my forgetting to have made the statement, if 
17 you will, I am not exactly certain of. I think that is a 
18 fair statement of the whole issue. 
19 Q Is what you are saying then that these 
20 circumstances that existed, the ones that we discussed 
21 about the length of trial, et cetera, may have been 
22 responsible for not making a conscious decision to make 
23 an opening statement. 
24 MR. BUGDEN: That requires absolute 
25 speculation. He is saying, "I don't remember that I made 
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1 a reflective decision." Now he is asking him to 
2 speculate. I will object to the form of the question. 
3 THE COURT: Would you read the question back. 
4 (Reporter read back the last question.) 
5 MR. BUGDEN: "May have been responsible." 
6 THE COURT: I think that is further application 
7 of his prior explanation. I will allow it. Go ahead. 
8 THE WITNESS: Those factors may have influenced 
9 the fact that I forgot, let's put it that way. I didn't 
10 think it was very important to remember. If that is the 
11 opposite of forgot, that is what I intended to tell both 
12 you and Mr. Bugden. 
13 Q (By Mr. Sonnenreich) In light of the 
14 circumstances of the trial at this time, it did not 
15 appear important to you then to sit down and really 
16 analyze the question; is that what you are saying? 
17 MR. BUGDEN: I will object to that. I will 
18 object to the form of the question, Your Honor. 
19 THE COURT: Why? 
20 MR. BUGDEN: He is, I think, completely 
21 mischaracterizing what Mr. Barber has said before. 
22 Again, he is asking him to second guess it, to 
23 quarterback it now after the fact. When what he is 
24 saying is, "I didn't go through a reflective process." 
25 MR. SONNENREICH: And I am asking why. 
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1 MR. BUGDEN: I had no conscious — 
2 THE COURT: Mr. Bugden, I think you are trying 
3 to hear what you want to hear. That isn't exactly what 
4 he is saying, not the way I hear it. Did you understand 
5 the last question he just asked you, Mr. Barber? 
6 THE WITNESS: Yeah. 
7 THE COURT: Well, I think I did too. Can you 
8 answer it? 
9 THE WITNESS: No, I have got to hear it again 
10 now. 
11 THE COURT: Read the last question, Dorothy. 
12 (Last question read back by the reporter.) 
13 THE WITNESS: Well, I don't think I am saying 
14 that either. What I am saying is that I was satisfied to 
15 proceed without making the opening statement and whatever 
16 circumstances were then extinct that led me to be 
17 satisfied, appeared to have discouraged from the fact 
18 that I forgot to put the statement in, to spend any more 
19 time thinking about it or analyzing that prospect. I 
20 can't express it any more clearly than that. 
21 THE COURT: I understand. That is all right. 
22 MR. SONNENREICH: Thank you. Nothing further. 
23 THE COURT: Mr. Bugden. 
24 
25 
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1 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
2 BY MR. BUGDEN: 
3 Q Mr. Barber, you did not make a strategic 
4 decision to forego giving an opening statement. There 
5 was no analysis where you said strategically "I am not 
6 going to make an opening statement"? That didn't happen, 
7 did it? 
8 MR. SONNENREICH: Your Honor, if that calls for 
9 a legal conclusion as to what he says constitutes a, 
10 quote, "strategic decision" within the meaning of the 
11 case law, I object. That is for the Court to decide. 
12 THE COURT: Well, it is. It is and while I 
13 have some problems with the question and Mr. Bugden knows 
14 what those problems are, I am going to allow you to 
15 answer it. 
16 Q (By Mr. Bugden) You didn't go through a thought 
17 process, a cognitive process at all with regard to the 
18 opening statement? 
19 A That is correct. 
20 Q I will start there. And because you didn't go 
21 through a cognitive process, you didn't go through a 
22 strategic decision-making process either, did you? 
23 A I don't know what the difference is. 
24 Q I am not sure I do either, but I am interested. 
25 You didn't make a strategic decision to not give an 
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1 opening statement? 
2 A I did not sit down and think, once again, about 
3 whether I should make an opening statement. 
4 Q And what I understand you to have said now in 
5 response to the State's attorney is that you reserved the 
6 opening statement but had not decided whether you would 
7 give one. 
8 A I just reserved it. I didn't do any prior 
9 consideration of whether I was going to give one again. 
10 Q And when you didn't give one, there was no 
11 consideration. You forgot to give one at that time, 
12 right? 
13 MR. SONNENREICH: Well, I'm sorry. He has 
14 expressed what he meant by "forgot." 
15 THE COURT: Well, I understand that. If you 
16 can answer, let him. 
17 Q (By Mr, Bugden) You forgot to give one, isn't 
18 that right, Jimmy? 
19 A In the sense that in light of all of those 
20 other circumstances that I have given you about eight 
21 times, I did not think about the process of not giving 
22 the statement. I am not going to say it is forgetting, 
23 though, because I think it implies more than I mean to 
24 say, and that is, that there was a reason to remember. 
25 You understand what I am saying? 
53 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 Q There was no thinking with regard to giving the 
2 opening. It just didn't happen. 
3 A It was a decision or non-decision that was made 
4 given the applicable circumstances. 
5 Q And are you suggesting today, Mr. Barber, that 
6 just somehow subconsciously these other things you have 
7 told Mr. Sonnenreich about, that is, that the trial was 
8 running on, that you thought that the jurors were bored, 
9 that you thought you were losing the jury, you think that 
10 just subconsciously helped you make the decision? 
11 A Of course. 
12 Q Oh, I see. 
13 A That is how you make decisions in trial. 
14 Q But you didn't make this decision, did you? 
15 MR. SONNENREICH: Argumentative, Your Honor. 
16 Q (By Mr. Bugden) You made no decision about an 
17 opening statement, isn't that your testimony? 
18 A Is that a question? 
19 Q Yes, sir. 
20 THE COURT: No. I will allow it. 
21 THE WITNESS: Yeah, I didn't make a conscious 
22 decision about it. 
23 MR. BUGDEN: Thank you. That is all I have, 
24 Judge. 
25 MR. SONNENREICH: Just very quickly, Your 
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1 Honor. 
2 RECROSS EXAMINATION 
3 BY MR. SONNENREICH: 
4 Q Mr. Barber, how long have you been a trial 
5 attorney? 
6 A About 20 years. 
7 MR. BUGDEN: This is beyond the scope. 
8 MR. SONNENREICH: No, he got into the question 
9 of whether he does it consciously or subconsciously, Your 
10 Honor. 
11 THE COURT: All right. 
12 Q (By Mr. Sonnenreich) Mr. Barber, how many cases 
13 have you tried, approximately? 
14 A Oh, I have no idea. Apparently not as many as 
15 Mr. Brass. 
16 Q More than a few cases? 
17 A Yeah, more than a few. 
18 Q Tried maybe more than a few cases a year? 
19 A Not anymore. 
20 Q Not anymore, just a few a year? 
21 A Uh-huh. 
22 Q Is it safe to say you have tried at least a 
23 hundred cases? 
24 A I would say so. 
25 Q Do you always make every single decision in a 
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1 case as a matter of conscious thought? 
2 A No. 
3 Q Do you make many decisions just subconsciously 
4 as a matter of reflex? 
5 A If you want to call that making a decision, 
6 yes. What you do is act on the basis of the 
7 circumstances as you then perceive them. 
8 MR. SONNENREICH: Thank you, no further 
9 questions. 
10 MR. BUGDEN: I have nothing else. 
11 THE COURT: May this witness be excused? 
12 (No objection from counsel.) 
13 THE COURT: Mr. Barber, you may step down. You 
14 may be excused. 
15 All right now, I think, Mr. Bugden, I 
16 understand. I am not saying you can't argue. That isn't 
17 the point. I am trying to tell you where I am. 
18 MR. BUGDEN: Yes, sir. 
19 THE COURT: I think I understand what your 
20 position is in regard to the — that is, as far as the 
21 evidence is concerned. 
22 MR. BUGDEN: Yes, sir. 
23 THE COURT: In regards to the issue of Mr. 
24 Barber not making an opening statement. 
25 MR. BUGDEN: Thank you. 
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1 THE COURT: And I think I understand the 
2 testimony as it has come in on your issue as to the 
3 failure to introduce the Subscription Agreement. 
4 MR. BUGDEN: Yes. 
5 THE COURT: And your position is that that is 
6 all the evidence that we need and you are prepared now — 
7 I am not trying to put words in your mouth — but you are 
8 now prepared, we can go forward with the rest of this, 
9 for lack of a better way of phrasing it with my 
10 inadequacies, a normal procedure to argue the motion. 
11 MR. BUGDEN: I am ready. I have the spurs on 
12 my side. I am ready to roll. 
13 THE COURT: The spurs aren't in your side. I 
14 am in pain. All right now, Mr. Sonnenreich, are you 
15 satisfied at this point that I now have before me the 
16 evidence, if we want to call this evidence or whatever, 
17 all of the extrinsic materials I need now to make a 
18 decision on this case? 
19 MR. SONNENREICH: Your Honor, with the possible 
20 question of one thing, and that is that we have the 
21 preliminary hearing transcript in front of you. It is 
22 important that I can reference that transcript and 
23 reference the references in it to quote Exhibit D-l. 
24 Now, I can put on witnesses who can tell you 
25 exactly what D-l is. The transcript describes it 
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1 somewhat in its description of exhibits. It calls it a 
2 "Questionnaire Subscription Booklet." I can tell you 
3 what it was, but I do need to know that that issue has 
4 been resolved so you know what the transcript is talking 
5 about because our argument, of course, to give you the 
6 one-second version, is that Virl Thornton had already 
7 testified that he didn't see the pages in the 
8 Subscription Agreement that are the key pages. That is 
9 our reading of that transcript. 
10 THE COURT: Well, Mr. Bugden, I don't want in 
11 any way to impinge upon the procedural oars, substantive 
12 prerogatives of you as counsel for your client. On the 
13 other hand, it seems to me that what we are talking about 
14 insofar as this document, the saying is that the document 
15 we are talking about is really pretty much a housekeeping 
16 matter. 
17 MR. BUGDEN: I would agree. I totally agree. 
18 THE COURT: If you feel aggrieved with Mr. 
19 Sonnenreich by being able to — Well, if you are not 
20 willing to accept his statement as a person who was 
21 present at the time of the preliminary hearing in this 
22 matter, that that is what those records refer to, that is 
23 the document that those references refer to, then I would 
24 suggest we can go ahead today and hear argument for a 
25 somewhat limited period, and you can supplement the 
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1 identification of what that reference refers to by an 
2 affidavit of an independent party present at the trial 
3 who knows exactly what that is. I don't know who that 
4 is, but it has got to be a bunch of other people who were 
5 around at the time of the preliminary hearing. I said 
6 "trial." I didn't mean that. I meant the preliminary 
7 hearing. 
8 MR. SONNENREICH: Max Wheeler, for example, 
9 could identify the documents since he produced them. 
10 THE COURT: All right, whatever. And yet we 
11 could — And if you want to do that, we can listen to 
12 argument for a period of time today. And then if there 
13 is still a dispute about what that reference refers to, 
14 we can have that affidavit produced. If you are then not 
15 satisfied, I will make a ruling one way or the other. 
18 MR. BUGDEN: We can work it out. I am sure we 
17 can work it out. I am not willing to take his 
18 representation to you today without some discussion about 
19 it with him, which we haven't had a chance to do yet; but 
20 I am prepared to present argument and proceed. 
21 THE COURT: How much time do you need? 
22 MR. BUGDEN: Well, I think I probably need at 
23 least half an hour to 40 minutes. Half an hour at a 
24 minimum. 
25 THE COURT: I understand. I am not trying to 
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1 cut you short and, by the same token, I don't want to 
2 keep running you around the horn and bringing you back to 
3 here. 
4 MR. BUGDEN: We could at least, I would think, 
5 address the Strickland vs. Washington today. The 
6 evidence is fresh in your mind. We can talk about the 
7 standard. 
8 THE COURT: Can we do that in, say, 15 minutes 
9 on the side? 
10 MR. BUGDEN: I am sure I can. I will be less 
11 than that. 
12 THE COURT: All right then, what I want to do 
13 is this. . . (Court and counsel discussing a continuation 
14 date.) 
15 Let me make another statement here. I am just 
16 gradually, God, believe it is gradually — I don't know 
17 why it is, I can go out to Tooele and I get further and 
18 further behind here. Everybody else goes out to Tooele 
19 and they make time. I don't know how they do that, but I 
20 don't. I am just now catching up from my Tooele syndrome 
21 and I have not had the time to put into this file what I 
22 want to. I want to read both of these memos again. I 
23 went through them, but I have got to say that it was 
24 rather hurriedly. 
25 MR. BUGDEN: I know that you will find that it 
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1 is enthralling reading. 
2 THE COURT: I know I will. The trial was an 
3 enthralling trial. (Courtroom laughter.) The only thing 
4 I like about stocks is the fact they produce income, and 
5 mine don't. But I want to find some time when we can do 
6 this that will give you gentlemen enough time to be 
7 thoroughly satisfied that you have gotten over it in its 
8 entirety. And by the same token, I would like to be at 
9 that point thoroughly, word for word, conversant with 
10 your briefs which is going to take me probably four or 
11 five hours, three or four hours, to go through them and 
12 re-read and so on. I have the same kind of a problem the 
13 week following next week and the week following that. 
14 The judicial conference is being held the 21st through 
15 the 24th and I am taking three days of the following 
16 week. What about — Why don't we set this for — What 
17 about doing it on Friday, the 1st of May, at 2:00, and 
18 let's plan an hour to an hour and a half to the outside. 
19 Is that satisfactory, Mr. Sonnenreich? 
20 MR. SONNENREICH: Yes, it is. 
21 THE COURT: I will give you each a half hour 
22 right now on the — 
23 MR. BUGDEN: Ineffective. 
24 THE COURT: And then I will have that in mind 
25 when I read this thing this weekend, then you can come 
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1 back and give me a half hour each on the balance of your 
2 arguments. 
3 (Court and counsel discussing continuation of 
4 further court dates.) 
5 MR. BUGDEN: May 1 is great, if we could do it 
6 then at 2:00. 
7 THE COURT: I'll do it at 2:00 if that is when 
8 you want to do it. 
9 MR. SONNENREICH: That works for me. 
10 THE COURT: We will do that. We can do the 
11 whole thing that day. I'll give you the whole rest of 
12 the day until 7:00. 
13 MR. BUGDEN: Okay. 
14 THE COURT: Is that satisfactory? 
15 MR. BUGDEN: Great. 
16 MR. SONNENREICH: Your Honor, in order to speed 
17 things up, obviously with me copying opposing counsel, I 
18 would like to send you some supplemental briefing 
19 material mainly in the form of — indicating which pages 
20 of the preliminary hearing to look at with respect to 
21 these issues. 
22 THE COURT: I have no objection to that, but I 
23 don't want anymore argument. I don't want anything new. 
24 If you want to give me something that will help me get to 
25 where you want me to go in the record, I will do that. 
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1 Now, I don't mind that, a carbon copy of Mr. 
2 Bugden. Mr. Bugden, if you have references that you wish 
3 to bring to the Court's attention, you may do the same 
4 thing. I don't want more argument. I don't want 
5 anything new, but if you want to give me some references, 
6 you may do so. 
7 MR. SONNENREICH: I do have one significant 
8 after-discovery case which I just came upon the last day 
9 or two in Tenth Circuit, and I have a copy on that. Not 
10 with elaboration, but here is the case and one paragraph. 
11 THE COURT: Yeah. All right now, if we are 
12 going to do that, let's do the whole thing on that date 
13 rather than today, Mr. Bugden, is that all right? 
14 MR. BUGDEN: Sure. 
15 THE COURT: Because what I will do is we will 
16 come on at 2:00. If you guys need three hours, we will 
17 go right down the trial. I hope we don't. In the 
18 meantime, I will get through the briefs in their 
19 entirety. Don't worry about me not remembering the 
20 evidence. It is clear in my mind where we are and what 
21 we are talking about. 
22 MR. BUGDEN: Your Honor, may I verse the Court 
23 with — I have underlined those. Do you have a copy that 
24 is not underlined? 
25 MR. SONNENREICH: What is that? 
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1 MR. BUGDEN: The transcript of Mr. Harry when 
2 he was before you a month ago. 
3 MR. SONNENREICH: My copy is not underlined but 
4 I have written in it. It has yellow outlining. Mine, if 
5 I photocopy, I don't think it will show. I think I do 
6 mind. 
7 MR. BUGDEN: Could we submit that to you? 
8 THE COURT: Sure. 
9 MR. SONNENREICH: I can do that at the same 
10 time that I indicate the pages, which I will do by Monday 
11 or Tuesday, I believe. 
12 MR. BUGDEN: Your Honor, I would appreciate it 
13 if you would rule, and I think it is appropriate at this 
14 time for you to rule that Mr. Barber's affidavit, the one 
15 that the State wants to introduce, will not be received 
16 cause he has testified. 
17 MR. SONNENREICH: It was already withdrawn, 
18 Your Honor. 
19 THE COURT: Yeah. It wasn't offered. 
20 MR. BUGDEN: So you are clear when you sit down 
21 and look at this stuff, what I think you should have is a 
22 packet of exhibits that Kathy can — she had it in a 
23 separate packet from the earlier hearing, the March 
24 hearing where my client testified. Then we will include 
25 an affidavit from Mr. Barber that was received. 
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1 THE COURT: That is in the file. Kathy, dig 
2 that stuff out. 
3 THE CLERK: I had it and gave it to one of the 
4 attorneys earlier. 
5 THE COURT: Now, are these the documents you 
6 talk about? 
7 MR. BUGDEN: Yes, sir. 
8 THE COURT: Give them to Kathy and she will put 
9 them all together. I will have my homework on this case 
10 done by Monday afternoon of this coming week. 
11 MR. SONNENREICH: Your Honor, I believe that 
12 Mr. Barber has already waived his right to sentencing 
13 time and the timeframe for Mr. Harry. Could I get 
14 another waiver on the record? 
15 MR. BUGDEN: He will waive that. We want you 
16 to have a chance to look at the briefs. 
17 You have the right to be sentenced in a speedy 
18 fashion. Actually, the statute talks about between 2 and 
19 30 days after a jury verdict or a finding of guilt. Are 
20 you willing to waive your statutory right? 
21 MR. HARRY: Yes. 
22 THE COURT: You are? 
23 MR. HARRY: Yes. 
24 THE COURT: Okay. Now, if either counsel feel 
25 aggrieved about the Court's handling of this matter with 
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1 Mr. Brass's testimony or anything else, if you want to 
2 bring it to my attention by motion, you can do so. I 
3 didn't in any way mean to dis-accommodate anybody, nor to 
4 cut you off from any of your rights. I wanted to fully 
5 advise of the premises. So if there is something you 
6 think we haven't done that we ought to, or in any way 
7 where somebody's rights have been trampled upon, please 
8 let me know. I am trying to avoid those problems 
9 exactly. Is there anything further then? 
10 MR. BUGDEN: Nothing further from the 
11 defendant. 
12 MR. SONNENREICH: Nothing further, Your Honor. 
13 THE COURT: Well, that will be the procedure we 
14 will follow. If there is nothing to come before the 
15 Court this afternoon, we will be in recess. 
16 MR. BUGDEN: Thank you. 
17 MR. SONNENREICH: Thank you. 
1 Q ^ *f> ^ ^ ^ 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
PLAINTIFF 
VS 
HARRY, RONALD ALAN 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 901901580 FS 
DATE 04/10/92 
HONORABLE RICHARD H MOFFAT 
COURT REPORTER OROTHY TRIPP 
COURT CLERK KBG 
TYPE OF HEARING: HEARING 
PRESENT: DEFENDANT 
P. ATTY. SONNEREICH, DAVID 
D. ATTY. BUGDEN, WALTER F. 
THIS CASE COMES NOW BEFORE THE COURT FOR A FURTHER HEARING 
ON THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR ARRESET OF JUDGMENT, OR IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL. 
ED BRASS IS SWORN AND EXAMINED IN BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANT. 
BASED UPON DISCUSSIONS, FURTHER HEARING OF THIS MOTION IS 
CONTINUED TO MAY 1, 1992 AT 2:00 PM. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : MINUTE ENTRY 
Plaintiff, z Case No. 901901580 FS 
vs. : JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT 
RONALD ALAN HARRY, : 
Defendant. : 
The Court having considered the Motion for New Trial or in 
the Alternative, Motion in Arrest of Judgment, all of the 
pleadings on file in regard thereto and having heard oral 
argument in two separate hearings and now being fully advised in 
the premises makes this its: 
MINUTE ENTRY 
The Motion for New Trial and the Motion in Arrest of 
Judgment are both denied. The Court is of the opinion that the 
six points raised by the defendant are without merit. Point one 
is that the Court should not have allowed the State's expert 
witness to express an opinion as to what constitutes 
materialality in a securities fraud case. The brief answer as 
n-nn^E-J 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATE V. HARRY PAGE 2 MINUTE ENTRY 
to all of the issues raised by the defendant is that they have 
been met and the Court's opinion is based upon, inter alia, the 
arguments contained within the State's Memorandum in Opposition 
to the Motion for New Trial or Arrest of Judgment. 
However, specifically the first argument is met by the 
recent Utah case State v. Larsen, found at 180 Utah Advance 
Reporter 13 decided February 7, 1992. This issue was 
specifically decided in favor of allowing the expert testimony 
and in fact the expert involved in that case immediately 
preceded the expert in this case as the Director of Registration 
for the Securities Division of the State of Utah. 
Point two is also answered by the Larson case in that the 
distinction between "willfulness" and "specific intent to 
defraud" was discussed and the case held that willfulness was 
the proper standard under the Utah Securities Act. The 
defendant's point three claims that good faith is a complete 
defense to prosecution under Utah Code Annotated Section 61-1-1 
(1), (2), (3) and 61-1-2-1. Again because of the holding in 
Larson a complete discussion of which will found in the State's 
Reply Memorandum, the Court is of the opinion that under the 
circumstances herein the instruction given was completely 
adequate. 
Point four is a claim by the defendant that his trial 
counsel was ineffective in assisting him. This claim raises a 
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STATE V. HARRY PAGE 3 MINUTE ENTRY 
great deal of concern on the part of the Court because it has 
become fashionable as a defense tactic to throw the original 
trial counsel in criminal cases to the wolves on the platter of 
ineffective assistance of Counsel giving little or no credence 
to the circumstances of the trial. The trial court supervised 
the proceedings in this case and is of the opinion that there 
was no ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court does not 
believe that trial counsel's performance fell below an objection 
standard of reasonableness. The Court certainly does not feel 
that the failure to make an opening statement in any way reduces 
effectiveness of counsel. That is often done and in the facts 
before the Court in this case is impossible to determine that 
failure to make an opening statement would have altered the 
outcome of this case in any way whatsoever. The question of 
introduction of the subscription booklet to the Red River 
Mountain Project appears to the Court to be much more a tactical 
decision than it does to be ineffective assistance of counsel. 
There is certainly no evidence here that would tend to show that 
introducing the booklet would have altered the outcome of this 
case. As a matter of fact there was no way of knowing what the 
testimony might have been by Mr. Thornton if the document had 
not been used but there is some substantial reason to believe 
that his testimony could have been damaging to the defense. 
As to points five and six the Court is of the opinion that 
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Count 4 and Counts 2 and 3 were properly pled and the Court so 
ruled on motion during trial. As a matter fact as is noted in 
the opposition memorandum Judge Fuchs at a preliminary hearing 
on this matter ruled that Counts 2 and 3 were sufficiently pled 
and there has been no new argument or evidence in support of the 
defendant's position raised at any time. 
Counsel for the Sta^e will prepare an appropriate order. 
DATED this ^ ^ day of May, 1992^-
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